1 Revanchist Russia? Russian Perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian Sovereignty, 1990-2008 Rasmus Nilsson UCL For the degree of PhD 2 I, Rasmus Nilsson, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 3 Abstract The theme of this thesis concerns post-Soviet Russian foreign policy perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty between 1990 and 2008. In the thesis I argue that Russian perceptions became increasingly revanchist in nature during this period, and that we may distinguish between two different types of revanchism, the consequences of which for Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty are quite different. I argue that all Russian perceptions of international affairs are constituted by perceptions of Russia. Thus, perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty may be divided into three categories, or paradigms, each of which centres on a specific concept that legitimises the existence of Russia, and determines how Belarus and Ukraine are viewed. The three central concepts are the concepts of Law, Power, and Nation, respectively. In the introduction, I outline these paradigms, both in abstract terms and in relation to Russian foreign policy in general, as well as Russian foreign policy towards Belarus and Ukraine. Subsequently, I present my methodology and my literature review, together with a discussion of the theoretical assumptions, which provide the foundation for my argument. Then, I briefly outline Russian foreign policy making during the period relevant for my thesis, before the four main chapters of my thesis outline in roughly chronological fashion how the relative significance of the three paradigms has changed over time. Overall, I find that whereas the paradigm of Power has generally dominated perceptions, the paradigm of Law has gradually lost influence, whereas the influence of the paradigm of Nation has gradually increased. Since I define both the paradigm of Power and the paradigm of Nation as “revanchist,” I conclude that Russian perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty between 1990 and 2008 gradually became more revanchist in nature. 4 Contents Abstract 3 Table of contents 4 Abbreviations 5 Transliteration 6 Acknowledgements 7 Chapter 1: Introduction 8 Chapter 2: Theory: assumptions of the argument 48 Chapter 3: Russian foreign policy making, 1990-2008 63 Chapter 4: Imagining sovereignty (1990-1993) 84 Chapter 5: Constructing sovereignty (1993-1999) 135 Chapter 6: Consolidating sovereignty (2000-2004) 207 Chapter 7: Strengthening sovereignty (2004-2008) 270 Chapter 8: Conclusion: revanchist Russia 330 Bibliography 352 5 Abbreviations BSSR: Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic CRA: Council for Religious Affairs of the Soviet Union CSCE: Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States CSTO: Collective Security Treaty Organisation FDI: Foreign direct investment GDP: Gross domestic product KGB: Committee for State Security of the Soviet Union LDPR: Liberal Democratic Party of Russia NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation OSCE: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe RSFSR: Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation SES: Single Economic Space START: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty UkSSR: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic UN: United Nations USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics VAT: Value added tax WTO: World Trade Organisation 6 Transliteration In this thesis, transliteration from Russian follows the United States Library of Congress System. All Russian words, including names of persons and places have been transliterated following this system, apart from the cases where anglicised spelling has become the academic norm; for instance, I write “Moscow” instead of “Moskva.” Names of Belarusian persons and places have mostly, but not exclusively been presented in their Russian forms, since Russian is one of the official languages in Belarus. Names of Ukrainian persons and places, on the contrary, have been presented in their Ukrainian forms, since only Ukrainian is official language in Ukraine. For reasons similar to those described above, a few cases of anglicised spelling have been preserved. 7 Acknowledgements Over the course of writing this thesis I have acquired a number of significant debts. First and foremost, I would like to thank the supervisor of my work, Dr Peter Duncan. Apart from the instances when he has directly contributed to the contents of my thesis, instances far too numerous to mention, he has provided invaluable moral support throughout. Furthermore, I would like to thank Dr Felix Ciută for his always thought-provoking comments and critique, constantly challenging any incomplete assumptions I might have. In addition to these two scholars, a large number of colleagues and friends have assisted my research. I would especially like to thank my examiners Professor Margot Light and Dr Bobo Lo for their highly useful suggestions that helped improve the quality of the thesis throughout, together with the reviewers of Political Perspectives, published by the University of Manchester, who provided me with useful feedback on my analysis of Russian perceptions during the early 1990s. Marta Jenkala should be singled out, as she enabled me to come to terms with Ukrainian language and on several occasions pointed me in the direction of very interesting Ukrainian sources. Dr Susan Morrissey was instrumental in correcting initial inconsistencies in the argument of the thesis, while Sven Kerpen, Dr Katja Richters, Professor Alena Ledeneva and Dr Richard Mole all provided highly valuable input, too. I would like to thank the Danish Embassy in Moscow, and particularly Thomas Richter, Søren Liborius and Sergei Danilin, for practical assistance in connection with my research visit there. Finally, special thanks goes to my family, my mother Elsebeth and my wife Ivelina whose moral support ensured that I continued my research even when this was most frustrating. Of course, any errors or omissions in this thesis are the responsibility of the author alone. 8 Chapter 1: Introduction Argument In this thesis, I argue that Russian perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty between 1990 and 2008 were significantly influenced by what I term “revanchism.” Below, I shall elaborate my argument, outlining how I demonstrate that revanchism has or has not been present in specific issues. First, though, I must define “Russians,” and “Belarusians” and “Ukrainians,” for that matter. In short, I define actors according to their self-definition. Thus, if an actor implicitly or explicitly defines him- or herself as “Russian” in a given text (whether by using rossiiskii, russkii or some other label) he or she is Russian for my purposes. In themselves, ethnicities or citizenships are therefore not relevant here; thus, if an individual in Ukraine without Ukrainian citizenship defines himself as Ukrainian he is Ukrainian for my purposes. Two caveats are in order, though: first, actors’ self-definitions might change over time and within different issues; second, if the above-mentioned self- defined Ukrainian is viewed as Russian by others I cannot ignore their perceptions in favour of his choice. Ultimately, therefore, my analysis seeks to be highly alert to the constitutive development of actors’ self-definitions within a social context. With this in mind, I argue that Russian perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty between 1990 and 2008 were increasingly marked by revanchism. Russian perceptions may be divided into three categories, or paradigms, all constituted by perceptions of Russian sovereignty. Each of these paradigms centres on a specific concept, respectively Law, Power, and Nation. Within each of these paradigms a specific worldview of Russia, of Belarus and Ukraine, and of the international system at large exists. The claim that Russian 9 perceptions were revanchist implies that they were mostly influenced by the paradigms of Power, that the paradigm of Law had increasingly less ability to challenge the paradigm of Power, and that the paradigm of Nation was increasingly able to do so. Since both the paradigms of Power and of Nation were revanchist in nature Russian perceptions overall became increasingly revanchist. However, by distinguishing between the paradigms of Power and Nation, I argue that two quite different types of revanchism existed, an observation that existing scholarship, in my opinion, has not acknowledged. I shall now summarise the three paradigms. For each paradigm I shall begin by highlighting its internal logic in abstract terms. Then, I shall relate the paradigm to Russian foreign policy in general, presenting my assumptions of how Russian foreign policy would be conducted if the given paradigm was dominant. Finally, I shall show how Russian foreign policy towards Belarus and Ukraine would be conducted if the given paradigm dominated foreign policy thinking. Subsequently, in the main parts of my thesis I shall analyse developments in Russian foreign policy towards Belarus and Ukraine, evaluating to what extent each paradigm held significance at given times and within given issues. Paradigm of Law: assumptions As in the other two paradigms, perceptions of Belarusian and Ukrainian sovereignty in the paradigm of Law are constituted by perceptions of Russian sovereignty, of what “Russia” really is. The paradigm of Law equates “Russia” with the