Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report: Special Issue Mar 2000 INTRODUCTION 1. OVERVIEW - POLITICAL, SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT Gaining Humanitarian Access: A continuing Challenge The DDR Factor The UNAMSIL Factor 2. THE PEACE PROCESS- Is time running out? - A humanitarian perspective 3. CRITICAL AREAS OF NEED Rehabilitation of water and sanitation facilities Rehabilitation and support to the health sector Rehabilitation of Educational infrastructure and provision of learning materials Agricultural support in the northern and eastern regions, particularly Tonkolili and Bombali districts Close monitoring of food security situation especially in rural areas Reinforcement of bridges and arterial routes prior to rains Close monitoring of refugee and IDP returnees Increase support to the DDR Process to facilitate access. 4. BUILDING BLOCKS - A case for continued constructive engagement A vibrant civil society A more dynamic GOSL leadership in coordination of assistance programmes The DDR Programme - A more integrated system International/Regional Support - Sustained interest 5. MOVING TOWARDS A COMMON VISION - The way forward 6. SECTORAL HIGHLIGHTS - February 2000 100 Days of Disarmament and Demobilization Resettlement and Reintegration Agriculture Health and Nutrition Refugees - UNHCR monitors spontaneous Returns Logistics Water and Sanitation Child Protection Food Aid Education Socio-economic Trends in IDP Movements Human Rights Annex 1. One Hundred Days of Disarmament - Progress Made Annex 2. Humanitarian Profile of Currently Unstable Areas Annex 3. Map Republic of Sierra Leone District Annex 4. Status of Response to War-Wounded and Amputees Introduction This review period marks the seventh month of the Lome Peace Agreement, which was signed on 7 July 1999. While some progress has been made towards the implementation of the Accord, there is every indication that the process is troubled. Security has improved in some parts, but the overall situation in the country remains tense and volatile. Achieving unhindered humanitarian access, one of the first major agreements signed by the parties to the conflict in Lome on 3 June 1999, has proved difficult. Despite the establishment of a Government of National Unity, former RUF/AFRC fighters continue to lay claim to large areas of the country, obstructing free movement. This makes it extremely difficult for agencies to gain a longer-term perspective on assistance programmes. This special issue examines the current humanitarian situation and the external and internal factors affecting the implementation of humanitarian programmes countrywide. 1. OVERVIEW - POLITICAL, SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT Gaining Humanitarian Access: A continuing challenge The Lome Peace Agreement cracked the doors open to previously inaccessible parts of the country, but only wide enough to allow for needs-assessment and limited relief intervention. At this time, humanitarian agencies still do not have unhindered and safe access to seven out of 12 districts (Bombali, Tonkolili, Kambia, Kono, Kailahun, Koinadugu and Port Loko), which make up 80 of the country’s 149 chiefdoms, with a total population of 2.4 million according to 1997 projections. Current operations in these areas are carried out under very difficult circumstances, characterised by frequent disruptions and uncertainty. This hinders appropriate programming and effective and sustained engagement in support of the most needy. Furthermore, interventions are mainly limited to emergency relief, while assistance programmes aimed at rehabilitation and reconstruction of devastated communities await more favourable conditions. Humanitarian Profiles of Currently Unstable Areas (attached) highlights present conditions. In sharp contrast to the grim picture in the north, the southern province, the Western Area and some parts of the eastern province continue to enjoy relatively good conditions of safety and security. Local administration such as the Police and traditional chiefs are also in place in some of these areas supporting the maintenance of law and order. As a result, these areas are benefiting from programmes of reconstruction and rehabilitation in such sectors as agriculture, education, road rehabilitation and restoration of health facilities. It must however be noted that as long as insecurity persists in the northern and eastern parts, the whole country remains vulnerable, particularly places like Kenema with close proximity to Kailahun district. The DDR Factor: Formally launched on 4 November 1999, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programme is perhaps one of the most important benchmarks for the consolidation of peace in Sierra Leone. After a difficult start, the Programme is finally gaining momentum, but continues to be bogged down by a troubled political process. According to the Peace Agreement, Disarmament and Demobilization should have been completed by 15 December 1999. While there is an overall upward trend, (see chart on current DDR trend), the process has been slow, with just over 12,000 of the estimated 45,000 combatants enrolled in the Programme during the first 100 days. The Ministry of Defence disarmed 3,804 loyal SLA, while another 1,414 who were discharged in July 1999 are now undergoing the reintegration Programme. All told, just over 17,000 of the 45,000 have been accounted for with regard to disarmament. Furthermore, less than 5,000 of those who disarmed have actually undergone demobilization, as many of them, in particular, the ex-SLA, have refused to demobilize, in anticipation of a chance to re-enter the Army. The result is over-crowding in the camps, a more cumbersome working environment for DDR personnel and further delays in moving the process forward. Perceptions on factors contributing to the slow pace of the Programme vary. In addition to slow progress in the political process, the DDR Programme is clearly bogged down by fear, suspicion and mistrust, with each group waiting for the other to disarm first. This is most evident between the RUF and the CDF, which are both disarming at a close rate of 23% and 22% respectively. (see bar chart for proportional representation by group). The leaders of the combatants all claim unflinching commitment to the process, while at the same time justifying reluctant participation. For NCDDR Executive Secretary, a factor in the slow pace is the lack of security, especially in the north and east of the country, which has prevented the institution from setting up centers there. With over 7,000 men of the approved 11,100 military personnel on the ground, UNAMSIL has successfully deployed forces in Makeni, Port Loko, Lungi, Daru and Kenema. But there has been little or no progress in disarmament in the northern and eastern parts of the country, the exception being Port Loko District. The Daru centre is currently functioning below capacity, with less than 100 people, most of who are ex-SLA wishing to be considered for the new Army. Neither the RUF nor the CDF combatants are showing up at the center. In Makeni, the programme is yet to commence, as DDR officials were unable to secure existing facilities for encampment of the ex-combatants. The NCDDR has identified two sites in the area, but construction, scheduled to begin in March, will take 4-6 weeks. Additionally, DDR officials believe that the unresolved issue of who would be able to join the new Sierra Leone Army has contributed to slowing down the process. Over 900 of the 1300 ex-combatants currently residing at the Lungi center are ex-SLAs who have refused to demobilize. Some of them have been in the centers for more than three months. Similarly, another 700 ex-SLAs continue to occupy much needed space at the Port Loko DDR camps. The situation in the northern town of Kabala is equally worrying. Agencies have repeatedly reported attacks on civilian populations and aid workers by ex-SLA soldiers in the town who are either waiting to be enrolled in the DDR programme or to be reintegrated into the new Army. Kabala is not one of the designated locations for setting up DDR centres. While UNAMSIL undertook some ‘mobile’ disarmament, there remains a large number of the combatants in and around the town, extorting money and attacking civilians. The latest victims of these attacks are currently being treated at the Kabala hospital. Aid agencies in the area have noted that a continuation of the situation will inevitably lead to the suspension of much need programmes. For instance, a measles outbreak has been reported in the district and a vaccination campaign should begin immediately, but this will be difficult under the current conditions. It is hoped that this problem will be resolved when the Government adopts a policy on Military Reintegration. In the interim, Defence Headquarters has issued a press release stating that it has completed plans to move all ex- SLA soldiers to designated bush camps where they will be disarmed and catered for in accordance with the Lome Peace Agreement. At the time of release, nearly 1,000 of the solders had already been moved to a bush camp at Matene (approximately 8 km NE of Masiaka). This activity is aimed at screening and sensitization training for those ex-SLA soldiers who wish to join the new SLA and who are not currently in the DDR programme. Those who do not qualify for the new Army will be absorbed in the DDR Programme. The UNAMSIL Factor An important milestone was reached in November when the UN Security Council established a Peacekeeping Force for Sierra Leone. In a further move to support the country’s fragile peace, the Council voted for an expansion from 6,000 military personnel to 11,100 in February. This move has raised hopes that a precarious security situation will finally be stabilized, facilitating DDR and enabling humanitarian and development agencies to meaningfully assist needy populations. The first gain was reaped in February, when the successful deployment of UNAMSIL troops in the northern provincial capital of Makeni paved the way for agencies to undertake a comprehensive multi-sectoral assessment of needs in the area.