University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons CUREJ - College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal College of Arts and Sciences 3-28-2018 Media Distrust: Whose Confidence was Lost? Hunter Pearl University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/curej Part of the American Politics Commons Recommended Citation Pearl, Hunter, "Media Distrust: Whose Confidence was Lost?" 28 March 2018. CUREJ: College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, University of Pennsylvania, https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/215. This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/215 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Media Distrust: Whose Confidence was Lost? Abstract The news media is among the least-trusted institutions in the nation, with only 41% of Americans reporting a great deal or fair amount of trust in it (Swift 2017). This is a major change from the highly trusted media of the mid-20 th Century, although historically this independent, powerful, and widely respected media establishment is an anomaly. To analyze the causes of media distrust over the last forty years, I have demographically broken down results from a question asked by the General Social Survey since 1972. I tested these results, isolated through a regression analysis, against my predictions of potential sources of media distrust. Among all the factors, only political factors – partisanship and political ideology – were substantially significant, while age and hours of TV watched showed weak significance. This did not clearly support any of my predictions but indicates the preeminence of politics as a determinant of media trust. Keywords political science, public opinion, media, press, media trust, distrust, Political Science, Social Sciences, Matthew Levendusky, Levendusky, Matthew Disciplines American Politics This article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/215 Media Distrust: Whose Confidence was Lost? Hunter Pearl Thesis Advisor: Matthew Levendusky Introduction A half century ago, the mass media was among the most trusted institutions in American life, and CBS Evening News Anchor Walter Cronkite was the most trusted public figure in the nation (Ladd 2012, 1). Gallup surveys taken in the early 1970s showed that 70% of Americans had a great deal or fair amount of confidence in the press to report the news fairly. Nearly 50 years later, the picture is strikingly different. The media is now rated as among the least-trusted institutions in the nation (Gronke and Cooke 2007), with those same Gallup surveys showing only 41% now have a great deal or fair amount of trust in the media (Swift 2017). It is hard to overstate the extent to which public attitudes toward the media have shifted in the last few decades, or the consequences of that shift for the media itself and the broader political context. Why the media captured public confidence before – and why it no longer does now – represent a fundamental unsolved puzzle in American politics. One obvious hypothesis is that political actors have long politicized the media. In particular, Republican elites—Starting with Goldwater and cemented with the Nixon administration and Edith Efron’s book The News Twisters—have called out the media for an alleged liberal bias (Hemmer 2016). Not to be outdone, many on the left do the same, except alleging right-wing, pro-corporate biases (McChesney 2004). So while Donald Trump—with his shouts of “fake news!” and outrageous tweets—may raise media criticism to new levels, he is far from sui generis (Ladd 2012). This politicization of media coverage reflects itself in public opinion data as well. Those identifying as Republicans or conservatives have, since at least the 1970s, reported a lower amount of trust in the media, and this gap has widened over time (Ladd 2012). In September 2016, the Gallup survey reported a low of 32% of respondents showing a great deal or fair amount of trust in the media, but in 2017 this recovered to the 40-44% range that was seen every other year for the last ten years. This recent shift, however, was driven entirely by changes among Democrats: while Republicans remained extremely distrusting of the media (14% in both years), Democratic support increased 20 percentage points (51% in 2016 to 72% in 2017). Further, the 2016 numbers for Democrats were about the same as those in 2015, whereas in 2015 trust by Republicans were more than double at over 30% (Swift 2017). A 2017 Pew Research Center report found a similar trend: from February 2016 to March 2017, U.S. adult respondents that expressed “a lot” of trust in news they get from national news organizations increased from 27% to 34% among Democrats while it fell from 15% to 11% among Republicans (Barthel and Mitchel 2017). This disparity highlights the importance of breaking down general trends in explaining the larger picture. However, the 40-year trend still shows a dramatic decline for respondents identifying with either (and neither) parties. To explain both the mutual decline and the partisan split, there must be a factor or factors besides party ID that are affecting media trust. The news media has been discussed frequently since the 2016 election of President Donald Trump. Though he is by no means the first politician to attack the media, Trump has voiced his opposition to the mainstream media to such a great extent that the term he popularized - “fake news” – has risen in usage by 365% since 2016 and was named the Collins Dictionary Word of the Year for 2017 (Hunt 2017). One oft- reported factor of the 2016 Presidential election was Donald Trump’s ability to excite the white working class, a group of lower income and lower educational attainment Americans, to turn out for him in both the Republican primary and the general election. These loyal supporters often echoed Trump’s criticisms of the mainstream news media, with criticisms going beyond partisanship (“liberal” media) to include factors such as geography and social class (“coastal elite” media). Does this represent a real change in the demographics of distrust? In the decade since Gronke and Cooke analyzed how media trust varies by demographic factors, have these patterns changed? If this were to be the case, our understanding of how and why the public has lost trust in the media would change dramatically. To narrow the list of possible causes of loss of confidence in the media as an institution, this paper will analyze how trust in the media varies by a wide variety of demographic attributes: education, race, age/birth cohort, sex, frequency of newspaper reading, hours spent watching TV, general verbal acuity, partisanship, and liberal-conservative self- identification, more commonly known colloquially as ideology. This is by no means an exhaustive list of factors that could affect media trust; however, together they cross-cut the American people in important ways. In order to frame this discussion in context, I will delve into the historical background of the American media and its relationship with the public. I will then examine various theories on the causes of media distrust and make predictions about what different outcomes in demographic analysis of confidence in the media would suggest. These results will be tested against a demographic break down of the long-run media trust trend from the General Social Survey (GSS) and a multivariate regression analysis of these demographic factors. Finally, I will draw conclusions about the causes and implications of media distrust from these tests. Historical Background Scholars study Americans’ level of confidence in various institutions because this institutional trust is critical to a well-functioning democracy: “whether citizens judge politicians or government trustworthy influences whether they become politically active, how they vote, whether they favor policy or institutional reforms, whether they comply with political authorities, and whether they trust one another” (Levi and Stoker 2000, 501). The perceived legitimacy of all government and civic institutions in democracies depend on some level of public trust, but for the media trust is even more central: a well-trusted media has the power to set national dialogue, shape public perceptions, and hold governments and public figures accountable. On the other hand, distrust leads to disbelief, and a media that is entirely disbelieved has no power or function whatsoever. While there has been a secular decline in trust across all institutions, the media stands out for the extent of this decline (Gronke and Cooke 2007). Further, “partisanship and ideology have a weak connection with trust in the government yet show a strong connection with trust in the news media” (Lee 2010, p. 17). This suggests that, while they may be contributing factors, causes of general skepticism of antagonism towards civil and political institutions cannot fully explain modern media distrust. Explanations must be specific to the media in order to understand it as an institution, predict future trends and behavior, and offer solutions. We must view confidence in the media and the media itself in its larger context to avoid implicitly accepting uncertain assumptions. The Gallup survey quoted in the introduction asked Americans how confident they were in “mass media” (with examples given as newspapers, TV, and radio) reporting news “fully, accurately, and fairly.” What is the “mass media?” When this question was asked in the 1970s, it was synonymous with the “mainstream” media – news sources aimed at general audiences, with significant (at least city-wide and especially national) distributions. The picture today of the mass media is complicated by numerous factors. There is a more heterogeneous media landscape; whereas in the mid-20th century Americans got their news from a local newspaper or one of the 3 major television networks, today Americans are increasingly likely to get their news from non-mainstream internet sources (Shearer and Gottfried).