THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S OTTVATIONS FOE INTERVENING' IN GRENADA (OCTOBEE 25* 1968) A Thesis Submitted to the committee on Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Faculty of Graduate Studies Christopher E. Evelyn M.A. Candidate Trent University Peterborough, Ontario, Canada (c) Copyright by Christopher E. Evelyn 2010 History Master of Arts September 2010 Library and Archives Bibliotheque et 1*1 Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada Your file Vote reference ISBN: 978-0-494-68230-2 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-68230-2 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'Internet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le loan, distribute and sell theses monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non­ support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in this et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni thesis. Neither the thesis nor la these ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci substantial extracts from it may be ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement printed or otherwise reproduced reproduits sans son autorisation. without the author's permission. In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la Privacy Act some supporting forms protection de la vie privee, quelques may have been removed from this formulaires secondaires ont ete enleves de thesis. cette these. While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis. 1+1 Canada I Abstract: The Reagan Administration's motivations for intervening in Grenada (October 25,1983) Christopher E. Evelyn This thesis has focused on the Reagan Administration's motivations for intervening in Grenada in October 1983. By critically examining the three stated justifications and proposing unstated motivations for intervention, this work has highlighted larger issues related to the role of public opinion and support in the formation of American foreign policy. As the first intervention since America's defeat in Vietnam, the Grenada intervention comes at a particularly tentative time in U.S. foreign policy and as such this thesis examines how the Reagan Administration attempted to sell the war. This thesis was informed by a variety of primary sources drawn from declassified documents from the Reagan Presidential Library, captured documents from Grenada's People's Revolutionary Government, newspaper articles, and memoir accounts from leading actors in the Reagan Administration as well as leading secondary documents on the topic. Keywords: Urgent Fury, Grenada Intervention, Grenada Invasion, Reagan foreign policy, Grenada Revolution, Maurice Bishop, Paul Scoon, II Acknowledgements: Often throughout this process I have felt that completing my research and writing was an individual journey, and in many ways it was, however there have been many people whose support and kindness fuelled my progress. My thesis supervisor David Sheinin initially encouraged me to apply into the History M. A. program at Trent and has been a continual source of support over the last two years, providing both valuable insights and gentle nudges when needed. I would also like to thank the members of my supervisory committee Graham Taylor and Robert Wright who provided valuable advice on the larger themes involved but their attention to detail caught many of my errors along the way. A special thank you goes out to the staff of the Bata Library at Trent University. Particularly the staff of the interlibrary loans office who went above and beyond the call of duty to ensure that I had access to the resources needed and were always available to give advice sourcing documents. Special thanks are also in order for Mike Duggan from the Reagan Presidential Library who over the course of a number of weeks helped me to navigate the archives of the library and to narrow my search for documents. Finally I would like to thank my family and friends who have offered a listening ear and continual encouragement. My mother, Dr. Veronica Evelyn was particularly helpful in editing chapters, and providing advice on structure and content. When I was unable to travel to Barbados to do research, my sister Camille Lvelyn stepped up to the plate and dedicated many weeks of her short summer break to photographing articles from the Nation Newspaper in Barbados. Thanks Camille. Three of my colleagues Derek Lipman, Devon McKinnon and Bradley Melle have been unselfish in offering a listening ear at times when I needed to vocalize my thoughts. Thanks for the intellectual engagement guys. Without the contributions of these people, completing this project would not have been possible. in Table of Contents Abstract ii Acknowledgements iii List of abbreviations V Introduction 1 Background: Grenada in a Nutshell 23 The Safety of American Citizens in Grenada 37 The OECS/ Governor General's Invitation 60 The Soviet/ Cuban Threat 86 The Unstated Motivations for Intervention 111 Conclusion 139 Appendix: Dramatis Personae 150 Bibliography 152 List of Abbreviations: BDF Barbados Defence Force CARICOM Caribbean Community CBI Caribbean Basin Initiative CC Central Committee CIA Central Intelligence Agency LIAT Leeward Islands Air Transport NJM New Jewel Movement OECS Organization of Eastern Caribbean States PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization PRA People's Revolutionary Army PRG People's Revolutionary Government PSIA Point Salines International Airport RFG Radio Free Grenada RMC Revolutionary Military Council SGU St. George's University School of Medicine UN United Nations 1 Introduction In the early morning hours of Tuesday October 25, 1983 on the Caribbean island of Grenada, the United States launched the first military operation since their humiliating withdrawal from Vietnam. The operation, coded named "Urgent Fury", involved over 7000 troops representing all sectors of the U.S. Military; the Air Force, Navy, Army, Marines, Army Rangers, Navy Seals and even the Delta Force.1 This unprecedented show of force by the U.S. military has aptly been described as using "a sledgehammer to crack a nutmeg."2 These troops were joined by a force of 300 troops from six Caribbean countries.3 The objectives of "Urgent Fury" were clear. First, the troops sought to protect and evacuate the estimated 1000 American citizens on the island, many of them students at the St. George's University. In order to do this, they would need to "neutralize" the Grenadian People's Revolutionary Army (PRA), the militia, and a contingent of Cuban foreign workers. Once both tasks had been completed, the U.S. in conjunction with their Caribbean allies would seek to restore democracy to the island.4 In order to achieve this mission, certain key sites would need to be seized including the Pearls and Point Salines airports, Radio Free Grenada, the Governor General's residence, the St. George's University School of Medicine campuses and the Richmond Hill prison where political prisoners 1 Robert Freeman Smith, The Caribbean World and the United States: Mixing Rum and Coca-Cola, Twayne's International History Series (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), 64. 2 Gary Williams, US-Grenada Relations: Revolution and Intervention in the Backyard (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 2. 3 Hugh O'Shaughnessy, GRENADA: An Eyewitness Account of the U.S. Invasion and the Caribbean History that Provoked it (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1984), 8-9. 4 Robert J. Beck, The Grenada Invasion: Politics, Law and Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1993), 17-18. 2 were being held.5 In theory, this operation should not have presented a challenge for the elite forces of the world's foremost superpower. In reality, "Urgent Fury" was plagued by miscommunication, a lack of intelligence on the island and an underestimation of the resolve of Grenadian troops and Cuban workers. These 784 Cubans had been on the island assisting Grenada with a number of development projects, including the construction of the Point Salines International Airport where 550 were assigned.6 Due to the demoralization of the militia following the death of Prime Minister Bishop, it is hard to estimate how many of the 2500 militia fought. It is however estimated that most of the 600 members of the PRA fought.7 It was not until the arrest of former Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard and leader of the Revolutionary Military Council Hudson Austin on October 29, that fighting ended.8 In the final analysis, at the end of Operation Urgent Fury 87 were dead and 503 wounded.9 Military historian, Mark Adkin, in summarising the operation, notes that while it was both a political and military success, it "came within a hairsbreadth of being a military disaster."10 American military intervention in Grenada will be the focus of this work. My interest in the topic first developed in 1997 after a high school trip to the island. I can still vividly remember visiting Fort Rupert, where the guide, a woman in her early thirties, expertly explained to our group the complexities of Grenadian revolutionary history and the conditions that led to the assassination of former Prime Minister Maurice Bishop on that very spot.