PROCEEDINGS, FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE APRIL 1973 Maurice C. Benewitz, Editor Table of Contents Order of speeches for the Journal of the First Annual Conference of the Na­ tional Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education. Introduction Page Sidney Hook - The Academic Mission and Collective Bargaining 8 Robert J. Kibbee -A Chancellor Views Bargaining in Retrospect and Prospect ---------------------------------------------------- 18 David Selden - Unionism's Place in Faculty Life ___ _____ ________ _ 24 Donald H. Wollett- Historical Development of Faculty Collective Bar­ gaining and Current Extent__________________________________________________________________ 28 Terrence N. Tice -The Faculty Rights and Responsibilities Report: University of Michigan ______________ _ __ __________ _______________________________ ________ 41 Robert J. Wolfson - Productivity and University Salaries: How will Col- lective Bargaining be Affected? ___ ______________________________ __ _______ 52 Margaret K. Chandler and Connie Chiang - Management Rights Issues in Collective Bargaining in Higher Education____ ___________ 58 Israel Kugler - Creation of a Distinction Between Management and Faculty ____ _____ _______ ___ _____ _________________ _______ _____________________ 67 Tracy H. Ferguson - Certification of Units under Federal Law____ 72 Jerome Lefkowitz - Certification of Units in Higher Education 81 Charles Bob Simpson -Academic Judgement and Due Process__ 89 Milton Friedman - Special Issues in Arbitration of Higher Education Disputes: Academic Judgment and Tenure Quotas ____________________ __ 96 Thomas G. S. Christensen - Due Process and Academic Judgment _ 104 James P. Begin - Collective Bargaining and Collegiality 109 William B. Boyd-The Question of Tenure_ 117 Woodley B. Osborne - Is Tenure a Bargainable Issue? 125 David Newton - Management Structure and the Financing of Bargains in Public Universities 130 Introduction As of September 15, 1973, 211 institutions (or more than 321 Colleges) in the United States have had a Union Agent of some kind designated to represent their faculties and sometimes their non-teaching professionals. This phenom­ enon covers the spectrum from two-year college to university and is true in both the private and public sector. Of these 211 institutions, 25 are in the pri­ vate sector and 186 are in the public sector. The agents include the National Education Association, American Federation of Teachers, American Associa­ tion of University Professors, and unaffiliated groups.1 Why this should have occurred is the subject of an already voluminous lit­ erature.2 It has been suggested by a variety of writers that the reasons include the ability to organize with legal protection provided by state public employ­ ment laws; the necessity of public institution faculties to compete effectively with other organized employee groups for limited governmental resources; the similar need of private sector faculties to compete with other union groups on the same campus; dissatisfaction with governance or other organizational schema on campuses; fears for personal security in an era of cut-backs in edu­ cational resources; the coming of tenure quotas;3 and the like. At the same time, a number of faculties have deliberately decided not to enter into bargaining, at least at the present. This collection of papers includes an examination of the reasons for such behavior at the University of Michigan by Terrence Tice. On a more general basis, Everett C. Ladd and Seymour M. Lipsett have sought to analyze both why some faculties, and which ones, have entered into bargaining and why other faculties have thus far declined to do so. Their study seems to suggest a relationship between the decision made and the status of the institution in the educational sector.4 As they them­ selves note, the status of institutions is related to the presence or absence of some of the qualities which faculties have sought through unionism: a stronger voice in governance, for example. This compendium of papers presented at the First Annual Conference of the National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education held in New York City on April 12 and 13, 1973 surveys the status of bargain­ ing as it now exists in higher education, some of the reasons for it, some of the effects already detected, some of the problems created, and some of the ex­ pected future directions bargaining will take. Several overview papers are presented: those of Chancellor Robert Kibbee of the City University of New York, a major institution with a contract; of Dr. Sidney Hook, a distinguished philosopher who discusses the reasons for and impact of bargaining on campus as he sees it; and of Professor Donald H. Wollett who has studied collective bargaining from its inception on campus and who also, as a legal practitioner, was involved in the early growth of 1Elias Liebennan Higher Education Contract Library, National Center of the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, Baruch College. 2See Bibliography, No. 1 published by the National Center. 3See Keast, W.R., Faculty Tenure. Jossey-Bass, 1973. 'Ladd, E. and Lipsett, S. Professors, Unions, and American Higher Education, McGraw­ Hill, 1973. Also "Unionizing the Professoriate." Change, 5( 6): 38-44, Summer, 1973. 5 unions. As might be expected, Wollett's view that faculties adoption unionism might well abandon traditional governance schemes differ from those of Kibbee and Hook, and they differ among themselves. The papers of Jerome Lefkowitz and Tracy Ferguson trace the legal foun­ dations on which bargaining is based in both the public and private sectors. Distressing as it may be to the campus, it will not be possible to avoid com­ pletely, if at all, the "industrial model'' on campus if the precedents and law relating to the formation of units are drawn from law adapted to the needs of other types of employee groups and these papers show that this is true. Later this year, in June and July, the National Labor Relations Board, in the Syra­ cuse5 and New York University6 unit determinations, showed that application of the usual unit determination rules might well fragment the campus, a result justified in law but at least arguably undesirable in the type of symbiotic com­ munity found on the campus.7 At the same time, as Ferguson shows, the regu­ latory agencies have found the customs and realities of the campus to be difficult to deal with under the law and precedents established: i.e., in the area of collegiality. Who are supervisors? Are chairmen always supervisors? Sometimes? The various unit determinations show the difficulty of applying the law to the campus. The question of collegiality on campus and its implications for bargaining - as well as for unit determination - is discussed in the paper of James P. Begin. If unionism implies an employer-employee relationship as John Dunlop noted long ago,8 is collegiality possible on campus once bargaining has come? A number of scholars such as Donald Walters of the University of Massachu­ setts would answer in the affirmative. Many other students of bargaining would be doubtful that a new type of bargaining model is possible, or at least, that one has emerged. Other papers here presented view the impact of bargaining from many aspects. Margaret P. Chandler and Connie Chiang view the impact on management rights, which is, of course, related to the question of collegiality. Israel Kugler from a union viewpoint, believes a distinction must be created between man­ agement and faculty. Robert J. Wolfson, looks at yet another bargaining prob­ lem, the relationship between productivity, university salaries and bargaining. To what extent will the economics of the campus be altered by this new insti­ tution? One difficulty of answering this question is the vast difference in pay­ ment patterns and their causation that existed before bargaining. Govern­ mental impacts in the public area; relative wealth in the private area; rigid schedule systems v. individual bargains; differing criteria of worth and ac­ complishment have always existed. Yet another economic problem caused by bargaining is examined in the 583-LRRM-1373-79. 683-LRRM-1549-58. 7See the Center Newsletter, Volume 1, No. 1 for a brief discussion of these decisions and their implications. 8Dunlop, J. T. "The Development of Labor Organization: A Theoretical Framework," in Insights Into Labor Issues, R. A. Lester and J. Shister, eds., (New York, 1948) p. 184. 6 paper of David Newton. The significant cost of bargaining and contract admin­ istration must not be disregarded in considering the impact of bargaining on the campus. It would be interesting to discover the equivalent expenditures of the union representatives. Undoubtedly, the cost is high there also. Are the returns worth such expenditure of resources which would presumably be available for other educational uses if not allocated here? Related to collegiality is the question of tenure, tenure quotas, and the right of faculties to bargain over these rights. Many students of collective bargaining have held that the increased security and protection of individual rights achieved in contracts is at least as important as the economic gains in explaining the desire of employees to have contract protections. The papers of Woodley B. Osborne and William B. Boyd deal with the question of tenure and the bargaining process. This writer has suggested elsewhere9 that the broadening of security sought in many bargains for the untenured