CHAPTER IV BOLIVAR'S FIRST LIBERATION OF VENEZUELA— THE "WAR TO TI4E DEATH" ONTEVERDE soon had good reason to regret having let Bolivar escape. The future Liberator 'landed at Curaçao, then M in the possession' of the British, on the 28th August 1812. He was almost penniless, for, owing to informalities in the papers of the ship by which he arrived, all his property on, board was seized by the customs, and Monteverde had sequestrated his Venezuelan possessions. He is said to have talked of going to England to seek employment in the Peninsula under Lord Wellington. Whatver his real intentions, his financial difficulties prevented' any such scheme. At Curaçao he found some of his1 companions who had escaped from La Guaira, and others had accompanied him. It was not long before, having succeeded in borrowing some money in Curaçao, Bolivariwas again off to offer his services to the republican government at Cartagena. He arrived there in the middle of November 1812, and at once set to work at his new ienterprise of inspiring energy amongst the separatists of the republic, and of acquiring a position amongst then which might hereafter enable him to come to the aid of Venezuela. For the moment, the fire of revolution in his own country had been stamped down, though it Was still smouldering. In Cartagena he hoped to fan the flame into a blaze SQ CARTAGENA AND NEW GRANADA 81 involving all the neighbouring provinces. On the 15th December, two days after Labatut had successfully driven the Spaniards from the mouth of the Magdalena, Bolivar, with the approval of the Dictator Torices, by whom he had been well received, issued a manifesto to the inhabi- tants of New Granada. It is too long for quotation in full for, like most of Bolivars proclamations, it is prolix and wearisome to English ears, and much too full of highflown sentiments, sell-glorification, and flattery of his audience. However, he knew his people, and that this style of writing was acceptable to them, and gratifying to their vanity. The manifesto, which occupies nearly eleven pages of O'Leary,' may be summarised in a few words for our purpose. After explaining his own position and his desire to help New Granada, Bolivar states what to him appear to have been the main causes of the Venezuelan failure. To begin upon, there had been a deal too much leniency on the republican side; he was thinking of his own differences with Miranda on this subject. Then there had been too much theory, and too little practical work ; we had," he writes, philosophers for leaders, philanthropy in place of legis- lation, dialectics instead of tactics, and sophists for soldiers." Instead of well-trained soldiers, the re- publican leaders had endeavoured to compel the service of yokels, thus raising useless bands of militia and ruining the agriculture of the country. Curiously enough, Bolivar strongly opposes, for his own country, the idea of the nation in arms," though he admitted its success against mercenary troops in France and North America. Perhaps he was right, looking to the peculiar circumstances of his country, and recognising in his heart of hearts that the revolution, as yet, had The manifesto is gwen in full in O'Leary, i. 86-96 The letter to the Congress of New Granada in the wine terms is in O'Leary, Documents, 13, P. 57. F 82 SIMON BOi'IVAR little root amongst the general' population, and would never have been started but for the influence of ideas imported from Europe and North America by men like Miranda and himself. Then he denounces the federal Congress, which he blames as an instrument of dissolu- tion and civil war rather than of union, which, in his opinion, was only to be attained by a centralised re- public. A federal government, *ith its factions and dis- sensions, was far too weak to succeed. He had no faith in popular elections made by ignorant rustics and the intriguers of cities. " Our own divisions," he wrote, "not the arms of Spain, have brought us back to slavery." Whilst admitting fully the effects of the earthquake, combined with ecclesiastical infibence, he always harks back to his argument that, if Caracas had imposed itself on the country as the governing authority, all would have been well. Then he boldly advocates the re- conquest of Caracas by New Granada. Its difficulties he admits, but urges that Venezuela, in the hands of the Spaniards, now occupies the same position in regard to South America generally as Coro had formerly occu- pied towards Caracas. Venezuela should be attacked in Maracaibo through Santa Marta, and in Barinas through the mountains of Cócut& The whole manifesto is Bolivar's first real profession of political and military faith. He appealed in similar terms to the General Congress of New Granada assembled at Tunja, and his arguments gained him many adherents, of whom the most important was Camilo Torres, the original leader of the outbreak in Bogota in July, 181 o. In the meanwhile, Bolivar was given a command under Labatut in the expedition was to attempt the conquest of Santa Marta. The appointment was by no means acceptable to the Frenchman. By way of getting rid of his subordinate, Liabatut posted him at Barranca, a small place on the 'western (left) bank of CARTAGENA AND NEW GRANADA 83 the Magdalena, some fifty or sixty miles from its mouth. Bolivar had strict orders to remain there, guarding Labutut's rear in the advance on Santa Marta. Those orders he disobeyed as soon as Labatut's back was turned. He set out with 200 men for Tenerife, some thirty miles farther up the river on the opposite bank. The Spanish garrison, surprised by Bolivar's sudden arrival, evacuated the place and fell back towards Valle de Upar, south of Santa Marta. After compelling the submission of Tenerife to the republican government, Bolivar continued his march up the river, through a country of grass and marshes, to Mompox,' some 15 o miles from the mouth of the river. On the way he cleared out all the small Spanish posts on the left bank of the great river. Mompox in those days was an im- portant place, and in it Bolivar was received with en- thusiasm, on 27th December 1812. Here he gathered in many recruits, and was able to leave for Banco, travelling by boats on the river, with 500 men. Banco,2 though fortified, was evacuated by its Spanish garrison, who retired up the river Cesar towards Valle de Upar. Still pushing on, Bolivar, after defeating a royalist detachment at Chiriguana, reached Tamaleque, Puerto Real,3 and finally Ocafia, an important place well above the valley of the Magdalena in the foothills of the Eastern Cordilleras. He had gained a very considerable and important success, opening as he had nearly 300 miles of the lower Magdalena, cleaiing out the Spanish garrisons, and capturing their boats, as well as much Mompox was in Bolivar's time on the main stream. This has now shifted twenty miles to the west, and the branch which passes Mompox has become a minor one, only navigable for steamers when the river is in flood. Banco stands on a slight eminence on the right bank of the Magdalena, at the point where, now, the branch passing Mompox separates from the main stream. Puerto Ocana on the map. Now called Puerto Nacional. Up to about this point steamers can travel day and night. Above it, it is generally only safe to proceed by day. 84 SIMON BOIVAR ammunition, many muskets, and some artillery. More- over, he had freed for the use bf Cartagena all the plain to the vest of the Magdalena, whence supplies of cattle and grain could be drawn. I It was now time for Bolivar to call a halt and endeavour to regularise his 'very irregular position. Labatut was furious at his disobedience of orders, all the more so because it had relounded to the glory of a man of whom he was jealouj. He issued orders for Bolivar's immediate return to Barranca, orders to which the successful lieutenant replied by detailing his victories without any promise of obedience. Labatut appealed to Torices at Cartagena, demanding Bolivar's trial by court martial. But Torices, appreciating the advan- tages gained at the cost of insubordination, refused the request, even when Labatut hastened to Cartagena to back it in person. -Bolivar, therefore, had matters all his own way, and rose immensely in the estimation of the Cartagenians.1 He now considered himself oil high road to carrying out his greater scheme of invading Venezuela from the west. I At this time the Spanish military commander of Maracaibo, Ramon Correa, was firmly established about Cñcuta. He had marched thither from Maracaibo whilst Monteverde was subduing the central part of Venezuela. Forcing back such republican troops as he encountered in the provinces of Trujillo and Merida, he was now in a position to threaten the Granadi4n towns of Pamplona and Ocaña. Had he been bold enough to press on, he According to Bricelso Mender, Bolivar had got permission from Torices for his expedition even before the capture of Tenerife. This seems more than doubtful on the whole. In any case, B,olivar's appeal to the govern- ment, behind the back of his immediate superior, would not much improve his position in the matter of insubordination. Labatut was soon afterwards arrested by order of Torices, and expelled from Cartagena territory. CARTAGENA AND NEW GRANADA 8 could probably have easily driven out Manuel Castillo, the republican officer commanding in Pamplona.