2 021 PRISMVOL. 9, NO. 2 | 2021 PRISM VOL. 9, NO. 2 NO. 9, VOL. THE JOURNAL OF COMPLEX OPER ATIONS PRISM ABOUT VOL. 9, NO. 2, 2021 PRISM, the quarterly journal of complex operations published at National Defense University (NDU), aims to illuminate and provoke debate on whole-of-government EDITOR IN CHIEF efforts to conduct reconstruction, stabilization, counterinsurgency, and irregular Mr. Michael Miklaucic warfare operations. Since the inaugural issue of PRISM in 2010, our readership has expanded to include more than 10,000 officials, servicemen and women, and practi- tioners from across the diplomatic, defense, and development communities in more COPYEDITOR than 80 countries. Ms. Andrea L. Connell PRISM is published with support from NDU’s Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS). In 1984, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger established INSS EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS within NDU as a focal point for analysis of critical national security policy and Ms. Taylor Buck defense strategy issues. Today INSS conducts research in support of academic and Ms. Amanda Dawkins leadership programs at NDU; provides strategic support to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands, and armed services; Ms. Alexandra Fabre de la Grange and engages with the broader national and international security communities. Ms. Julia Humphrey COMMUNICATIONS INTERNET PUBLICATIONS PRISM welcomes unsolicited manuscripts from policymakers, practitioners, and EDITOR scholars, particularly those that present emerging thought, best practices, or train- Ms. Joanna E. Seich ing and education innovations. Publication threshold for articles and critiques varies but is largely determined by topical relevance, continuing education for national and DESIGN international security professionals, scholarly standards of argumentation, quality of Mr. John Mitrione, U.S. writing, and readability. To help achieve threshold, authors are strongly encouraged Government Publishing Office to recommend clear solutions or to arm the reader with actionable knowledge. Our review process can last several months. The PRISM editorial staff will contact authors during that timeframe accepting or regretfully rejecting the submis- EDITORIAL BOARD sion. If the staff is unable to publish a submission within four months of acceptance, Dr. Gordon Adams PRISM will revert publication rights to the author so that they may explore other Dr. Pauline Baker publication options. Ambassador Rick Barton Constructive comments and contributions are important to PRISM. We also welcome Letters to the Editor that are exclusive to PRISM—we do not publish open Dr. Alain Bauer letters. The PRISM editorial staff will contact authors within two months of submis- Dr. Hans Binnendijk sion if they accept the letter for publication. ADM Dennis Blair, USN (ret.) Please direct all comments and submit manuscripts in electronic form to Ambassador James Dobbins [email protected]. Hard copies may be sent to the address listed below, and should include a note that provides a preferred email address and phone number for feed- Dr. Francis Fukuyama back: PRISM does not return original hard copy submissions. Ambassador Marc Grossman National Defense University Ambassador John Herbst PRISM Editor Dr. Laura Junor (ex officio) 260 Fifth Avenue, S.W. Dr. David Kilcullen Building 62, Suite 212 Fort Lesley J. McNair Ambassador Jacques Paul Klein Washinbgton DC 20319 Dr. Roger B. Myerson Dr. Moisés Naím DISCLAIMER Ambassador Thomas Pickering This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) edition of PRISM. Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or Dr. William Reno extracted without permission of the copyright proprietors. PRISM should be Dr. James A. Schear acknowledged whenever material is quoted from or based on its content. Dr. Joanna Spear The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within ADM James Stavridis, USN (ret.) are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of DOD or any other agency of the Federal Government, or any other organization associated with Dr. Ruth Wedgwood this publication. Mr. Robert Zoellick ISSN 2157- 0663 FEATURES 3 Natural Hazards and National Security: The COVID-19 Lessons VOL. 9, NO. 2 By David Omand 21 The Military in the Time of COVID-19: Versatile, Vulnerable, and Vindicating By Nina Wilén 35 China and America: A New Game in a New Era PRISM By William H. Overholt 47 China and America: From Trade War to Race and Culture Confrontation By Walter Woon 59 Time for a New National Innovation System for Security and Prosperity By Robert Atkinson 77 Iran’s Gray Zone Strategy: Cornerstone of its Asymmetric Way of War By Michael Eisenstadt 99 A Friend to All is a Friend to None: Analysis of Russian Strategy in the Middle East By Maj Jason Hamilton, USAF, Maj Rosemarie Wilde, USAF, and LTC Jason Wimberly, USA 113 Negotiating [Im]plausible Deniability: Strategic Guidelines for U.S. Engagement in Modern Indirect Warfare By Kyle Atwell, Joshua M. Portzer, and Daphne McCurdy INTERVIEW 122 The Honorable Jack Lew—Interviewed by Michael Miklaucic BOOK REVIEWS 136 America in the World: A History of U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, by Robert Zoellick Reviewed by Thomas Pickering 140 How Ike Led: The Principles Behind Eisenhower’s Biggest Decisions, by Susan Eisenhower Reviewed by Walt Hudson 144 The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare, by Christian Brose Reviewed by T.X. Hammes 146 Weaponized Words: The Strategic Role of Persuasion in Violent Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization, by Kurt Braddock Reviewed by Vivian Walker 149 Power on the Precipice: The Six Choices America Faces in a Turbulent World, by Andrew Imbrie Reviewed by John Campbell 2021 www.ndu.edu More than 1,300 members of the Indiana National Guard assist with testing and other measures to limit the spread of COVID-19. (Spc. Jules Iradukunda, Indiana National Guard, Oct. 30, 2020) 2 | FEATURES PRISM 9, NO. 2 PRISM 9, NO. 2 Natural Hazards and National Security The COVID-19 Lessons By David Omand atural hazards can have serious implications for national security. The COVID-19 pandemic illustrates how first-order challenges are created for our national security planners, not least main- taining SSBN and SSN submarine crew and air crew rosters during quarantine restrictions, as well Nas keeping forces operationally effective while establishing social distancing in supply, repair and support facilities, gyms, and mess halls. We must also expect our adversaries to try to exploit the dislocation such events cause to further their own agendas. From our painful experience of COVID-19, we can draw general lessons for planning against the poten- tial impact on national security of a range of natural hazards. In this article, I also want to address some of the less direct second- and third-order effects of COVID-19 that have wider implications for our future national security.1 Those indirect effects prompt the question of whether we have adequately defined the boundaries of what ought to be included within the rubric of planning for national security in the future. That in turn raises the question of where the balance of argument lies in moving in the direction of a Scandinavian-style “total defense” against both threats and natural hazards. That would likely involve some extension of the scope of the funded missions of the armed forces, and enlargement of the responsibilities of defense departments over an expanding national security space. There are important debates to be had drawing on the lessons from the COVID-19 experience, from how best to organize national resources for an all-of-nation response and identifying and analyzing potential natural hazards, to making informed choices as to where best to invest in precautionary measures that will meet with public support. Threats and Hazards In this article I am using the term threat to refer to security challenges that have human agency behind them, whether from state or non-state actors; and the term hazard to refer to the impersonal forces of nature that can create disruptive challenges, ranging from naturally occurring infectious disease to coronal ejections of damaging charged particles from the sun. Professor Sir David Omand is a Visiting Professor at the War Studies Department at King’s College London and the for- mer UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator and Director, GCHQ. PRISM 9, NO. 2 FEATURES | 3 OMAND British governments have traditionally preferred to Forces of the Russian Federation (also known as the use the term “disruptive challenge,” rather than crisis GRU) deployed to try to digitally coerce targeted to describe the arrival of such events, since the essence Ukrainian enterprises, ended up escaping into of what makes a crisis is events that succeed each the wild and doing $10 billion worth of damage to other so fast that the normal processes of decision- global private companies, a very significant sum. making cannot keep pace. Governments do not like Yet the likely financial and social impact of such to give the impression they have lost control—that threats pales in significance compared to the speed may lead them into overly optimistic pronounce- and depth of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. ments of how they are managing disruptive The coronavirus caused a contraction in U.S. gross situations. I will therefore in this article reserve the domestic product at the fastest rate ever recorded word “crisis” for when I am anticipating precisely that between April and June 2020.2 The UK is in its deep- temporary loss of control due to the pace of events. est recession in at least a century.3 The pandemic has These categories of threat and hazard can done more economic damage and social dislocation, interact of course. Disease can be spread maliciously, resulting in the premature deaths of more people, refugee movements from drought-affected areas can than any hostile terrorist or cyberattack could have.
Details
-
File Typepdf
-
Upload Time-
-
Content LanguagesEnglish
-
Upload UserAnonymous/Not logged-in
-
File Pages155 Page
-
File Size-