LANDESVERTEIDIGUNGSAKADEMIE WIEN FacingtheTerrorist Challenge- CentralAsia’sRolein RegionalandInternational Co-operation StudyGroups RegionalStabilityinCentralAsia SecuritySectorReform ViennaandGeneva,April2005 Publishers: Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence; National Defence Academy, Vienna and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva in co-operation with PfP-Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes Editors: Anja H. Ebnöther Maj Ernst M. Felberbauer Martin Malek Managing Editors: Karin Grimm Silvia Hyka Facilitating Editor: Etienne Berchtold Production: Akademiedruckerei Landesverteidigungsakademie, Vienna. Address: Stiftgasse 2a, 1070 Vienna, AUSTRIA ISBN: 3-902275-13-8 2 CONTENTS Philipp H. FLURI Preface 5 Heidemaria GÜRER Forms of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia 7 Bakhtiyar KAMILOV Formation of Conceptual Approaches to the Problems of Ensuring National Security in Central Asian States - Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan 19 Sergey GOLUNOV Border Security in Central Asia: Before and After 9/11 89 Toktogul K. KAKCHEKEYEV Changes to Kyrgyzstan’s Special Forces; Influences on the War on Terror 111 Anna MATVEEVA Tajikistan: Evolution of the Security Sector And the War on Terror 133 3 Serhiy I. PYROZHKOV Geopolitical Change in Central Asia; A View from Ukraine 157 Rafik S. SAYFULIN Republic of Uzbekistan against Terrorism: Approaches, Experiences, Prospects 169 Raisa K. KADYROVA Protection of Power in Central Asia – Using Terror as a Pretext? A Kirgyz NGO's Vision 185 Joris VAN BLADEL Security as a Holistic Idea and the Consequences for the Central Asian States 209 Peter K. FORSTER The Terrorist Threat and Security Sector Reform in Central Asia: The Uzbek Case 227 Charles HARNS Migration, State Security and Regional Stability in Central Asia 247 Bulat K. SULTANOV The Shanghai Organisation for Cooperation – The Tool for Security in Central Asia? 259 4 Philipp H. Fluri PREFACE Democratic institution building in and democratic governance of the security sector continue to pose challenges to all governments which have emerged from the former Soviet Union. Sustainable democratization, however, presupposes not only a general willingness and informedness, but also operational knowledge which can only come from democratic practice. European and Euro-Atlantic institutions have engaged Central Asia in a discourse on the comprehensive reform of state and societal institutions. The invitation to reform the security sector has as its objective an improvement of the security institutions and security-providing services as a change of the very ‘culture of security’. What is at stake is a shift from the ‘culture of state security’ to a ‘culture of cooperative security’, embedded in the Euro-Atlantic system. This again implies not only a process of insightful adaptation to Euro- Atlantic standards, norms and procedures. It also implies a process of ‘un-learning’ the past. Accountability – the construction of transparent lines of responsibility for each individual regardless of their position in government – will need to replace the expectation of collective responsibility. Parliamentary and public democratic oversight of the security sector budgets and personnel will need to replace the expectation that state security comes before individual security, and that budgets are therefore best kept secret and security-providing services best kept beyond the reach of parliamentary and public control. Civil- military relations with a strong accent on civilian political leadership structures within Ministries of Defence, and the successful integration of the General Staff within them, will have to replace the expectation that the military forms a state within the state. Civil society organizations will develop the sufficient competence and expertise to independently assess security sector governance, replacing the organizations that previously disseminated ideas to the public (for good or ill, as vested 5 political interests dictated). Collective cooperative security, as provided by an alliance of sovereign states, will replace the expectation of a rigid system of artificially homogenized and integrated states and their militaries, as well as expectations of Darwinian battles of nation against nation. The concept of human security will replace the concept of security for one’s nation – or one’s office. Though almost every Central Asian state is engaged to some degree in a discourse on security sector reform, democratic oversight of the security sector, and civil-military relations, it would be incorrect to assume that the joint efforts of European, Transatlantic, regional and national actors (including the media, civil society and academia) have led to homogenous or at least sustainable progress. The added challenge of joining the global coalition in the ‘fight against terrorism’ has accelerated development in some departments of the security sector. It has, however, at the same time led to a standstill if not a backlash in the evolution of a culture of human and civil rights, not to mention international humanitarian law. As security sector reform unfolds in Central Asia, human rights and will need to triumph over all supposed justifications to curb them. Security Sector Reform is not about making repression better. DDr. Philipp H. Fluri Deputy Director Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Geneva 6 Heidemaria Gürer FORMS OF REGIONAL COOPERATION IN CENTRAL ASIA After the collapse of the Soviet Union the five Central Asian former Soviet Republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) appeared as one region. Though it is scientifically debatable if “Central Asia” consists of only these five states or if others should be included as well (e.g. Afghanistan, Mongolia), my findings will basically deal with the five former Soviet Central Asian republics – sometimes, where appropriate, with references to adjacent countries. In distinction to other parts of the former Soviet Union, e.g. the Baltics or the Southern Caucasus, independence came unexpectedly to Central Asia. Statehood as such was gained and developed in most all cases rather easily – the phenomenon of “failed states” was to be encountered less in Central Asia than in some other former Soviet republics – it initially seemed for them more difficult to put themselves as real, initiative actors on the international arena – also due to a lack of own foreign policy experience during Soviet times. But comprising a territory of a size comparable to Europe – although populated only by a small percentage of the European population (some 50 million) – and being resource rich and strategically located between Europe, China, Russia and South East Asia (some of them on the shores of the Caspian Sea) to make their voices heard on the international arena became a stringent necessity. Should this goal be pursued on an individual basis or through common efforts? Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union all five Central Asian states became – next to the United Nations (a special UN ECE programme was - though so far not very successfully - started for Central Asia) – members of the CIS as well as the OSCE. In contrast to other former Soviet Republics, CIS membership was never really put into doubt, although Uzbekistan pursued a sometimes more hesitant 7 policy towards certain CIS sub organisations like the CIS Collective Security Treaty (initially even called “Tashkent Treaty”), becoming also member of the GUAM thus enriching this organisation not only with a Central Asian outlook but also with one more “U” in its name, thus becoming GUUAM – an organisation originally formed by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (all states that at this specific time had territorial problems with Russian involvement). In retrospective one could argue that today, in 2005, the CIS and relations with Russia are more important for Uzbekistan than its membership with GUUAM which was anyhow suspended for some time due to lack in progress in expected enhancement of trade and communication relations (for Uzbekistan being a double landlocked country a very important aspect) in favour of territorial questions (Nagornyi Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transniestria) with which Uzbekistan did not want to get involved and harm its relations with Russia for nothing. Concerning OSCE membership of the five Central Asian States in this Euro-Atlantic organisation it was at the beginning questioned by some countries (also and foremost by Russia), but applying the approach of equal opportunities to all former Soviet Republics geography was not taken as a membership criteria. OSCE membership gave the Central Asian States a “European” outlook on the one hand, but in the course of time their membership also transformed the OSCE into an organisation with a Central Asian emphasis. The OSCE with its field missions played its most important role in Central Asia in Tajikistan in helping to surmount the traces of the civil war. OSCE field missions were opened in all five Central States. During Austria’s OSCE chairmanship in the year 2000 Central Asia became for the first time in CSCE/OSCE history an explicit priority of a Chairmanship – the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs visiting the region four times within less than two years. Trying to put equal emphasis on all OSCE matters – democracy/human rights, economy/environment and security – the Central Asian states themselves