The Danish Approach to UN Peace Operations after the Cold War: A New Model in the Making? PETER VIGGO JAKOBSEN The traditional Danish and Nordic peacekeeping model emphasized the principles of impartiality and no use of force except in self-defence, and was designed for operations enjoying the full consent of the warring parties. Today, this model is increasingly being regarded as obsolete because most contemporary United Nations (UN) operations enjoy limited or no consent. Since most analysts regard the Nordic countries as a bastion of traditionalism, little attention has been paid to their efforts to come up with a new and more relevant approach to contemporary peace operations. This is a mistake, as Denmark has 'revolutionized' its approach to peace operations and is about to come up with a new model that meets the requirements for success in a cost-effective manner. This article presents the emerging Danish model, analyses its strengths and limitations and concludes that it stands a good chance of becoming just as influential as the traditional peacekeeping model it is replacing. The Danish tanks changed the way to solve wider peacekeeping tasks forever. The tanks became a model for the existing NATO force in Bosnia.'I Lt-Gen. Michael Rose Why study the Danish approach to peace operations after the Cold War? This is a pertinent question to ask, as most analysts regard the Nordic countries as a stronghold of traditional peacekeeping characterized by the principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self defence. According to this view, the Danish approach to contemporary peace operations is essentially pacifist and irrelevant.2 This view is mistaken as revolutionary change has taken place. 'Militarization' is a provocative, yet correct, way of describing it.' Danish tank crews in Bosnia inflicted the largest military defeat upon Bosnian Serb forces prior to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Operation Deliberate Force. In an engagement in April 1994 lasting several hours, Danish tanks fired 72 shells Peter Viggo Jakobsen is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. International Peacekeeping, Vol.5, No.3, Autumn 1998, pp.106-23 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON and destroyed all the Bosnian Serb units that opened fire upon them. The introduction of a medal for bravery in the Danish Armed Forces is also difficult to square with the prevailing view of the Danish approach as pacifist. It was awarded for the first time on 13 May 1997 to seven soldiers who had served in former Yugoslavia.' These changes raise a number of questions. What has replaced the traditional Danish model? How do the Danish armed forces approach the tricky question concerning the use of force in low-consent operations? How has public opinion reacted to the 'militarization' of the Danish approach to peace operations? What has Denmark done in order to prepare its forces for such operations? How can these adjustments be made at a time when defence budgets are declining? This article will address these questions. The challenges posed by low-consent operations are presented first. Then follows an analysis of the Danish responses. The final section analyses the strengths and the weaknesses of the emerging Danish model. The Challenges of Contemporary Peace Operations and the Need for a New Approach During the Cold War UN operations generally enjoyed consent from the parties to the conflict (the Congo operation 1960-64 was the obvious exception to this rule). A traditional peacekeeping operation was based on the assumption that the environment was benign and that there would be no need to engage in combat. Troops were thinly deployed, carried light weapons and travelled in soft-skinned vehicles. Their task was a relatively simple one: to separate the parties and monitor ceasefires. Lacking the capability to impose their will on the parties, peacekeepers strove to remain impartial and relied primarily on their negotiating skills in crises. Use of force was as a rule limited to self-defence. In the 1990s, the erosion of consent undermined the traditional approach to peacekeeping. The experiences from Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia where lightly armed peacekeepers were deployed in environments characterized by limited consent show that, for a peace force to be effective under these circumstances, it must be able to fight and stop attempts by the parties to prevent it from achieving its mission. In short, whereas the ability to fight is unnecessary on missions enjoying the consent of the parties, this ability is absolutely crucial for success in missions where consent is limited or non-existent.55 The low risk of combat allowed traditional peacekeeping operations to succeed during the Cold War although the forces deployed were militarily ineffective. Pre-mission planning was minimal and deployment characterized by last-minute improvisation. It was usually piecemeal and .