POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE MARKET - Towards a Comparable Assessment of Market Liberalism Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität zu Köln 2018 Dipl. Pol. Leonce Röth aus Hennef/Sieg - 0 - Referent: Prof. Dr. André Kaiser Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Ingo Rohlfing Tag der Promotion: 13.07.2018 - 1 - Contents Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................... v Collaboration with co-authors ........................................................................................................ ix Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 1 PART I | THE CONCEPT OF MARKET LIBERALISM ................................................... 15 1. The conceptual foundation........................................................................................... 15 1.1 The core elements of market liberalism ...................................................................... 19 1.2 Adjacent elements of market liberalism ...................................................................... 21 1.3 Party families and market liberalism ............................................................................ 24 1.4 Intervention without states ........................................................................................... 32 1.5 The peripheral elements ................................................................................................ 33 1.6 Summary of Part I .......................................................................................................... 36 1.7 References of Part I ....................................................................................................... 41 PART II | MEASURING MARKET LIBERALISM .............................................................. 45 2. A systematic review of measurement decisions ......................................................... 45 2.1 Benchmarks .................................................................................................................... 47 2.2 Step 1: Selection and transformation of indicators ................................................... 49 2.3 Step 2: Adding salience to positions ............................................................................ 51 2.4 Step 3: Weighting the indicators .................................................................................. 54 2.4.1 The mixed response model ........................................................................................... 56 2.5 Step 4: Aggregation ........................................................................................................ 59 2.6 Assessment of validity ................................................................................................... 61 2.7 Counterfactual transformation and measurement decisions ................................... 62 2.8 Substantial impact .......................................................................................................... 64 2.9 Degrees of equivalence ................................................................................................. 66 2.10 The Meaning of Market Liberalism over Time ......................................................... 69 2.11 Towards comparable government preferences ......................................................... 76 2.12 Conclusions Part II ........................................................................................................ 87 2.13 References Part II .......................................................................................................... 91 i PART III | IMPACT OF MARKET LIBERAL GOVERNMENTS .................................. 96 3.1 Why would government ideology still matter? .......................................................... 96 3.2 The impact of different government ideology measures ....................................... 100 3.2.0 The generalized causal identification procedure ...................................................... 102 3.2.1 De-regulating the economy .......................................................................................... 109 3.2.2 Retrenchment of welfare and government spending .............................................. 115 3.2.3 The revenue side. Changing the composition and progressivity of tax systems . 119 3.3 Market liberalism and performance ........................................................................... 127 3.3.1 Market liberalism, productivity and growth .............................................................. 133 3.3.2 Market liberalism and inequality ................................................................................. 137 3.3.3 The long run .................................................................................................................. 142 3.3.4 Identification of long term effects ............................................................................. 144 3.4 The Impact of Populist Radical Right Parties on Socio-Economic Policies ....... 152 3.4.1 Populist Radical Right Parties and Socio-Economic Policy ................................... 153 3.4.2 Vote-seeking strategies................................................................................................. 154 3.4.3 Office-seeking strategies .............................................................................................. 156 3.4.4 Research Design, Method and Data .......................................................................... 159 3.4.5 Dependent Variables .................................................................................................... 161 3.4.6 Main Independent Variables: PRRPs in Government ............................................ 162 3.4.7 Alternative Explanations and Controls ..................................................................... 164 3.4.8 Quantitative Analysis: Average Effects of PRRP Government Participation ..... 167 3.4.9 Selections for case study analysis ............................................................................... 171 3.4.10 Qualitative Analysis: Austria 1997-2003 .................................................................... 173 3.4.11 Discussion and Conclusion ......................................................................................... 179 3.4.2 References Part III ....................................................................................................... 182 PART IV | MARKET LIBERALISM AND THE SUPERIMPOSITION OF TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS ........................................................................................................ 193 4.1 Market liberalism and territoriality ............................................................................ 193 4.2 Centre–Periphery Conflict and Ideological Distance in Turkey ........................... 194 4.2.1 Decentralization Claims and National Responses ................................................... 197 4.2.1 A Quantitative Assessment of the Turkish Actor Constellation ........................... 201 4.2.2 Territorial Authority in the Turkish Context............................................................ 206 4.2.3 A Qualitative Analysis of Party Preferences ............................................................. 209 4.2.4 Kurdish Autonomy Claims 1987 - 2015 ................................................................... 209 ii 4.2.5 National Neglect of Kurdish Autonomy Claims ..................................................... 215 4.2.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 225 4.3 A General Theory of Ideological Authority Insulation .......................................... 227 4.3.1 Why accommodate minorities? .................................................................................. 227 4.3.2 Partisan Rationales ....................................................................................................... 232 4.3.2.1 Electoral vulnerability................................................................................................... 234 4.3.2.2 Intra-party insulation .................................................................................................... 234 4.3.3 Implications of the partisan rationales ...................................................................... 235 4.3.4 The Theory of Ideological Authority Insulation ...................................................... 236 4.3.5 Our Universe of Cases, Case Selection and Data .................................................... 238 4.3.6 Alternative partisan rationales .................................................................................... 243 4.3.7 Structural incentives to accommodate....................................................................... 244 4.3.8 Opportunity structures for state-wide governments ............................................... 244 4.3.9 Identification ................................................................................................................. 245 4.3.10 Results ............................................................................................................................ 246 4.3.11 Robustness of the ideological proximity effect .......................................................