NAGORNO-KARABAKH: A PLAN FOR PEACE Europe Report N°167 – 11 October 2005 p TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF CONFLICT.................................................................. 3 A. HISTORICAL ..........................................................................................................................3 B. POLITICAL AND LEGAL .........................................................................................................4 C. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS................................................................................................6 III. THE NEGOTIATON PROCESS.................................................................................. 8 A. THE MINSK GROUP FORMAT.................................................................................................9 1. Key decisions.............................................................................................................9 2. The parties ...............................................................................................................10 B. A PACKAGE OR STEP-BY-STEP? ..........................................................................................10 C. BUYING TIME .....................................................................................................................11 IV. THE QUESTION OF FUTURE STATUS ................................................................ 12 A. STATUS OPTIONS ................................................................................................................13 B. IMPLEMENTING A SOLUTION BY REFERENDUM....................................................................15 V. OTHER QUESTIONS TO BE RESOLVED ............................................................. 18 A. SECURITY GUARANTEES .....................................................................................................18 1. Separation of forces and demilitarisation ................................................................19 2. Deployment of peacekeepers...................................................................................19 3. Broader military cooperation...................................................................................20 B. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES..............................................................21 1. The Lachin corridor .................................................................................................22 2. Kelbajar....................................................................................................................23 C. RETURN OF IDPS ................................................................................................................24 1. Return to districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh...............................................24 2. Return to Nagorno-Karabakh proper .......................................................................25 3. International assistance programs............................................................................26 D. TRADE AND COMMUNICATION LINKS..................................................................................26 1. Roads and railways ..................................................................................................27 2. Dialogue and confidence building ...........................................................................28 VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 29 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SOUTH CAUCASUS .................................................................................................30 B. MAP OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND SURROUNDING SEVEN DISTRICTS .............................31 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................32 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON EUROPE ..........................................................33 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ...................................................................................35 Europe Report N°167 11 October 2005 NAGORNO-KARABAKH: A PLAN FOR PEACE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Settlement of the long running Nagorno-Karabakh conflict The Minsk Group of the Organisation for Security and -- the most significant obstacle to stability in the South Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), currently co-chaired Caucasus -- remains elusive, despite more optimistic by France, Russia and the U.S., has been facilitating noises recently from Azerbaijan and Armenia. Eleven negotiations since 1994. After a decade of fruitless talks, years after the 1994 ceasefire, burgeoning defence a new format of meetings, the Prague Process, involving budgets, increasing ceasefire violations, and continuing direct bilateral contact between the foreign ministers of demonisation by each side of the other side are ominous Armenia and Azerbaijan was initiated in 2004. During signs that time for a peace agreement is running out. But a the past twelve months the participants and OSCE co- compromise can now be constructed around an approach chairs alike have publicly expressed optimism that a that, while addressing all the matters in dispute, leaves the deal can be reached soon. But there is an urgent need to core issue of Nagorno-Karabakh's ultimate status open for translate that generalised optimism into very specific later resolution, after other measures have been put in agreement and action. place. An earlier Crisis Group report explored how the Armenian Key elements of that proposed settlement package include and Azeri communities of Nagorno-Karabakh and the the withdrawal of the Armenia-backed Nagorno- surrounding districts live today and view resolution Karabakh forces from the occupied districts of Azerbaijan of the conflict.1 Against that background, this report surrounding the entity; the renunciation by Azerbaijan of examines the causes of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the use of force to reintegrate the entity; the deployment analyses the OSCE-led negotiations process as it has of international peacekeepers; the return of displaced evolved since 1992, and identifies the necessary elements persons; and the re-opening of trade and communication of a workable and achievable peace plan. links. Nagorno-Karabakh's status should ultimately be determined by an internationally sanctioned referendum RECOMMENDATIONS with the exclusive participation of Karabakh Armenians and Azeris, but only after the above measures have been To Avoid a Resumption of Fighting: implemented. Until then Nagorno-Karabakh would remain part of Azerbaijan, though in practical terms it would be 1. All parties to the conflict should respect the 1994 self-governing and enjoy an internationally acknowledged ceasefire, refrain from using force, not promote the interim status. use of force, and end the arms race in the region by halting the rise of defence budgets. Today Armenia and Azerbaijan remain divided on vital points. Azerbaijan does not accept any compromise of To Create an Appropriate Environment for its territorial integrity, nor does it agree that Nagorno- Conflict Settlement: Karabakh's population alone can vote on determining its final status. Armenia is not willing to support 2. Azerbaijan should resume direct contact with the de withdrawal from the seven occupied districts around facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities and facilitate Nagorno-Karabakh, or allow the return of Azerbaijan the development of closer contact between internally displaced persons (IDPs) to Nagorno-Karabakh, Karabakh Azeris and Karabakh Armenians. until the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh is a reality. There has been tentative discussion of a possible plebiscite to determine the entity's final status, but with none of the necessary detail agreed as to who would vote on what, when and how, nor any agreement as to what other settlement conditions would create the context for such 1 Crisis Group Europe Report N°166, Nagorno-Karabakh: a vote. Viewing the Conflict from the Ground, 14 September 2005. Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace Crisis Group Europe Report N°167, 11 October 2005 Page ii 3. The de facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should Committee of the Red Cross, OSCE and end support for settlement of formerly Azeri non-governmental organisations; and majority areas with Armenians, including by: (h) identification of a referendum mechanism (a) stopping privatisation of land, homes and for resolving the final status of Nagorno- businesses in those areas; Karabakh, as set out below, with provision until then for the entity to have (b) ceasing to establish local administrations and internationally recognised interim status, infrastructure in the occupied areas adjacent and its governing bodies to be elected under to Nagorno-Karabakh; and international supervision. (c) protecting the remaining Azeri homes. 6. The final status of Nagorno-Karabakh should be 4. Armenia should encourage the de facto Nagorno- decided by a self-determination referendum, which Karabakh authorities to take a more conciliatory would: stance on resolution of the conflict. (a) be held after the return of displaced Azeris to former Azeri-majority areas in Nagorno- To Address the Substantive Matters in Dispute: Karabakh and after an international 5.