Heinrich August Winkler, ed.. Weimar im Widerstreit. Deutungen der ersten deutschen Republik im geteilten Deutschland. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2002. 193 pp. EUR 24.80, cloth, ISBN 978-3-486-56653-6. Reviewed by Matthew Stibbe Published on H-German (January, 2004) In the period since the collapse of the GDR The volume is neatly divided into three sec‐ and the reunification of Germany in 1989/90, tions, each devoted to a major area of controversy scholars have shown a growing interest in the within and between the two opposing historio‐ problem of coming to terms with a "divided past"; graphical traditions. The frst section deals with that is, the problem of how to reconcile the two the foundations of the Weimar Republic in very different historiographical traditions preva‐ 1918-19, and in particular with rival interpreta‐ lent in capitalist West Germany and communist tions of the character and significance of the No‐ East Germany during the Cold War era. In particu‐ vember 1918 revolution. Klaus Schoenhoven be‐ lar attention has focused on the Third Reich and gins with an overview of recent literature on the the Holocaust, as well as on the German resis‐ legacy of the First World War, paying particular tance to Hitler.[1] However, as Heinrich August attention to its political, social and cultural effects. Winkler argues in the introduction to this new In his view the First World War was both the collection of essays, "hardly any chapter in Ger‐ Urkatastrophe of the twentieth century and at the man history created such tensions between the same time particularly damaging to Germany, Federal Republic and the GDR as the Weimar [pe‐ where it helped to breed a widespread contempt riod]" (p. 9). This is largely because the political for parliamentary politics and a glorification of vi‐ and ideological battles between communists and olence, especially, but not exclusively, on the polit‐ social democrats which began at that time were ical Right. The results were already to be seen in still being fought out between the two German the early years of the new republic: between 1918 states in the 1950s and beyond. Even in the 1980s and 1924, for instance, 376 politically motivated and into the 1990s, the years 1918-1933 continued murders took place, and among the victims were to be a hotly contested area of debate, with both such prominent democratic politicians as sides claiming to represent the most humane and Matthias Erzberger and Walter Rathenau, as well democratic version of history. as the revolutionaries Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. These murders in turn were a heavy H-Net Reviews burden for the new republic to bear, perhaps out‐ early as 1948, and stressed the "bourgeois" nature weighing in importance even the economic and of the 1918 revolution and the "opportunistic" be‐ social costs of the war. havior of the SPD and USPD-dominated workers' Moving on to the November 1918 revolution councils. The "lessons" to be drawn were self-evi‐ itself, Winkler gives a precise summary of the dent: a successful socialist revolution could only changing nature of West German interpretations be achieved in Germany by ridding the workers' of the workers' councils of 1918-19. Whereas in movement of all forms of Sozialdemokratismus the 1950s historical writing on this subject was and instead building up a "party of a new type" dominated by anti-communism, in the 1960s new based on the Bolshevik model of democratic cen‐ questions arose. Was the period November 1918 tralism as practiced by Lenin in the Soviet Union to February 1919 a missed opportunity for the left and by the SED from 1948-49 onwards. Even so, as in Germany? Could the split in the workers' move‐ John notes, this orthodox position was challenged ment between communists and social democrats at various points--particularly in the late 1950s have been avoided at this time? Was there a "third and again in the Gorbachev era--by an alternative way" between a Soviet-style dictatorship and a view which stressed the revolutionary (albeit capitalist parliamentary republic? Winkler him‐ non-Leninist) character of the workers' councils self rejects the answer provided by the "68ers" in of 1918-19 and the possibility of missed opportu‐ West Germany, who stressed the revolutionary nities for a separate German road to socialism. In democratic potential contained in the workers' other words, the "lessons" of 1918 might just as council movement of Winter 1918-19. As far as he easily challenge the legitimacy of SED rule as rein‐ is concerned, the government of people's commis‐ force it. This problem explains why party chair‐ sars, led by Ebert and Scheidemann, had to make man Walter Ulbricht took such a strong personal compromises with the bourgeois parties and the interest in the question of historical interpreta‐ forces of law and order in order to prevent the tions of 1918, and why, under his successor, Erich slide into chaos and civil war. Compromise with Honecker, the party actually began to distance it‐ the communists was out of the question, for the self from any positive references to 1918 at all. In‐ latter were determined to block not only the elec‐ stead, greater emphasis was now placed on the tions to a National Assembly but also the forma‐ revolutions of 1848, which could be more easily tion of a broadly representative coalition-based presented as a defining moment in the history of government. If the elections had not taken place, the German workers' movement within the and if the bourgeois parties had not been allowed broader framework of the "heritage and tradition" to enter the government, argues Winkler, then the debate. most likely result would have been civil war fol‐ The second section of the book moves on to lowed by right-wing dictatorship, and certainly look at another equally controversial area of the not a strengthening of democratic socialism in historiography, namely the rival and mutually in‐ Germany. compatible policies adopted by the SPD and the A very different view of the events of 1918-19 KPD in the early 1930s when confronted with the prevailed in the GDR, as Juergen John shows in rise of Hitler and the Nazi party. Eberhard Kolb, his contribution, which examines in detail the use in his contribution, subjects the actions of the SPD made by the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) of leadership between 1930 and 1933 to a critical the anniversaries of 1918 in 1948, 1958 and 1968 analysis and comes to a fairly positive assessment in order to reinforce its own claim to historical le‐ of the party's attempts to uphold democracy in gitimacy. The official party line was laid down as the face of threats from a totalitarian left and fas‐ cist right. In particular the decision of the party to 2 H-Net Reviews "tolerate" the Bruening government between 1930 burg in 1919, and the crushing of the May Day and 1932 must be judged in terms of how it was demonstrations by the SPD-dominated Prussian seen at the time: as a short-term strategy designed government in 1929. Such events, argues Bramke, to allow the parliamentary system to survive the drove the KPD into a marginalized position within immediate economic crisis, rather than as a be‐ Weimar society and encouraged the process of trayal of social democratic principles. Andreas Stalinization at the expense of internal party Wirsching, on the other hand, investigates the po‐ democracy. sition adopted by the KPD between 1928 and 1932, The fnal section looks at differing interpreta‐ with particular emphasis on the "anti-fascist ac‐ tions of the legacy of Weimar in the post-1945 tion" of 1932. The KPD's policy after the Prussian world. Here we are dealing with some of the most elections in April 1932 was to undermine the lead‐ important "founding myths" of the two German ership of the SPD by appealing to the SPD rank- states in 1949. In West Germany, for instance, the and-file to join in a common struggle against slogan "Bonn is not Weimar" was linked to a nega‐ Hitler. If SPD-oriented workers could be won tive interpretation of the 1919 Weimar constitu‐ over, their leaders would have to follow. Yet, as tion, which was held to contain insufficient safe‐ Wirsching notes, any real chance of a united front guards against the rise of extremist parties on the against fascism was destroyed by internal rifts one hand and the abdication of power by respon‐ within the KPD, which ended ultimately in the re‐ sible democratic parties on the other. However, as fusal of the party's Central Committee to compro‐ Dieter Grimm points out, Bonn survived not only mise on ideological questions or to drop its con‐ because it had a more robust constitution but be‐ demnation of "reformist" social democratic organ‐ cause of the entirely different conditions prevail‐ isations as "social fascist." Initial confusion and ing in the western zones of Germany in the late uncertainty in April 1932 were followed by a 1940s and beyond. In particular the Basic Law of hardening of entrenched ideological positions in 1949 was preceded by the reemergence and/or July 1932, to Hitler's advantage and to the disad‐ amalgamation of democratic parties who were in vantage of both KPD and SPD. fundamental agreement on the principles which The two further commentaries by Hermann should govern the new state. Anti-communism Weber and Werner Bramke are perhaps more in‐ too was perhaps an important unifying factor in teresting for what they say about Wirsching's con‐ West German politics, especially in the 1950s.