C O R P O R A T I O N MIRANDA PRIEBE, ANGELA O’MAHONY, BRYAN FREDERICK, ALYSSA DEMUS, BONNY LIN, MICHELLE GRISÉ, DEREK EATON, ABBY DOLL Operational Unpredictability and Deterrence Evaluating Options for Complicating Adversary Decisionmaking For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA448-1. About RAND The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. To learn more about RAND, visit www.rand.org. Research Integrity Our mission to help improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis is enabled through our core values of quality and objectivity and our unwavering commitment to the highest level of integrity and ethical behavior. 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ISBN: 978-1-9774-0616-3 Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. Preface This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled Deter- rence and Operational Unpredictability, sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army. The purpose of the project was to assess whether and how the Army might utilize unpredictability in force employment, posture, and operations to deter adversar- ies and identify the possible risks of such approaches. This research was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) sponsored by the United States Army. RAND operates under a “Federal-Wide Assurance” (FWA00003425) and complies with the Code of Federal Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects Under United States Law (45 CFR 46), also known as “the Common Rule,” as well as with the implementation guidance set forth in DoD Instruction 3216.02. As applicable, this compliance includes reviews and approvals by RAND’s Institutional Review Board (the Human Subjects Protection Commit- tee) and by the U.S. Army. The views of sources utilized in this study are solely their own and do not represent the official policy or position of DoD or the U.S. Government. iii Executive Summary The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy instructed the U.S. military to become more operationally unpredictable and suggested that doing so would help the United States deter attacks on U.S. partners. In this report, we propose a definition of U.S. operational unpredictability—adversary uncertainty about how the United States would fight—and develop four potential approaches for increasing U.S. operational unpredictability and deter- ring attacks on U.S. allies and partners. We also examine two Cold War era cases in which the United States sought to be more operationally unpredictable and assess how the four approaches could affect U.S. relations with Russia and China. We find that increasing adversaries’ perceptions of U.S. operational unpredictability may be possible if the United States has detailed information about their operational analysis and decisionmaking processes. The most promising approach appears to be increasing adversary uncertainty about the most likely U.S. course of action, often through the development of new capabilities. However, increasing U.S. operational unpredictability may be costly and, in some cases, involve negative side effects (e.g., reducing U.S. military effectiveness and increasing China’s and Russia’s threat perceptions). We recommend weighing the potential cost and effec- tiveness of these approaches against more traditional approaches to deterring U.S. adversaries. v Contents Preface ........................................................................................................... iii Executive Summary ............................................................................................ v Figures and Tables ............................................................................................. ix Summary ........................................................................................................ xi Acknowledgments ............................................................................................xiii Abbreviations ...................................................................................................xv CHAPTER ONE Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 Scope ............................................................................................................... 2 Report Organization ............................................................................................. 3 CHAPTER TWO Key Concepts and Methodology for Generating Options for Enhancing U.S. Operational Unpredictability ........................................................................................... 5 Steady-State Changes in U.S. Capabilities and Activities ................................................... 5 Operational Unpredictability ................................................................................... 6 Extended Deterrence ............................................................................................ 7 Generating and Evaluating Approaches to Enhancing U.S. Operational Unpredictability and Ability to Deter Attacks on U.S. Allies ..................................................................10 CHAPTER THREE Approach 1: Create Irregular Deployment Patterns ....................................................13 Changes to U.S. Capabilities and Activities .................................................................14 Potential Effects on U.S. Operational Unpredictability ....................................................14 How This Approach Could Help to Deter Attacks on U.S. Allies ........................................15 Costs and Risks .................................................................................................15 Could This Approach Help to Deter Russia from Attacking a U.S. Ally? ...............................16 Could This Approach Help to Deter China from Attacking a U.S. Ally or Partner? ................. 20 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 23 CHAPTER FOUR Approach 2: Reveal or Demonstrate New Capabilities .................................................25 Changes to U.S. Capabilities and Activities ................................................................ 26 Potential Effects on U.S. Operational Unpredictability ................................................... 27 How This Approach Could Help to Deter Attacks on U.S. Allies ....................................... 30 vii viii Operational Unpredictability and Deterrence: Evaluating Options for Complicating Adversary Decisionmaking Costs and Risks .................................................................................................31 Could This Approach Help to Deter Russia from Attacking a U.S. Ally? ...............................32 Could This Approach Help to Deter China from Attacking a U.S. Ally or Partner? ..................39 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 44 CHAPTER FIVE Approach 3: Bluff About U.S. Ability to Conduct Multiple COAs ...................................45 Changes to U.S. Capabilities and Activities ................................................................ 46 Potential Effects on U.S. Operational Unpredictability and Deterrence .................................47 Costs and Risks .................................................................................................47 Could This Approach Help to Deter Russia from Attacking a U.S. Ally? .............................. 48 Could This Approach Help to Deter China from Attacking a U.S. Ally or Partner? ..................49 Conclusion .......................................................................................................49