“[AMERICA] MAY BE CONQUERED WITH MORE EASE THAN GOVERNED”: THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH OCCUPATION POLICY DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION John D. Roche A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History. Chapel Hill 2015 Approved by: Wayne E. Lee Kathleen DuVal Joseph T. Glatthaar Richard H. Kohn Jay M. Smith ©2015 John D. Roche ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT John D. Roche: “[America] may be conquered with more Ease than governed”: The Evolution of British Occupation Policy during the American Revolution (Under the Direction of Wayne E. Lee) The Military Enlightenment had a profound influence upon the British army’s strategic culture regarding military occupation policy. The pan-European military treatises most popular with British officers during the eighteenth century encouraged them to use a carrot-and-stick approach when governing conquered or rebellious populations. To implement this policy European armies created the position of commandant. The treatises also transmitted a spectrum of violence to the British officers for understanding civil discord. The spectrum ran from simple riot, to insurrection, followed by rebellion, and culminated in civil war. Out of legal concerns and their own notions of honor, British officers refused to employ military force on their own initiative against British subjects until the mob crossed the threshold into open rebellion. However, once the people rebelled the British army sought decisive battle, unhindered by legal interference, to rapidly crush the rebellion. The British army’s bifurcated strategic culture for suppressing civil violence, coupled with its practical experiences from the Jacobite Rebellion of 1715 to the Regulator Movement in 1771, inculcated an overwhelming preference for martial law during military campaigns. The British army’s beliefs about occupation policy changed slowly during the American Revolution. General Thomas Gage initially hoped a military show of force would awe the American colonists into submission. This approach failed in Boston between 1768 and 1770 due to legal restraints. The creation of a garrison government by appointing Gage iii as the governor-general in 1774 only prompted escalation, ultimately resulting in both civil war and martial law in June 1775. When the British captured New York City in 1776 they did not reconstitute civil government because of their belief in imminent victory. However, by 1777 Sir William Howe realized that Commandant James Robertson could not administer the entire city on his own and implemented hybrid civil-military organizations such as the Court of Police and the Superintendent of Imports and Exports to enhance order. The British replicated these bureaucracies in every other city they occupied. By 1779, Commandant James Pattison and Superintendent Andrew Elliot sought to use effective governance as a war-winning weapon in the battle for the colonists’ hearts and minds. iv To my wonderful family: Daddy’s big book report is finally done! v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS A project of this magnitude inevitably requires the mentorship, patronage, and support of numerous people and institutions. First and foremost I would like to thank my advisor, Wayne Lee, for his indispensable guidance and assistance. I would also like to thank the rest of my committee members - Kathleen DuVal, Joseph Glatthaar, Richard Kohn, and Jay Smith – who in conjunction with my advisor showed me what it means to be a professional historian and equipped me with the skills necessary to perform at this level of scholarship. One of the greatest challenges of the historical discipline is having the time and financial support required to conduct the necessary archival research to make an original contribution to the field. Without a doubt, I owe Colonel Mark K. Wells of the United States Air Force Academy’s Department of History a tremendous debt of gratitude for sponsoring my Ph.D. Considering that the Air Force made me a fulltime student for three years and that it still took me six and a half years to complete my degree it is inconceivable that I could have done this on my own while serving on active duty any other way. I am also extremely grateful to the David Library of the American Revolution for their fellowship sponsorship. Not only is the David an incredible one-stop-shop for microfilmed archival material from around the globe relating to the American Revolutionary period, but their dedicated and knowledgeable staff – especially Meg McSweeney and Katherine Ludwig – made my two months of research there astoundingly productive and delightful as we vi The historical community at large also played a significant role in flushing out my ideas by permitting me to present early drafts of my chapters at various conferences. The Society for Military History gave me an opportunity to present at its 79th annual conference. Holly Mayer provided insightful remarks as my commentator, and Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy shared his manuscript on British officers during the American Revolution with me. In October of 2012 the Urban History Association included me in its sixth biennial conference during which Barnet Schecter, Rohit Aggarwala, and Benjamin Carp all provided invaluable feedback as well as additional avenues to explore for my research. Due to the special relationship between the history departments at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill and King’s College London (KCL) I had the opportunity to present at KCL. Not only was I honored to have David Bell comment on my conference paper, but the trip to London enabled me to spend two weeks conducting research in the National Archives at Kew. I would like to thank Emily Merrill for including me on an all- graduate-student panel during the 2014 Organization of American Historians annual conference. Caroline Cox and Jessica Choppin Roney’s feedback on my paper was particularly helpful for bridging the intellectual frameworks with the practical activities of the British when dealing with civil violence. Last, but not least, I was privileged to have Jack Greene comment on my chapter dealing with the transition to martial law in Boston during the Agora Institute’s October 2015 conference examining whether or not the American Revolution was a just war. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………..ix Chapter 1: “Harmony between the Gown and the Sword”: The Evolution of Military Commandants and Occupation Policy, 1647 – 1777 …………………………………………1 Chapter 2: British Officers’ Perspectives of Proper Military Force along the Spectrum of Violence ……...………………………………………………………………..48 Chapter 3: The British Army’s Prerevolutionary Responses to Civilian Violence …………70 Chapter 4: “Whether we are or are not a proper garrison town”: The Occupation of Boston, 1768 – 1770……………………………………………………………………..120 Chapter 5: “No Law can be in force where there is a civil War”: The British Army’s Governance of Boston, 1774-1776 ………………………………………………………...154 Chapter 6: “From the success that had attended the British army, very beneficial consequences were expected to result”: The New York Campaign, 1776 – 1777 ………...185 Chapter 7: “And it is most devoutly to be wished that the Continent may follow the Example of this City”: The Evolution of British Occupation Policy in New York City, 1777 – 1780 ..........................................................................................................................219 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………………252 Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………..261 viii Introduction This study examines the influence of the Military Enlightenment upon the British army’s strategic culture during the eighteenth century regarding the proper response to civil disturbances and the governance of populations living within occupied cities.1 It does this in two ways. First, it examines the pan-European intellectual currents transmitted by the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century military treatises most popular with British officers by building upon Ira Gruber’s study of the books officers owned and read.2 Second, it analyzes the British army’s experiences with suppressing rebellions between 1715 and 1780. These intellectual and practical influences shaped the army’s responses towards the American colonists during the American Revolution.3 This study is also heavily indebted to John Lynn’s cultural model of warfare which Lawrence Freedman succinctly summarized as “an 1John A. Lynn, Battle : A History of Combat and Culture (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2003), xix-xxi, 125- 127, 359-369; Wayne E. Lee, "Warfare and Culture," in Warfare and Culture in World History, ed. Wayne E. Lee (New York: New York University Press, 2011), 1-12. Lee defines cultures as “’habitual practices, default programs, hidden assumptions and unreflected cognitive frames’ that inform their [any group of humans living or working together over time] choices, or indeed they will have created ‘a repertoire or ‘tool kit’ of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct ‘strategies of action.’ Crucially, if the community persists, it will then transmit that repertoire to the next generation ‘through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission.’ Finally, such transmission occurs not merely through words but also through symbols and actions.” Lee also identifies five overlapping types of culture related to military organizations: societal (subset of parent