An Analysis of Qualitative Feel as the Introspectible Subjective Aspect of a Space of Reasons Michael James Stuart Beaton Submitted for examination in the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Sussex, April, 2009 Declaration I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be submitted, in whole or in part, to this or any other University for the award of any other degree. Signature: ................................................ An Analysis of Qualitative Feel as the Introspectible Subjective Aspect of a Space of Reasons Michael James Stuart Beaton Summary This thesis presents an analysis of qualitative feel (‘qualia’), based on a Sellarsian ‘space of reasons’ account of the mental. The first non-introductory chapter, Chapter 2, argues against an over-strong phenomenal realism (the claim that inverted spectra, zombies, etc., are at least conceptually possible), and against the modern phenomenal concept defence of such claims. Nevertheless, it is agreed with the proponents of these views that we must allow for introspective knowledge of our qualia, if we are to take qualia seriously at all. It is therefore proposed that we allow our search for qualia to be guided by some independently plausible theory of introspection. In Chapter 3, Shoemaker’s account of introspection is presented, extended in certain respects, and defended against some current objections. Chapter 4 is used to argue that Shoemaker’s current account of qualia can only be made compatible with his account of introspection by paying certain very high costs (which Shoemaker is aware of, but seems willing to pay). However, it is also argued that Shoemaker’s account of qualia has some attractive features, which can be preserved. In Chapter 5 a novel analysis of qualia is presented, as non-intrinsic (i.e. relational), introspectible aspects of mind, fully capturable at the level of a ‘space of reasons’ analysis of an agent. A detailed analysis is given, for the cases of colour qualia and of pains. The aforementioned, attractive features of Shoemaker’s account are adapted, in order to address some of the complexities of the different ways in which we can think about such qualitative properties. In Chapter 6, it is argued that this account of qualia has the potential to explain plausibly many of our problematic intuitions concerning qualia including: their ineffability; our ability to know them infallibly and incorrigibly; and (though only in weak senses) their intrinsicness and privacy. Submitted for examination in the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Sussex, April, 2009 i Acknowledgements Acknowledgements I would like to thank my two supervisors, Steve Torrance and Ron Chrisley, for their encouragement and support. I would also like to thank Steve for deciding to take a chance on me as I returned to academia after an extended break. Amongst my fellow graduate students over the years at Sussex, I would like to thank the following for many discussions and for invaluable feedback on written work: Tom Beament, Rob Clowes, Chris Davia, Chrisantha Fernando, Tom Froese, Hanne De Jaegher, Miriam Kyselo, Rowan Lovett, Marek McGann, Simon McGregor, Tony Morse, Will Newhouse, Joel Parthemore, Alexandra Penn, Marieke Rohde, Nathaniel Virgo and Alexandros Zographakis. Thanks, too, to all the other members of the various research, reading and discussion groups at Sussex who have given feedback and generally created a friendly and intellectually stimulating research environment, including all the members of PAICS, E-Intentionality, CogPhi, CCNR, Life and Mind and PAC Lab. I owe Inman Harvey here at Sussex more than, I think, he realizes. I am deeply indebted to him for some two or three years of patient conversation, during which he successfully convinced me that there was something fundamentally wrong with the representationalist assumptions underpinning most theorizing in cognitive science; and – though I hesitate to mention this – he also made sure that I realized that I needed to be much more careful in my thinking, as I moved between mind talk and brain talk. This would not have been the thesis it is, without his input. I would like to thank Lucy Allais for running the graduate philosophy class which introduced me to McDowell. Many established academics from other Universities have been extremely generous with their time, at one point or another, in allowing me to work through details of their ideas (or mine!) by email, or during face to face conversation, including: Torin Alter, Uzi Awret, Ned Block, Patricia Churchland, Daniel Dennett, Marco Giunti, Germund Hesslow, Nicholas Humphrey, Dan Lloyd, Thomas Metzinger, Alva Noë, Chris Nunn, Kevin O’Regan and David Rosenthal. ii Acknowledgements My thanks to David Chalmers for deciding that there was something worth saying in the first version of my RoboDennett paper (but also for helping me to understand how much needed doing to turn it into a publishable paper). I would especially like to thank Romi Nijhawan and Beena Khurana for providing an extremely constructive and supportive atmosphere, within their research group, into which I was welcomed as I explored psychophysics for a period of around a year, during the course of my DPhil research. (Romi, we will get that red-green flash-lag data written up as a journal paper, now that I have submitted!) My thanks to Zoltan Dienes for also providing help and guidance in this area. Very grateful thanks to my sister, Caroline, for several instances of specific and invaluable support, as I tried to work out how to manage my time and move forward with this research; and, for that matter, for helpful tips on public speaking! This work was financially supported (during the second and third of the three full- time years allocated for DPhil research) by a Graduate Teaching Assistantship awarded by the former School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences (COGS) at the University of Sussex. COGS (formerly) and Informatics (latterly) have also been generous in provision of funding to attend various academic conferences over the years. The James S. McDonnell Foundation and the European Science Foundation were kind enough to provide funding to attend two separate but equally invaluable Summer Schools, each of which brought together early-career and established researchers from philosophy and neuroscience. iii Preface Preface The bulk of Chapter 2 (specifically, Section 2.2) is in press elsewhere (Beaton, in press). A large portion of Chapter 6 (Section 6.4) is already in print (Beaton, 2005). These papers were produced as an integral part of the present thesis research. Copyright in these papers has been assigned to the publishers of the Journal of Consciousness Studies , and they are included herein with permission for non-commercial distribution only. iv Table of Contents Table of Contents Summary...................................................................................................................... i Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................... ii Preface........................................................................................................................ iv Table of Contents........................................................................................................ v 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Introductory Remarks.................................................................................... 1 1.2 Chapter Overview ......................................................................................... 3 1.2.1 Chapter 2 – Background Issues.............................................................. 3 1.2.2 Chapter 3 – Introspection....................................................................... 4 1.2.3 Chapter 4 – Shoemaker’s New Account of Qualia ................................. 6 1.2.4 Chapter 5 – A Space of Reasons Analysis of Qualia .............................. 8 1.2.5 Chapter 6 – Reclaiming Qualia ............................................................ 12 1.2.6 Appendix – Noë on Experience ........................................................... 16 1.3 Original Contributions................................................................................. 17 1.3.1 Chapter 2............................................................................................. 17 1.3.2 Chapter 3............................................................................................. 17 1.3.3 Chapter 4............................................................................................. 18 1.3.4 Chapter 5............................................................................................. 18 1.3.5 Chapter 6............................................................................................. 19 1.3.6 Appendix............................................................................................. 20 2. Background Issues ............................................................................................ 21 2.1 Introduction................................................................................................. 21 2.2 Qualia and Introspection.............................................................................. 21 2.2.1 Abstract for this Section ...................................................................... 21 2.2.2 Overview............................................................................................