Somalia: Failed State Expired? Maximilian M. Meduna Abstract For the past two decades, the ‘failed state’ of Somalia has been ravaged by protracted violence and famine, armed clashes between warlords, and their unpredictably shifting alliances. As the extended mandate of the corrupt and dysfunctional Transitional Federal Government nears its expiration date in August 2012, increasing international attention has created an impetus for a renewed consolidation process leading to the recent London Conference on Somalia. This paper assesses the realistic options for a shift towards peaceful governance, and examines what lessons can be learned from the hitherto existing international approach that has fuelled rather than averted violent conflict. I. Introduction In 1960, the Somali Republic inherited administratively distinct territories upon its independence from the British and Italian colonial powers. Ethnically and religiously a homogeneous entity, it subsequently struggled for nine years in a process of political consolidation that ended with a military coup d’état. Highly reliant on the bipolar theatre of the Cold War, President Siad Barre ruled the country in an increasingly autocratic fashion until 1991, when he was ousted by clan-based opposition groups. Two decades of “socialist” dictatorship established the concept of central governance in a society that had traditionally always been highly decentralized, where power was dispersed among clans and regional alliances. The Somali Civil War that followed the collapse of statehood in 1991 resulted in half a million casualties, not counting the victims of famines exacerbated by the conflict or the millions of refugees and internally displaced persons that resulted from the conflict. The subsequent civil war politicized and militarized clan structures, while empowering a multitude of warlords to compete for political dominance.1 From 1992 to 1995, international intervention mandated by the United Nations failed to achieve any success due to inadequate preparation and structure, a lack of understanding over local dynamics, and failures to adequately consider domestic politics and interests on the side of intervening states, most notably those of the United States.2 The world decided to look away for another decade while the northwestern province of Somaliland, which had unilaterally declared independence in 1991, gradually developed structures of functional governance and stability.3 In 2004 the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was appointed as a result of prolonged negotiations in Djibouti between warlord factions, militias, and international mediators. Five years later, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, former Commander in Chief of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Chairman of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) – previously an opposition group fighting the TFG – became the current President until his government’s mandate expires in August 2012.4 Externally constructed policies aimed at shifting power to central authorities and restoring functional government and statehood are being challenged by the high degree of corruption and inefficiency within the existing structures. By promoting top-down state- [106] The Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs building, international actors are fuelling violent conflict and creating incentives for faction and clan leaders to fight for territorial dominance and political influence in order to monopolize profits from the existing war economy. This has also facilitated the rise of Islamist groups seeking to implement ideological foundations at the core of the institutional setup of government. State-building, as realized by the TFG and endorsed by the international community, remains a structural factor of instability in Somalia. Ironically, it is both the cause of, and the main response to, the country’s dire situation. II. The Status Quo: A Glimpse beneath the Surface Despite numerous efforts to create stability and security, reflected by more than a dozen failed peace conferences and attempts to establish an inclusive government of national unity, Somalia remains in a state of insecurity and violence. International aid certainly dampens the mutually reinforcing impacts of environmental disaster and violent conflict, but at the same time it also sustains a persistent war economy that allows individual leaders to capitalize on the aid and divert power and money to their advantage at the expense of the public. The war economy is also sustained by other capital inflows from external actors and states – notably Ethiopia5 and Kenya – to favored factions, and through the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW).6 Finally, the practice of conducting internationally supported, large-scale, top-level peace conferences outside of the territory has hitherto been the ultimate incentive for illegitimate and self-appointed leaders to co-opt the process. Costly attempts to sustain the TFG “on life support”7 have produced very few significant political results. The successful ousting of the radical Islamist al-Shabaab8 from Mogadishu in January by pro-TFG forces is certainly a positive step, but such erratic successes build the illusion that the status-quo policies are working. Beneath the surface of complex power dynamics, personal interests and strategies is a completely different reality of Somali society. At the core of current power-sharing agreements is the so-called “4.5-formula,” which allocates seats in the governmental bodies proportionally to the four major clans – Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Rahanweyn – along with a fraction for minority clans and stakeholders from civil society.9 Decades of political engineering, however, have significantly decreased popular legitimacy for clan leadership. In fact, all major Somali clans fighting for political supremacy are deeply divided, sometimes even within nuclear families.10 Clan leaders and the whole “system” of clan politics in Somalia is facing increasing commitment problems and continuously diminishing legitimacy. This exacerbates the challenges of forming a representative government of national unity and raises the question of whether building governmental bodies based on the clan system is the best path forward. Somalia’s functioning institutions are largely to be found at the level of local self- administration. In the absence of functioning state-level governance and facing continuous threats from factions competing for state authority, local experience in administration has been nurtured since 1991. Indeed, a closer look at traditional Somali governance reveals the fundamentals of social life, widely disregarded by most international approaches to the peace process. Somali society is traditionally based on a complicated system of horizontal and collective loyalties on a jilib,11 sub-clan and clan level. A compensatory, discursive and polycentric Spring 2012 Volume 15 [107] legal system of collective responsibilities has been the foundation of governance, relying on the legitimacy of guurti – respected clan elders, elected at the community level and acting as personal legal advisers to clan leaders. This customary law, called xeer in Somali, is a truly indigenous and highly regarded element of Somali society, which offered a unifying foundation even prior to the establishment of a common language. Despite the continuity of xeer from pre-colonial times into the 21st century, it is worth noting that the clan system is anything but a rigid form of collective categorization. Boundaries are fluid, with individual ties and allegiances crosscutting and often blurry. Clearly, the reductionist cliché that everything in the country is based solely on clan dynamics does not account for the existence of power configurations such as Islamist movements and organized criminal gangs, which cut across clan groups .12 Community-based governance in Somalia has always been a form of kritarchy – judicial and political decision-making by judges who are directly nominated and thus legitimized by local constituencies.13 While the chaos of civil war has dominated the broad political landscape in Somalia, initiatives to secure stability and order have been continued by the xeer (especially in northern Somaliland), and by the rise of Islamic Courts in the South. Islam plays an integral role in society and politics. It survived a bizarre marriage with Siad Barre’s proclaimed “scientific socialism” and now endures during the schism between moderate forces and Salafists as well as internal disputes within jihadist groups. Islamic Courts and their shura councils consisting of clan leaders are at the core of existing regional and perhaps future state-level jurisdiction and administration. In April 2009, the transitional parliament passed a shari’a bill, yet in practice xeer continues to be the prime source of law, implemented by local authorities and elders.14 III. From “Transitional” to “Provisional” to Federal: Assessing the New Roadmap The essential power shifts required to create stability in Somalia are twofold: on the one hand, current TFG officials and political leaders have to accept a transition of power from the current dysfunctional and illegitimate structures to a more representative, inclusive, and effective framework. On the other hand, the vertical approach aimed at establishing the state’s monopoly of violence has to give way to a horizontal dispensation of governance. Local stability – achievable though traditional means of jurisdiction and administration – is the precondition