POLICING THE POLICE IN BOSNIA: A FURTHER REFORM AGENDA 10 May 2002 Balkans Report N°130 Sarajevo/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................................i I. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1 A. Current Context ...................................................................................................................1 B. The Origins Of UNMIBH/IPTF ..........................................................................................4 C. The Case For Joined-Up Police Reform..............................................................................7 II. POLICING STRUCTURES ..........................................................................................................9 A. Fragmentation......................................................................................................................9 B. Non-Cooperation With The Judiciary ...............................................................................12 C. The State Border Service (SBS) ........................................................................................15 D. Failures Of Regional Policing ...........................................................................................19 III. POLITICS AND POLICING ....................................................................................................... 22 IV. THE POLICING GAP: LOCAL CAPABILITIES VS. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS . 25 A. Providing Security For Returnees And ‘Minorities’ .........................................................25 B. War Crimes Arrests ...........................................................................................................27 C. The Scandal Of Human Trafficking ..................................................................................28 V. PROFESSIONALISING THE POLICE.................................................................................. 33 A. Training .............................................................................................................................33 B. IPTF Police Commissioners Project..................................................................................33 C. Creating Indigenous Accountability: Professional Standards Units (PSUS) ....................36 D. ‘Minority’ Police Recruitment...........................................................................................39 E. Police Academies ..............................................................................................................43 F. Paying The Police..............................................................................................................44 G. Shrinking And Reshaping The Police ...............................................................................46 H. Auditing The Police...........................................................................................................47 VI. INTERNATIONAL OVERSIGHT ........................................................................................... 49 A. Co-Location.......................................................................................................................49 B. De-Authorisation And Screening ......................................................................................51 VII. SFOR, IPTF AND THE SECURITY GAP.............................................................................. 56 VIII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 57 APPENDICES A. Glossary Of Abbreviations ................................................................................................61 B. Map Of Bosnia...................................................................................................................63 C. About The International Crisis Group ...............................................................................64 D. ICG Reports And Briefing Papers.....................................................................................65 E. ICG Board Members .........................................................................................................69 ICG Balkans Report N°130 10 May 2002 POLICING THE POLICE IN BOSNIA: A FURTHER REFORM AGENDA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Despite more than six years of increasingly intrusive botched. Nowhere is this more evident than in cases reforms carried out at the behest of the UN Mission involving the continuation or consolidation of in Bosnia & Herzegovina (UNMIBH), the local wartime ‘achievements’: ‘ethnic cleansing’, the police cannot yet be counted upon to enforce the law. appropriation of public assets and the maintenance Too often – like their opposite numbers in the of national-territorial divisions. Violence against judiciary – nationally partial, under-qualified, returning refugees and displaced persons waxes and underpaid, and sometimes corrupt police officers wanes with the political cycle, but cases are uphold the law selectively, within a dysfunctional frequently left unresolved after an initial show of system still controlled by politicised and nationalised serious concern. In similar vein, most war crimes interior ministries. suspects enjoy the effective protection of ‘their own’. The ‘long arm of the law’ is inconsistent and infirm, suffering from jurisdictional divisions that do not These unsophisticated but effective methods are hinder organised crime and from national-political symbolised and safeguarded by the continued manipulations that ensure there is one law for well- employment of police officers who were complicit connected members of majority populations and in war crimes. The law enforcement and criminal another for powerless minorities. Top-tier criminals justice systems will remain compromised until ply their trades with relative impunity, ethnic these officers have been purged. Removal of these violence is tolerated and corruption is widespread. and other recidivist or obstructionist elements has been slow. It only takes place when ordered by the The role of the police is not seen as being to ‘serve international community and, even then, is often and protect’ everyone, but to serve and protect circumvented by the domestic authorities. Those ‘one’s own kind’, whether they be co-nationals, who are removed frequently switch jobs within the colleagues or political masters. The communist-era interior ministries, are rewarded with plum posts in doctrine that the police exist to defend the regime publicly-owned companies, or gain elected office. persists, except that the working class has been Culpable individuals are rarely prosecuted. replaced by the nation as the ostensible beneficiary. Even ‘moderate’ politicians expect – and are often Yet matters could be much worse. However halting allowed – to influence investigations, recruitment the progress, the international community has taken and budgetary allocations. police reform seriously from the outset – and certainly more seriously than it has heretofore taken Citizens know they are not only unequal before the judicial reform. At Dayton, the United Nations was law, but unequal before its enforcers. Getting the tasked to reform police forces that had been part and police to investigate cases that involve the moneyed parcel of their respective masters’ war machines. or powerful invariably requires international After initial disorientation and incapacity as it built pressure and supervision. Even with international up its resources and sought to flesh out its mandate, insistence and assistance, investigations are often UNMIBH’s International Police Task Force (IPTF) Policing The Police In Bosnia: A Further Reform Agenda ICG Balkans Report N° 130, 10 May 2002 Page ii began in earnest: screening officers, de-authorising (b) Guarantee that sufficient resources are reprobates and war criminals among them, ensuring made available to support a that ‘minority’ recruits are hired, seeking to depoliticised, honest, competent and depoliticise police commands, creating new, all- cost-effective police service; Bosnian law-enforcement bodies such as the State (c) Provide a means for human rights Border Service (SBS), and facilitating inter-entity monitors to participate directly in the and regional co-operation. oversight of the police, alongside the follow-on mission. UNMIBH has latterly been active across a broad field and has initiated numerous remedial programs. After three years of intensified reform efforts, TO UNMIBH, EUPM AND OHR Bosnia’s police forces have begun to justify the decision taken at Dayton that they should be 2. Measures to enhance the accountability of reformed rather than replaced. But the UNMIBH Bosnia’s police forces should be put in train mandate expires at the end of 2002. The European or reinforced. These should include: Union (EU) decided in February 2002 to provide a follow-on mission. The EU Police Mission (EUPM) (a) The establishment of an independent is charged with picking up where the UN will leave police complaints authority; off. There is plenty of work still to be done, as many (b) The maintenance of the UN mission’s of the UN's programs have not been fully anti-trafficking and judicial assessment implemented or have been subverted by teams and its register of police obstructionist political elites and recalcitrant police personnel;