Voting and Participating in Direct Democracies DISSERTATION of the University of St.Gallen, School of Management, Economics, Law, Social Sciences and International Affairs to obtain the title of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics and Finance submitted by Katharina Eva Hofer-Jaronicki from Germany Approved on the application of Prof. Dr. Monika Bütler and Prof. Dr. Patricia Funk Dissertation no. 4388 difo Druck, Bamberg 2015 The University of St. Gallen, School of Management, Economics, Law, Social Sciences and International Affairs hereby consents to the printing of the pre- sent dissertation, without hereby expressing any opinion on the views herein expressed. St. Gallen, November 10, 2014 The President: Prof. Dr. Thomas Bieger 2 Acknowledgements A dissertation is not only the result of long hours of work. Rather, it thrives upon the interactions and discussions with, as well as input and support from key people along the way. I would like to use this opportunity to express my gratitude to those individuals. First of all, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Monika Bütler for her support and guidance throughout my dissertation. Her encouragement to work on questions that are of personal interest to me has been very inspiring. My thanks also go to the members of my thesis committee, Reto Föllmi, Pa- tricia Funk and Roland Hodler, for their useful comments that helped further improve my work. In addition, I am grateful to Antonio Merlo for inviting me to spend a year at the University of Pennsylvania. My research has benefitted greatly from our discussions and his input. Moreover, I would like to thank all my colleagues and friends who helped my doctoral studies elapse very quickly and made it such a pleasant experi- ence. Particularly, I am grateful to two former colleagues at the SEW-HSG, Andreas Steinmayr and Martin Huber, for their extremely helpful advice. I would also like to thank my office mate and co-author Christian Marti for long and interesting discussions. My special thanks go to my family. I am deeply grateful to my parents for their unconditional love and support not only during the doctoral studies but throughout my entire life. Last but not least, I would like to thank my husband Tobias who has been of invaluable importance in accomplishing this important milestone in my life. St. Gallen, November 2014 Katharina Eva Hofer-Jaronicki i Contents List of Figures v List of Tables viii 1 Introduction 1 2 Campaigning in Direct Democracies: Initiative Petition Sign- ing, Voter Turnout, and Acceptance 6 2.1 Introduction ............................. 6 2.2 Theoretical Justification and Hypotheses ............. 9 2.2.1 Turnout ........................... 11 2.2.2 Acceptance ......................... 12 2.3 Institutional Background, Data, and Descriptives ........ 13 2.3.1 Institutional Background ................. 13 2.3.2 Data and Descriptives ................... 14 2.4 Estimation Strategy ........................ 17 2.4.1 Turnout ........................... 17 2.4.2 Acceptance ......................... 18 2.4.3 Fixed Effects and Controls ................ 19 2.5 Baseline Results .......................... 21 2.5.1 Turnout ........................... 22 2.5.2 Acceptance ......................... 26 2.5.3 Controlling for Voter Preferences ............. 30 2.5.4 Probability of Signing an Initiative ............ 35 2.5.5 Additional Robustness Checks .............. 37 2.6 Concluding Remarks ........................ 39 ii Appendix 2.A Data Used from Swiss Census (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000) 41 Appendix 2.B Presentations and Acknowledgement ......... 41 3 Ready to Reform: How Popular Initiatives Can Be Successful 43 3.1 Introduction ............................. 43 3.2 Institutional Background ...................... 48 3.2.1 Main Characteristics .................... 48 3.2.2 Institutional Changes ................... 49 3.3Model................................ 51 3.3.1 Model Setup ........................ 52 3.3.2 Discussion of Modeling Choices .............. 57 3.3.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ............... 59 3.3.4 Equilibrium Analysis .................... 66 3.4 Data and Empirical Strategy ................... 70 3.4.1 Data ............................. 70 3.4.2 Empirical Strategy ..................... 75 3.5 Results ................................ 79 3.5.1 Probability of Amending the Status Quo ......... 79 3.5.2 Signature Collection .................... 84 3.5.3 Signature Collection Costs ................. 87 3.5.4 Collection Time Constraint and Signature Requirement 89 3.5.5 Voting Rule: Tie-Breaking Question ........... 91 3.6 Concluding Remarks ........................ 93 Appendix 3.A Proofs .......................... 94 Appendix 3.B Data Appendix .....................100 Appendix 3.C Coding of Time Periods for Initiatives ........102 Appendix 3.D Presentations and Acknowledgement .........104 4 Does Female Suffrage Increase Public Support for Govern- ment Spending? Evidence from Swiss Ballots 105 4.1 Introduction .............................105 4.2 Institutional Setup .........................110 4.3 Empirical Framework .......................116 4.4 Data and Estimation Method ...................120 4.4.1 Data .............................120 4.4.2 Identifying the Total Gender Effect ............123 iii 4.4.3 Identifying the Direct and Indirect Gender Effect ....131 4.5 Results ................................135 4.5.1 Average Treatment Effect .................135 4.5.2 Direct and Indirect Effects ................139 4.6 Concluding Remarks ........................145 Appendix 4.A Estimators of Direct and Indirect Effects .......147 Appendix 4.B Propensity Score Histograms .............148 Appendix 4.C Propensity Score Estimates ..............162 Appendix 4.D Direct and Indirect Effects ...............166 Appendix 4.E Federal Announcements / Bundesblätter .......169 Appendix 4.F Presentations and Acknowledgement .........170 Bibliography 171 iv List of Figures 1.1 Signatures for Swiss Popular Initiatives at Federal Level .... 2 2.1 Histogram of Turnout, Signatures Per Capita, and Acceptance Rate ................................. 15 3.1 Example of Winning Probabilities ................ 53 3.2 High Type Probability over Collection Time ........... 54 3.3 Extensive-Form Game Tree of Initiative Game ......... 56 3.4 Example of Cutoff Counter Proposal ............... 61 3.5 Example of Initiative Type and Winning Probability ........ 63 3.6 Politicians’ Best Strategy ..................... 64 3.7 Period Mean Shares of Observed Profiles ............. 80 3.8 Signatures and Collection Time by Observed Profiles ...... 84 4.1 Cantonal Approval Rates for Ballots 1 (15 November 1970) and 2 (6 June 1971) ...........................115 4.2 Mediation Framework .......................119 4.3 Participation Rate in Parliamentary Elections 1951-1991 ....129 4.4 Histograms of Voter Participation and Acceptance Rate ....135 4.5 Histograms of Propensity Scores by Gender ...........140 4.6 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mbasic and Cbasic, Vote 1981) 148 4.7 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mbasic and Cbasic, Vote 1991) 148 4.8 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mbasic and Cbasic, Vote 1993) 149 4.9 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mbasic and Cbasic, Votes 1981, 1991) .................................149 v 4.10 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mbasic and Cbasic, Votes 1991, 1993) .................................150 4.11 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mbasic and Cbasic, Vote 1993) 150 4.12 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mextended and Cextended, Votes 1981, 1991) .............................151 4.13 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mextended and Cextended, Votes 1991, 1993) .............................151 4.14 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mextended and Cextended, Vote 1993) .................................152 4.15 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mbasic and Cbasic, Votes 1981, 1991, 1993, Ballot Clustering) ...................152 4.16 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mbasic and Cbasic, Votes 1981, 1991, Ballot Clustering) ......................153 4.17 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mbasic and Cbasic, Votes 1991, 1993, Ballot Clustering) ......................153 4.18 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mextended and Cextended, Votes 1981, 1991, Ballot Clustering) ...................154 4.19 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mextended and Cextended, Votes 1991, 1993, Ballot Clustering) ...................154 4.20 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mbasic and Cbasic, Votes 1981, 1991, 1993, Canton Known) ....................155 4.21 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mbasic and Cbasic, Votes 1981, 1991, Canton Known) .......................155 4.22 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mbasic and Cbasic, Votes 1991, 1993, Canton Known) .......................156 4.23 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mbasic and Cbasic, Vote 1993, CantonKnown)...........................156 4.24 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mextended and Cextended, Votes 1981, 1991, Canton Known) ....................157 4.25 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mextended and Cextended, Votes 1991, 1993, Canton Known) ....................157 4.26 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mextended and Cextended, Vote 1993, Canton Known) .......................158 4.27 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mbasic and Cbasic, Votes 1981, 1991, 1993, Canton Clustering) ..................158 vi 4.28 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mbasic and Cbasic, Votes 1981, 1991, Canton Clustering) .....................159 4.29 Histograms of Propensity Scores (Mbasic and Cbasic, Votes 1991, 1993, Canton Clustering) .....................159