HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA SERBIA 2008 ANNUAL REPORT : SERBIA 2008 H HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND – VIOLENCE U M A N R I G H T S , D E M O C R A HHUMANUMAN RIGHTS,RIGHTS, C Y A N D – DDEMOCRACYEMOCRACY V I O L E N C E AANDND – VIOLENCEVIOLENCE Human Rights, Democracy and – Violence HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA Annual Report: Serbia 2009 Human Rights, Democracy and – Violence BELGRADE, 2009 Annual Report: Serbia 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND – VIOLENCE Publisher Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia On behalf of the publisher Sonja Biserko Translators Dragan Novaković Ivana Damjanović Vera Gligorijević Bojana Obradović Spomenka Grujičić typesetting – Ivan Hrašovec printed by Zagorac, Beograd circulation: 500 copies The Report is published with help of Swedish Helsinki Committee for Human Rights Swedish Helsinki Committee for Human Rights ISBN 978-86-7208-161-9 COBISS.SR–ID 167514380 CIP – Katalogizacija u publikaciji Narodna biblioteka Srbije, Beograd 323(497.11)”2008” 316.4(497.11) “2008” HUMAN Rights, Democracy and – Violence : Annual Report: Serbia 2008 / [prepared by] Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia; [translators Dragan Novaković ... et al.]. – Belgrade : Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2009 (Beograd : Zagorac). – 576 str. ; 23 cm Izv. stv. nasl. : Ljudska prava, demokratija i – nasilje. Tiraž 500. – Napomene i Bibliografske reference uz tekst. 1. Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji (Beograd) a) Srbija – Političke prilike – 2008 b) Srbija – Društvene prilike – 2008 5 Contents Conclusions and Recommendations . 9 No Consensus on System of Values . 17 I SOCIAL CONTEXT – XENOPHOBIA, RACISM AND INTOLERANCE Violence as a Way of Life . 45 The Hague trials and the process of dealing with the past . 90 Generating narrow-mindedness . 121 Is There any Room for the Other? . 135 II STATE MECHANISMS Transformation of the Army Slowed Down . 167 Police: Dynamics Without Radical Change . 195 III FREEDOM OF RELIGION Freedom of religion – between Constitution, Law and the Register . 205 IV LEGAL SYSTEM Judiciary: Yet Another Year Lost . 224 Ombudsman . 230 The National Assembly: An obstacle to progress . 235 New indictments and war crimes trials before Belgrade courts of law . 251 Organized Crime . 258 The Hague Trials . 269 V ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT High Expectations and Initial Impact of the Crisis. 299 Economic and Social Rights Challenges . 321 VI FEAR OF DECENTRALIZATION Vojvodina Aspires to Autonomy . 333 Sandžak: Potential for Instability . 361 VII NATIONAL MINORITIES National Minorities Measure for Democracy . 389 6 VIII THE MEDIA Insistence on the national concept . 429 IX RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS Croatia: Partner or Rival . 451 Croatia: a partner or a rival . 453 Bosnia and Herzegovina: Constant Pretensions . 471 Kosovo – an emerging state . 483 Macedonia : In the shadow of big neighbors . 510 Slovenia: burden of unresolved issues . 516 X RELATIONS WITH THE WORLD Serbia and the EU . 525 NATO – Yes or No? . 543 Getting closer to Moscow’s orbit . 551 XI ANNEX Letter . 567 What we accomplished in 2008 . 571 7 8 9 Conclusions and Recommendations The trend of institutional disintegration continued in 2008 in parallel with economic standstill, all of which negatively aff ected citizens’ mood. The pro-European coalition that won the spring 2008 election failed to meet their expectations as it was not politically courageous enough to make a breakthrough in fundamental reforms. In the meantime Serbia, like all other countries in the region, entered recession. The global economic cri- sis will only aggravate Serbia’s recession caused by domestic crisis. Eight years aft er Milošević’s ouster it turned out that Serbia had failed to get transformed – for, its elites have basically remained the same and it has not distanced itself from Milošević’s program. The national program has not been defeated yet: its ideology still en- joys strong support from a part of the Serb elite. This is about the elite that had inspired the Memorandum of the Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences and created the program itself. The ICTY has never examined the part ac- ademicians, the Serb Orthodox Church, the Writers’ Association, journal- ists and cultural elite from this circle played in the Greater Serbia project. Their role has not been morally condemned either in Serbia or beyond it. So their activity in the post-Milošević era remained the same. They are still dictating a cultural matrix and “moral” values for the society as a whole. And this is what mainly obstructs establishment of a moral vertical with- out which the Serbian society can hardly recuperate. In addition, terri- torial aspirations are still present, which is best mirrored in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, i.e. Republika Srpska. Nationalism and social and economic stagnation fuel the rightist, na- tionalistic extremism, xenophobia and hatred for others, particularly for Roma, Albanians, the gay population and human rights defenders. An al- ternative capable of coping with social and economic problems has not emerged in Serbia aft er the collapse of earlier socialist movements and trade unions. State institutions, therefore, need to resolutely respond to 10 serbia 2008 : all manifestations of radicalism to prevent further radicalization of the society. Serbia lacks energy for a breakthrough in democratization. Denial and relativization of the recent past have considerably reduced the po- tential for critical reexamination. However, infl uenced by the global crisis Serbia’s political class somewhat shift ed towards the EU as the only one that could provide fi nancial assistance. Europe’s hesitation to take in West- ern Balkans more resolutely demotivated citizens to some extent. In the meantime the new US administration took a more active stance toward the Balkans than the previous one and testifi ed that the region was high on the list of its priorities. This is obvious in its attitude towards Bosnia-Her- zegovina where the international community now tries to untie a complex Gordian knot. Under such circumstances human rights are placed on the margins. Some progress has been made in legislative area but the overall social climate hinders promotion of human rights. The debate in the parlia- ment and in the society as a whole over the adoption of the Law against Discrimination probably best illustrates this point. And yet, some non- governmental organizations have become recognizable as human rights defenders over the years: it was them that placed human rights on social agenda and drew a line state institutions cannot cross. In the meantime they have joined forces and have been making ad hoc coalitions against discrimination, intolerance, violence, racism and other forms of violation of human rights. At the same time there are individuals within state institutions – such as the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights, ombudsman offi ces for human and minority rights (at national and regional level), and for in- formation of public importance – who courageously support the concept of human rights and fi gure as major correctives for state institutions’ ac- countability. This segment of the state administration cooperates with the non-governmental sector: in this context the Ministry for Human and Mi- nority Rights signed a Memorandum on Understanding with over 100 NGOs in early 2009. Conclusions and Recommendations 11 International organizations (Council of Europe, EU, OSCE) and inter- national non-governmental organizations (Amnesty International, Hu- man Rights Watch) actively inspect and protect human rights in Serbia. Always in contact with local actors they have helped to create a mechanism for prompt response to detected off ences. Internationalization of human rights in Serbia encourages their promotion and protection, but also lead to a culture of human rights. Serbia’s inability to make the pro-European orientation predominant cannot but lead to the conclusion that Serbia needs the EU’s assistance. Brussels’ ongoing fi nancial aid maintains Serbia at the existential mini- mum and nourishes its regional pretensions. A candidacy for the EU membership would put an end to adverse trends in Serbia. Reaching of “inner” consensus necessitates active partici- pation from local self-governments and citizens apart from political elites. Considering the conclusions above, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia recommends to: GOVERNMENT, PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY AND MINISTRIES Constitutional Amendments • Amendment of some provisions of the 2006 Constitution that re- strict the country’s movement towards Euro-Atlantic integrations and adoption of European standards. Amendment of disputable constitutional provisions that hinder independent action by MPs – presently under strong partisan infl uence – and passing of a new election law. Amendment of the provisions in the areas of judicial independence and independent action by the President of the Re- public. Amendment of the provisions on territorial organization (autonomy and local self-governance), which are incompatible 12 serbia 2008 : with contemporary standards in this fi eld. Last but not least, amendment of the excessively complex procedure for any consti- tutional amendment. • Amendment of the articles 43 and 44 of the Constitution that con- siderably violate freedom of expression. • Amendment of the Law on Referendum and Popular Initiative to ensure citizens’ bigger and more direct participation in decision- making in the issues vital to them. • Permanent campaigning