Chapter 4 Moral value monism 4.1 Intro duction So far, I dealt with two of the three main traditional background assump- tions of the ideal of equality: moral universalism and volitional individu- alism. Two alternatives were intro duced: moral realism and realistic in- dividualism. Both are based on the Wittgenstein-Davidson approachto language and interpretation. In this chapter, the third assumption, moral value monism, is discussed. Value monism was held to b e one of the tradi- tional background assumptions of the ideal of equality b ecause of the idea of a contract. In contracts the go o ds for p eople are compared to each other and in contracts it is agreed that the loss of one go o d is comp ensated by some other go o d. If you giveupyour right to that which will b e advan- tageous for me, then I will giveupmy right to something else in return. Such a trade-o suggests the idea that there is one value with resp ect to which all go o ds have to b e compared. This moral value monism can also b e discerned as the assumption b ehind the discussion on the prop er equal- isandum; it seems that it is assumed that there is just one equalisandum. In this chapter moral value pluralism is intro duced as an alternativeto moral value monism. It leads to the idea that there are several equalisanda instead of just one. This will have in its turn as a consequence that the articulation of the ideal of equality has to b e indep endent of a particular equalisandum. This chapter consists of two parts. In the rst part, the reasons for accepting moral value monism are examined and moral value pluralism is intro duced. I follow mainly Sto cker's line of argument against monism [Sto cker, 1990]. Two main reasons for value monism are discussed. One is 115 116 CHAPTER 4. MORAL VALUE MONISM based on the idea that the main concern of morality is that it should b e action-guiding and the other on the idea of comp ensation. Of b oth it is shown that they are not valid. Subsequently I present an argument against monism that is based on a discussion on the phenomenon of akrasia or weakness of will. It is shown that although in spite of what is commonly held, monism can account for akrasia. It is argued that monism cannot account for all common sorts of con icts and genuine choice. At rst sight it seems that an explanation for moral con icts and genuine choices calls for moral universalism, but as is shown, moral particularism within a moral realistic framework can account for these con icts and genuine choices to o. In the second part, it is argued that there are several equalisanda instead of just one. I arrive at equalisanda by discussing an issue touched up on in the previous chapter, namely the role of resp onsibility in the ideal of equal- ity and the prop er equalisandum. As was argued in the previous chapter, incorp orating resp onsibility in the equalisandum threatens the pro ject of this study b ecause evaluations of distributions without taking their history 1 into account b ecome imp ossible. Several recent prop osals for an equal- isandum, notably those of Rawls' primary go o ds, Dworkin's resources and Cohen's advantages, are discussed. Scanlon's idea on the equalisandum exp osed in his Preferences and urgency [Scanlon, 1975] and his idea on resp onsibility explained in The sigini cance of choice [Scanlon, 1988] are presented. They are of help in arguing that there are several equalisanda and that resp onsibility is not to b e incorp orated in the ideal of equality. Thus the threat to the aim of this study, the developmentofanevaluation of distributions that is pattern like, is neutralised. In this discussion on the prop er equalisandum and resp onsibility, I arrive at a plurality of equal- isanda. They can b e subsumed under the name of `lib erties', referring to real p ossibilities for individuals to act or enjoy situations that are valuable, without su ering from disadvantages that others do not su er from. 4.2 Monism versus pluralism 4.2.1 Reasons for value monism One of the main reasons for accepting monism is that it is held to b e ne- cessary for a de nite answer to the question: `What to do?', to which the answer is of course: `Cho ose the b est option!'. A complete ordering of avail- able options is a guarantee that there is a b est option that should b e chosen. It is held that such a complete ordering assumes just one value, whichis the value according to which the options are evaluated. If more values 1 Chapter 3 p. 89. 4.2. MONISM VERSUS PLURALISM 117 havetobetaken into account then a b est option is not any longer guar- anteed and some arbitrariness is held to b e inevitable and morality lo oses its de nite action-guiding character. Once taking morality as essentially action-guiding, one value has to b e assumed otherwise it could happ en that morality ended up with arbitrary choices, thus the argument. This value is taken to b e the central value of morality. In history it can b e seen that several suggestions have b een made for this value, happiness, eudaimonia, welfare, to mention only a few. Action-guidingness as the central idea of morality is given as one reason for monism. The second reason for value monism is more or less particular for the discussion related to equality. It is based essentially on the same assumption ab out comparing options and go o ds as the one of the rst reason. In using the ideal of equality the idea of comp ensation is a central one. It is held that it has to b e p ossible that lack of some sort of go o d can b e comp ensated by some other go o d in order to arrive at equality. Comparing several go o ds in order to comp ensate, assumes one value with resp ect to which the go o ds and lacks are compared. If there existed more values then there would b e no guarantee that the lack can b e comp ensated prop erly by some go o d. Wiggins for example formulates this idea as the principle of comp ensation in kind: ..., if course x is b etter in resp ect of eudaimonia than course y, then there is no imp ortant disadvantage that x has in com- parison with y, or no desirable feature that y o ers that x do es not o er to o, byway of an equal or greater degree of that very feature [Wiggins, 1982b, p. 259] Such a principle can b e seen as a reason to o for value monism. Both reasons are discussed subsequently. De niteness of morality As mentioned ab ove, one reason for monism is the idea that morality should give a de nite answer to the question: `What to do?' A complete ordering of options will secure a de nite answer, b ecause a complete ordering always has a b est element. This element, the b est option, is of course the answer. But it is not clear at all that the only concern of moralityistogive de nite answers to the question: `What to do?' And even if it is, it is not clear that the b est has always to b e chosen and even if the b est has to b e chosen it is not clear why a complete ordering on one scale means value monism. It could b e p ossible that there is a complete ordering without there b eing one sup ervalue which is resp onsible for this ordering. 118 CHAPTER 4. MORAL VALUE MONISM Let me rst turn to the idea that ethics is concerned with de nite an- swers to the question: `What to do?'. It can b e admitted that ethics is concerned with this question, but it is not its only fo cus. Morality is con- cerned also with judging p ersons, virtues, or asp ects of actions instead of the action itself, or that it is concerned with what is worthwhile to strive at. It is not merely the particular action which is of concern to morality but also the question: `What if the circumstances were di erent?' For example supp ose as a derivativeofRawls' theory that the one and 2 only value to b e taken into account is the well-b eing of the worst-o p erson. Now it can b e argued, and in fact some do, by p ointing to incentives, that we should divide go o ds not equally, b ecause then the worst-o would be even worse o . It is b etter even for the worst-o that go o ds are not divided equally, b ecause equalitywould lead to a decrease of the incentive to work and so to a diminished total amount of go o ds to divide, resulting in the worst-o receiving less. Thus is argued that there would b e less to divide b ecause the incentive for pro duction would b e far less with an equal distribution. Against this reasoning, one can hold that p ersons should not be moved by their own income but they should b e moved by the well-b eing of the worst-o .