Joseph de Maistre's Civilization and Its Discontents Author(s): Graeme Garrard Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Jul., 1996), pp. 429-446 Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3653948 . Accessed: 20/02/2014 11:03 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. University of Pennsylvania Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of the History of Ideas. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 131.251.254.50 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 11:03:44 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Joseph de Maistre's Civilization and its Discontents Graeme Garrard In his study of Sigmund Freud's social and political thought Paul Roazen claims that Freud was the first to depict the human psyche as torn between two fundamentallyantithetical tendencies: The notion of a human naturein conflict with itself, disruptedby the oppositionof social andasocial inclinations,the view thatthe social self develops from an asocial nucleus but that the social trends are also dynamic and emotional in nature, and finally the conception that reason's control can be extended by a detailed knowledge of the repressedasocial tendencies-all this was not known before Freud.' Although Freud is undoubtedly the most famous modem exponent of this conceptionof humannature at war with itself, he was by no means its first, let alone only, proponent.Kant, for example, wrote of the "unsocialsociability of men" over a century earlier.2An even more unlikely precursorof this basic assumptionof Freudiansocial psychology is the Catholicreactionary Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821). The social theory elaborated by this arch-paladinof throne and altar-who was, quite literally, plus royalist que le roi, plus catholiqueque le Pape-is strikinglysimilar to that expressed by Freudin his famous essay Civilizationand Its Discontents (1929).3 I would like to acknowledge my debt to Sir Isaiah Berlin for the time and attention he generously gave me to discuss the thought of Joseph de Maistre (and many other subjects) with him while I was a graduate student at Oxford University, when the first draft of this essay was written. 1 Paul Roazen, Freud: Political and Social Thought (New York, 1968), 249-50. 2 Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," in Kant's Political Writings, ed. H. Reiss, tr. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1970), 44-45. This work was first published in the Berlinische Monatsschrift, 4 (11 November 1784), 385-411. 3 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, tr. Joan Riviere, ed. James Strachey (London, 1979). 429 Copyright1996 by Journalof the Historyof Ideas,Inc. This content downloaded from 131.251.254.50 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 11:03:44 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 430 Graeme Garrard Both conceived of the individual as "a being both social and evil,"4 perpetually struggling to prevent the innate aggressiveness of the species from plunging society into a Hobbesian war of all against all. That is why Freud insisted that it "has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's aggressive instincts,"5a view advanced over a century earlier by Maistre.Events in Europeafter 1789 led many conservativessuch as Maistre, as events after 1914 would lead Freud, to reject the common Enlightenment view of humanbeings as naturallysociable and of social life as a reflection of the spontaneousharmony of a naturalworld governed by laws established by God and discoverable by reason. In Maistre's view, social and political life are better understoodas the artificial and fundamentallyprecarious imposi- tion of order on the violent flux of nature.Anticipating Freud, he asserts that individuals, if left to their own devices in society, would soon be plunged into a state of social warfareidentical to that which Hobbes had attributedto the state of nature. His particularbrand of extreme conservative thought derives its social and political authoritarianismfrom these deeply pessimistic social assumptions,which leave him with more in common (on this subject) with Freud than with either the Enlightenmentor fellow conservatives such as EdmundBurke. Homo Homini Lupus The pessimistic, even tragic, argument of Civilization and Its Discon- tents is that humanbeings are driven by extremely powerful instincts, the full satisfactionof which is incompatiblewith social life. According to Freud,the "cultural frustration"that ensues from this incompatibility "dominates the large field of social relationships between human beings. As we already know, it is the cause of the hostility against which all civilizations has to struggle."6Unhappiness, understood as the non-satisfaction of these basic libidinal urges, is thereforea necessary part of humanassociation. "One feels inclined to say that the intention that man should be 'happy,' " Freud writes pessimistically, "is not included in the plan of 'Creation.'"7 Freudalso argues that, in addition to these basically erotic instincts, there is a "constitutionalinclination in human beings to be aggressive towards one another,"8 which "constitutes the greatest impediment to civilization."9 4 Joseph de Maistre, "De 1'etat de nature," ch. 2, in Oeuvres completes (Paris, 1884- 1931), VII, 563 (hereafter cited as OC). 5 Freud, op. cit., 49. 6 Ibid., 34. 7 Ibid., 13. 8 Ibid., 79. 9 Ibid., 59. This content downloaded from 131.251.254.50 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 11:03:44 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Joseph de Maistre 431 This ineliminable tendency accounts for Freud's Hobbesian view of the precariousnessof civilization:10 [M]enare not gentle creatureswho wantto be loved, andwho at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked;they are, on the contrary, creaturesamong whose instinctualendowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbour is for themnot only a potentialhelper or sexual object,but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation,to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to tortureand to kill him. Homo hominilupus. Who, in the face of all his experienceof life and of history,will have the courageto dispute this assertion?" This innate aggressiveness poses a constant threat to the social bond, which is "perpetually threatened with disintegration" by "this primary mutual hostility of human beings."'2 Writing in the shadow of the First World War, just as Maistre wrote in the context of the French Revolution, Freudspeaks disdainfullyof those who claim that humanbeings are naturally good and that the aggression and cruelty so evident in human history is attributableto contingent external factors that can be overcome.13"For 'little children do not like it,' " he writes sarcastically, "when there is talk of the inborn human inclination to 'badness,' to aggressiveness and destructive- ness, and so to cruelty as well."14 At most, Freud claims, this native aggression can be held in check or channelled in socially benign directions. "Civilization, therefore, obtains mastery over the individual's dangerous desire for aggression," he writes, "by weakening and disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city."'5 It cannot, however, be eliminated. Freud mentions nationalism as an example of the beneficial outwardventing of these powerful destructive urges. He refers to this "con- venient and relatively harmless satisfaction of the inclination to aggression by means of which cohesion between the members of the community is made easier" as the "narcissism of minor differences," an antipathy commonly '1 On Freud's similarities to Hobbes, see Peter Gay, Freud: A Lifefor Our Time (New York, 1988), 546; Paul Roazen, Freud: Political and Social Thought, 154, 213; Jeffrey B. Abramson, Liberation and Its Limits: The Moral and Political Thought of Freud (New York, 1984), 4, 11, 52-53, 133-34, 137-38. ' Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 48. 12 Ibid., 49. 13Ibid., 50-52. '4 Ibid., 57. '5 Ibid., 60-61. This content downloaded from 131.251.254.50 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 11:03:44 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 432 Graeme Garrard found among immediate neighbors.16However, this aggression can also be "internalized"by directing it back at its source, where it is "takenover by a portion of the ego, which sets itself over against the rest of the ego as super- ego, and which now, in the form of 'conscience,' is ready to put into action against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous individuals.""7The tension that develops between the "strict"super-ego and the "subordinate"ego Freud calls guilt, which is manifested as "the need for punishment."'8This "internalpolice- man," the superego, reduces somewhat the need for the external repression of aggression. Thus, accordingto Freud, society rests precariouslyupon the basis of an ineliminable dialectic of aggression and repression. Our sexual drives and primal aggressiveness are locked in a perpetual struggle with both the superego of the individual and the social superego. These innate destructive forces occasionally shatterthe fragile bonds of society against which they are in constant, incipient rebellion, erupting in violent bursts of destructionand barbarismsuch as the Reign of Terror and the First World War.