EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee Brexit: Fisheries Written and Oral Evidence Contents Angling Trust — Written Evidence (FBR0013) .................................................................................... 3 Thomas Appleby — Written Evidence (FBR0012) ............................................................................. 9 Bertie Armstrong, Marcus Coleman, Hazel Curtis and Barrie Deas — Oral Evidence (QQ 12 – 21) ............................................................................................................................................................ 21 John Ashworth — Written Evidence (FBR0004).............................................................................. 43 Professor Richard Barnes, Professor Robin Churchill and Dr Bryce Stewart — Oral Evidence (QQ 1 – 11) .............................................................................................................................................. 44 Professor Robin Churchill, Professor Richard Barnes and Dr Bryce Stewart — Oral Evidence (QQ 1 – 11) .............................................................................................................................................. 64 Marcus Coleman, Bertie Armstrong, Hazel Curtis and Barrie Deas — Oral Evidence (QQ 12 – 21) ............................................................................................................................................................ 65 Hazel Curtis, Bertie Armstrong, Marcus Coleman, and Barrie Deas — Oral Evidence (QQ 12 – 21) ...................................................................................................................................................... 66 Barrie Deas, Bertie Armstrong, Marcus Coleman and Hazel Curtis — Oral Evidence (QQ 12 – 21) ............................................................................................................................................................ 67 Geir Ervik, Vidar Landmark and Sigurgeir Thorgeirsson — Oral Evidence (QQ 22 – 31) ..... 68 DEFRA — Written Evidence (FBR0001) ............................................................................................ 91 Fergus Ewing MSP — Written Evidence (FBR0011) ...................................................................... 104 John Farnell—Written Evidence (FBR0005) .................................................................................... 106 Fishing for Leave — Written Evidence (FBR0002)......................................................................... 110 Institute of Economic Affairs — Written Evidence (FBR0014) ................................................... 122 Institute for European Environmental Policy — Written Evidence (FBR0003) ....................... 125 Vidar Landmark, Geir Ervik and Sigurgeir Thorgeirsson — Oral Evidence (QQ 22 – 31) ... 130 Marine Conservation Society — Written Evidence (FBR0006) .................................................. 131 New Economics Foundation — Written Evidence (FBR0007) ................................................... 133 Seafood Industry Alliance — Written Evidence (FBR0008) ......................................................... 148 Dr Bryce Stewart — Supplementary Written Evidence (FBR0015) .......................................... 156 Dr Bryce Stewart, Professor Richard Barnes and Professor Robin Churchill — Oral Evidence (QQ 1 – 11) ............................................................................................................................................ 159 Sigurgeir Thorgeirsson, Geir Ervik and Vidar Landmark— Oral Evidence (QQ 22 – 31) .... 160 UKIP — Written Evidence (FBR0009) .............................................................................................. 161 UK Government — Oral Evidence (QQ 32 – 41) ......................................................................... 164 WWF — Written Evidence (FBR0010) ............................................................................................ 182 2 of 186 Angling Trust — Written Evidence (FBR0013) Angling Trust — Written Evidence (FBR0013) Before the UK can negotiate with the EU on fisheries, it needs to be crystal clear on its objectives and the means by which it intends to obtain those objectives. We suggest that the high level objectives should be: 1. Firstly, to ensure that European Fisheries are well-managed, since poor management in European fisheries leads to sub-optimal results that impact all European countries, including the UK. European fisheries management must strive to “increase the pie”. This involves the UK thinking not just about how fishing opportunities are allocated, but also about how to improve the basic machinery of European fisheries management, for example: • landing reporting, particularly for the U10 fleet, which are notoriously under- reported • effective enforcement • ensuring protection of nursery areas • protecting spawning stocks • work on selectivity/reducing discards • ensuring that subsidies are directed to the most essential projects Habitat protection and conservation zones also play an important part in improving stock levels. The UK needs to consider how it will ensure that progress continues to be made throughout Europe, enforcing and building upon existing law such as the Marine Strategy Framework Directive. 2. Secondly, to get the best deal for the UK from a shared resource. The best deal will maximise the long-term environmental, social and economic benefits accruing to UK society as a whole. This means we must not simply look to maximise the landings allocated in the short term to commercial fishing. Long-term benefits available from improving stocks have often been compromised by politicians misguidedly trying to protect their commercial fishermen’s short-term profits. The UK is now in a stronger position to demand that fishery decisions are focused on long- term maximisation of benefits. Historically, the focus in fisheries management has been on commercial fishing, but studies have shown that recreational fishing use of the same fisheries resource generates far greater environmental, social and economic benefits than commercial fishing. So for those stocks that are currently fished by both commercial fishermen and recreational anglers, for example cod and bass, Brexit is a crucial opportunity to reconsider how the UK can extract the greatest benefit from these stocks. Angling Trust — Written Evidence (FBR0013) Unsustainable fishing techniques are a barrier to maximising benefits from fish stocks. The CFP requires incentives to be provided for sustainable fishing, but to date little or no progress has been made – the UK should require the EU to deliver on this issue. Small scale fishermen using sustainable fishing methods must be given sufficient quota to allow them to survive without having to over-fish non-quota species. The UK needs to think particularly carefully about how it currently influences the decision- making of the EU and how it will be able to influence the EU once Brexit is finalised. For example, where and how often will UK fishery managers meet with their EU counterparts? How will UK fishery managers remain closely involved in decision-making processes if they cannot participate in meetings such as working parties and fishing opportunity meetings? How will stakeholders get their voices heard – will UK stakeholders continue to play a part in Advisory Council meetings? Finally, many of the questions posed below refer to the UK’s ‘national interest’. It would be helpful if this was more clearly defined as the interpretation of what this means (economically, socially, environmentally, politically?) differs and has a very significant bearing on how the questions are answered. 1. Which are the most urgent priorities for the UK’s negotiations with the EU on a future relationship with the EU regarding fisheries and why? Establishing sustainable levels of fishing – and ensuring that the move towards sustainability is maintained for stocks which are currently fished at unsustainable levels. As tempting as it may be for the UK to allocate fishing opportunities unilaterally it is not in the long term national interest of the UK to increase the UK’s fishing opportunities, fish shared stocks at unsustainable levels and undermine the long term objectives of the CFP. a. What should the UK aim to achieve from this negotiation? • Better control over fishing in UK territorial waters. • Maintenance of sustainable fishing limits. • A structure on how to agree fishing opportunities in the future for shared stocks with EU member states. • Maintained access to the common market for fisheries products. • More freedom to decide on management objectives suitable for the UK’s fisheries. • A review of relative stability. 2. Is it in the UKs interest to restrict access to UK waters for foreign vessels? Possibly if the UK is unable to apply its own conservation measures to EU flagged vessels. However, national interest (in respect of access to fish stocks) could be compromised by reciprocal restrictions to other EU MS waters. 4 of 186 Angling Trust — Written Evidence (FBR0013) a. What impact could that have on reciprocal access rights and UK fishermen? Access to EU waters could be denied and UK vessels may be forced to comply with EU and CFP regulations if fishing in waters where reciprocal rights apply. b. Which UK and non-UK Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) are most important to the UK fishing industry and which should the UK prioritise continued access to? 3. Should