PLA MODERNISATION PLA MODERNISATION The reorganisation of the upon the most serious restructuring since responsible for ‘maintaining peace, instead of multiple theatres dealing with one terms of opposing forces being able to beat I think the key its founding in 1933. President Xi Jinping’s deterring wars, winning battles and strategic front. “blue force”. The PLA may learn much from People’s Liberation Army overhaul will dramatically streamline responding to security threats from their Joint warfighting is also facilitated by defeat in exercises so that they will not challenge the PLA setsPLA theMODERNISATION stage for major the PLA’s four services: the army (PLA), strategic directions’. having all four services at the disposal of suffer defeat in war. But will political will face is ensuring changes as the transition navy (PLAN), air force (PLAAF) and rocket The main reason behind the restructuring the theatre commander, so that it is not agendas, personal interest and effective training in a force (PLARF). is to develop an agile force able to respond necessary to go through a clumsy chain of bureaucratic politics permit this?’ to a new command structure Before looking at platforms employed by quickly to contingencies. It streamlines the command to request assets from each joint environment that is affects all its services. PLA ground forces, it is imperative to command hierarchy, as each theatre service. Furthermore, it is hoped that the Five forces realistic... Exercises need to understand what China’s military operating under the Central Military training regime will become more efficient What are these five new commands? The be less scripted. By Gordon Arthur reorganisation entails. One fundamental Commission (CMC) can deploy troops at its since services will train together in a more Eastern Theatre Command faces Japan and change, enacted on 1 February, was the own discretion in both wartime and coherent manner. Taiwan across the East China Sea. It is he People’s Liberation Army (PLA), a abolition of seven military regions and their peacetime, enabling quicker transition to a Dr Malcolm Davis, senior analyst in critical to the PLA, since the government military beholden to the Chinese replacement by five joint theatre war footing. Theatre commands have been defence strategy and capability at the has not ruled out the use of force to reunite strengthened its core rather than its T Communist Party, has embarked commands. Xi said each command was organised to look after their own particular Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Taiwan with the mainland. It possesses peripheries with this restructuring. geographic areas. The said to LWI: ‘I think the key challenge the three group armies: the 1st, 12th and 31st. However, a caveat is needed here. It is assumption is that one PLA will face is ensuring effective training in With rising tensions in the South China one thing to create new commands and theatre command should a joint environment that is realistic. So Sea, the Southern Theatre Command is call them ‘joint’. It is quite another to be able to deal with exercises need to be less scripted and important too. As well as integral naval operate efficiently as a joint force. multiple strategic fronts, there needs to be real contestability in and amphibious elements, it also controls Although the PLA has carefully studied the Radical revamp forces in Yunnan and Guizhou near the US model and seeks to emulate it, the Vietnam, Myanmar and Laos borders. It decades-old tradition of army domination Special forces members of has three group armies: the 14th, 41st cannot be instantly negated. A joint force the Hong Kong Garrison of and 42nd. requires a culture where each service is the PLA perform a counter- The landlocked Western Theatre comfortable working with another. There terrorism demonstration. They Command is the largest in terms of will doubtless be many difficulties in are all wielding first-generation QBZ95 5.8mm assault rifles. territory, covering nearly half of China’s land achieving this, especially as the PLA (All photos: author) area. It is also responsible for internal ground forces, which used to enjoy security in Xinjiang, Tibet and elsewhere. Of uncontested supremacy, begin to play course, the Indian border looms large in second fiddle in some respects. this command’s thinking, and it boasts three group armies – the 13th, 21st and Downsized departments 47th – as well as ten divisions/brigades of Another significant change for the PLA is a the Tibet and Xinjiang military districts. sharp drop in troop numbers, particularly in The Northern Theatre Command must the estimated 1.6 million-strong army. Xi meet challenges from the Korean Peninsula, declared at the military parade in Beijing on Mongolia, Russia and northern Japan. With 3 September 2015: ‘I announce that China Kim Jong-un’s regime proving unpredictable, will cut the number of its troops by this command will face pressing issues from 300,000.’ Set to occur by 2017, the reason North Korea. Its four group armies are the is to streamline a bloated military to make 16th, 26th, 39th and 40th. it leaner and meaner. A smaller army Headquartered in Beijing, the Central means it is comparatively easier to Theatre Command protects the political modernise all services. heart with five group armies: the 20th, The new structure will allow the CMC to 27th, 38th, 54th and 65th. This command exert even tighter control over the PLA is the largest and most powerful, making it which, it complains, has long had too much the PLA’s strategic reserve. Furthermore, freedom. Xi said the reform will consolidate two of these armies (38th and 54th) are the principle that ‘the Chinese Communist considered the PLA’s trump units. Party has absolute leadership of the armed The Central Theatre Command’s forces’. Furthermore, Xi introduced greater structure reveals something of Beijing’s old- regulatory powers to monitor the PLA. fashioned thinking, however. Surely the Communism depends on tight central whole idea of creating theatre commands control, and these reforms, plus the drive to was that they could look after their own root out corruption and nepotism in the strategic spheres? What then is the PLA, are designed to enforce it. purpose of a massive strategic reserve? In Davis pointed out: ‘I think the PLA needs some ways it seems the PLA has to really aim for flatter command 8 LAND WARFARE INTERNATIONAL OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2016 VOLUME 7 NUMBER 5 WWW.LANDWARFAREINTL.COM WWW.LANDWARFAREINTL.COM VOLUME 7 NUMBER 5 OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2016 LAND WARFARE INTERNATIONAL 9 PLA MODERNISATION PLA MODERNISATION overseas base in Djibouti, which is now army is acquiring new capabilities, Soviet Union during the Cold War. There is a under way. particularly related to tactical and challenge in the shape of growing Islamist Much of China’s expenditure goes on operational mobility, and there is an forces that could influence the situation in PLA MODERNISATION asymmetric weapon systems (eg missiles, emphasis also on strategic mobility across Xinjiang, but that is a counter-terrorism/ submarines, cyber warfare and space/ military regions… The army used to be the counter-insurgency task – very different satellite technology) that give Beijing a dominant force politically, but its position is from high-end warfighting. decided edge in its scope. Erickson and Liff steadily being challenged as the PLAN and ‘It’s not so much what kit the army gets – commented: ‘This threatens to place the US the other arms rise in importance, pre- it is what its role and purpose is that is the and China’s neighbours on the costly end of eminence and political influence.’ key issue,’ he suggested. With that in mind, a capabilities competition. The PLA’s current Davis assessed that ‘the PLA is moving we may discuss the newest armoured development trajectory affords China the steadily from a low-tech infantry-intensive platforms being inducted. Elite armoured potential to severely challenge the interests force to a mechanised force, and ultimately divisions and brigades field the ZTZ99A of the US and its security partners in East to an informationised force’. However, the MBT. Mao Ming, Norinco’s chief designer, Asia. Among them: unfettered access to – ASPI analyst suggested that the army ‘is at called it a ‘world leader in terms of and the security of – international waters a crossroads and has to reinvent itself to firepower, defence, manoeuvrability and and airspace upon which all nations rely for remain relevant’. information technology’. It mounts a economic well-being.’ Davis explained: ‘The army faces a real 125mm gun modified to fire higher-density challenge in that the principal strategic rounds, and a dynamic muzzle reference Capable platforms direction under current Chinese doctrine… system boosts the ZTZ99A’s accuracy rate. As for hardware currently in service, Davis emphasises Taiwan and increasingly the The turret has better explosive reactive informed LWI: ‘When you look at capability South China Sea and East China Sea as of armour, and there is an active protection growth, the real growth is occurring with greatest importance. There is no real system and laser warning receiver. the PLAN, PLAAF and PLARF, not in the military challenge facing China from across Adding further to the tank’s combat ZBD04A IFVs manufactured by Norinco participated in the impressive military parade in Beijing on 3 September 2015. army.’ Nevertheless, he continued: ‘The its land borders to match that of the former capability is a data link that gives the tank These newest-generation vehicles are armed with a 100mm rifled gun and a 30mm cannon. structures, with more power to shape strategic support assurance. It is composed Defence budget operations to lower levels of command, of three separate force types: space troops, On 6 March, China announced a defence encourage initiative across the ranks and to cyber troops and EW forces; in essence, an budget of CNY954 billion ($143 billion), a invest more in high-quality non- aerospace army, internet army and EW army.