Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2004 If Reason Is Not Sovereign: The Function of Reason in Hume and Consequences for the Classical/Positivist Divide, Rational Choice Theory, Low Self-Control Theory, and the Criminal Propensity Construct Michael Jason Kissner Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IF REASON IS NOT SOVEREIGN: THE FUNCTION OF REASON IN HUME AND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE CLASSICAL/POSITIVIST DIVIDE, RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY, LOW SELF-CONTROL THEORY, AND THE CRIMINAL PROPENSITY CONSTRUCT By MICHAEL JASON KISSNER A Dissertation submitted to the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2004 The members of the Committee approve the Dissertation of Michael Jason Kissner defended on November 10, 2004. _______________________ Daniel Maier-Katkin Professor Directing Dissertation _______________________ Barney Twiss Outside Committee Member _______________________ Cecil Greek Committee Member Approved: __________________________ Thomas Blomberg, Dean, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................Page iv INTRODUCTION............................................................................................Page 1 1. THE GREAT DIVIDE IN THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY....................Page 10 2. HUME’S EMPIRICISM AND CLASSICAL CRIMINOLOGY ..................Page 23 3. BECCARIA’S CRIMINOLOGICAL VIEWS .............................................Page 40 4. LOMBROSO’S POSITIVISTIC CRIMINOLOGY .....................................Page 60 5. CHOICE THEORY IN CONTEMPORARY CRIMINOLOGY...................Page 76 6. CLASSICAL CRIMINOLOGY AND LOW SELF CONTROL THEORY..Page 94 7. A THEORY OF CRIMINAL PROPENSITY GROUNDED IN EMOTIONAL DETERMINISM .................................................................Page 111 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................Page 126 REFERENCES ............................................................................................Page 128 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...........................................................................Page 134 iii ABSTRACT This work shows that classical criminological doctrine has been misunderstood and that the consequences of this misunderstanding for contemporary criminological theory and research are grave. In particular, classical criminologists subscribe to a view of rationality that is strikingly different from that which is usually attributed to them. Classical criminologists deny that behavior is invariably rational, and hold that emotional considerations are determinative of the degree of rationality expressed in any given behavior. This view, called “emotional determinism”, is used to generate a theory of criminal propensity that can be empirically tested. The theory is intended as a replacement for Gottfredson and Hirschi’s 1990 low self-control theory, which, while influential, succumbs to the criticism that it is too heavily reliant on rational choice principles. Finally, the work suggests that the genuine distinction between classical and positivist criminologies consists in the fact that as empiricists classical criminologists are committed to holding that environmental forces can in principle be used to dissuade even the most committed of criminals. iv INTRODUCTION This work is about individual-level criminological theory1. It carefully examines the genesis of criminological theory in the so called “classical” and “positivist” schools of criminology and demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that contemporary criminological theorists are operating with seriously mistaken conceptions of the doctrines espoused by classical criminologists. The classical school has been systematically misinterpreted, and the consequences of this misinterpretation for contemporary criminological theory are grave. Because the genesis of criminological theory is steeped in British Empiricist ideas, this work is inherently philosophical as well as historical in character. An underlying motif of the work is that examination of the thought of great philosophers can yield fruitful theoretical ideas. Contemporary mainstream criminology divides the criminological tradition into two camps-the “classical” tradition and the “positivist” tradition. The former is customarily traced backed to the mid-eighteenth century writings of Beccaria, who was a utilitarian and an empiricist. The latter is traced backed to the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century writings of Lombroso, who is best known for his investigation of the relationship between biological factors and crime. Today, theories descending from the classical tradition are called “choice” theories. Theories descending from the “positivist” tradition are called “individual difference” or “propensity” theories. It is widely believed that there are paradigmatic differences between the two traditions, and hence between the theoretical descendants of those traditions. This belief is false. While there is a real difference between the two traditions, the difference is in principle empirically resoluble. Therefore, it is probably best not to characterize the difference as paradigmatic (Kuhn, 1970). The phrase “great divide” is used to designate the fiction, believed by nearly all contemporary criminologists, that there is a paradigmatic difference between the traditions. The remainder of the introduction briefly2 characterizes the divide and gives preliminary reasons for thinking that the great divide is an illusory construction. A concise rendition of the more salient consequences of the illusory divide is given as well. Finally, a thumbnail sketch of a conceptual replacement of the great divide that solves a host of problems bequeathed by the divide is outlined. Characterizing the Divide Most criminologists think that the classical tradition subscribes to free will, denies that there are individual motivational differences relevant to criminal behavior, is unscientific, and disavows the concept “cause”. Most criminologists think that the positivist tradition subscribes to determinism, upholds the idea of individual motivational differences relevant to criminal behavior, is scientific, and accepts the concept of cause. 1 Hereinafter, all references to “criminological theory” denote “individual-level” criminological theory unless otherwise indicated. 2 A more detailed characterization of the great divide is offered in Chapter 1. The discussion here is simply intended to orient readers. 1 These contrasts help constitute a great metattheoretical divide. It is easy to see that the above suppositions (alleged suppositions, as we shall see) of the two traditions are in stark contrast. The received view3 of the classical tradition ascribes to that tradition the belief that criminal behavior represents a freely chosen and rational response designed to maximize the pleasure/pain ratio of actors. The received view of the classical tradition ascribes to that tradition the belief that reason is sovereign over behavior, such that behavior invariably conforms with the dictates of reason. Combining the above ideas, the received view of the classical tradition ascribes to that tradition the view that criminal behaviors are simply rational solutions to self-interested pleasure/pain problems. The received view of the positivist position, on the other hand, holds that all behavior is caused by arational forces, and that the magnitude and/or intensity of these forces can vary across individuals and within the same individual over time. Freedom and the sovereignty of reason are denied by the received view of the positivist position. The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd edition) provides in pertinent part that “arational” means “not governed by the laws of reason” as well as “non-rational”. The positivist position is looked upon as holding that arational forces, or motivations, can issue from sociological, psychological, or biological sources. These considerations tend to make typical positivist theories “type of person” (Nagin and Paternoster, 1993) theories, or “propensity” theories. The typical positivist position says that criminal behavior represents the effects of an individually varying confluence of arational forces. For positivists, reason is not sovereign, the arational is. Theorists in this camp view crimes as the result of motivational propulsions operating on the organism, and any correspondence of criminal responses with rational views of self-interest is viewed as fortuitous in a causal sense. For positivists, behaviors are not performed because rational self-interest prescribes them; they are performed because arational forces propel them. These are strikingly different views of human behavior. The received view of the classical position essentially says that there is no need to worry about making people behave in rational, self-interested ways. This view holds that people invariably behave that way because it is human nature to do so. The foregoing suggests that received views of the two traditions differ sharply with respect to their estimation