IT WOULD SURELY BE THE SECOND: LEBANON, ISRAEL, AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR OF 1967 By Sean Foley1* This essay will discuss how three factors shattered this seemingly permanent settlement. First, the military balance following the Six-Day War ended the role of Syria and Egypt as bases for attacks on Israel and, eventually, the intention that these states would deliver a victory over Israel for the Palestinians. Second, Israel's total victory over Arab armies empowered the Palestinians to take direct command of their struggle to eradicate Israel, and to use Lebanon, which already housed 110,000 Palestinian refugees from the Galilee, as a base for direct attack of Israeli territory. Third, the Palestinians' use of Lebanese territory to attack Israel, combined with Israel's retalia- tion, strained Lebanon's already fragile political institutions to the point of collapse and postponed any hope of a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon for years. In the four decades between the advent of the Israel.2 The Israeli-Lebanese border wit- Six-Day War in 1967 and 2003, there have nessed less violence than marked Israel's bor- been few places which have witnessed more ders with Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in the violence in the Arab-Israeli conflict than 1950s and 1960s. Of the armistice agree- Lebanon and the lands adjacent to its border ments that Israel reached with its four with Israel. Throughout that period, the peo- neighbors in 1949, the only agreement fully ples of these areas suffered invasion, shelling, operative by the time the Six-Day War broke attacks, and occupation. By contrast, Israel's out was with Lebanon. 3 From the perspective borders with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria have of the Maronite-dominated and Western- remained largely quiet, particularly since the leaning government of Lebanon, it was as end of the October 1973 war. though the partition of Palestine in 1947 and In this context it is easy to forget that Is- the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-1949 had per- rael's border with Lebanon was the quietest in manently settled the Palestinian que stion. 4 the region in the years between 1949 and 1967, and that Lebanon, along with Jordan, was seen as one of the Arab states most "likely" to reach a permanent agreement with Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) 45 Sean Foley COMPLEMENTARY STATES AND A paltry military meant that it was never a mili- "MODEL" ARMISTICE tary or a political threat to Israel and that Bei- A chief factor contributing to the stability rut could opt out of the Arab military struggle of Lebanese-Israeli relations in the two de c- against Israel even if it might serve as a ades before the Six-Day War was the com- headquarters for Palestinian organizations or plementary nature of the two nations. Both as a supply route to ther states that housed Israel and Lebanon controlled tiny national Palestinian forces. Importantly, the other territories bordering the Mediterranean, with Arab states respected Lebanese neutrality and very small national populations and limited they only authorized Jordan, Syria, and Egypt natural resources. Both states bordered much to serve as bases for Palestinian guerilla at- larger states and maintained close ties with tacks against Israel.5 the West. Although the government of Leba- Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Israel non attempted to be ne utral in international and Lebanon upheld the armistice that they affairs, Beirut often shared Jerusalem's broad signed in 1949 with few problems. (By con- support of U.S. goals in the Cold War and trast, Israel suspended its Mixed Armistice was less militant than either Syria or Egypt in Commission with Egypt in 1956, after the its reaction to crises in Arab relations with occurrence of many cross-border attacks.)6 the West. Beirut's policies were sufficiently The Israeli military withdrew from positions pro-Western that Washington readily dis- in southern Lebanon, and Beirut and Jerusa- patched troops there when the Lebanese gov- lem agreed the armistice line would follow ernment requested assistance to restore order the international boundary of 1920 between in 1958. Lebanon and Palestine. Subsequently the The states were also very different from border between the two nations was virtually one another. While the Israelis adhered to a sealed. 7 dynamic and ethnically exclusive nationa l- ism, the Lebanese built a pluralistic society in WANDERING COWS AND A FRAGILE which a power-sharing agreement, the 1943 PEACE National Pact, protected the rights of various In 1961, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben communities. Israelis also sought strong, effi- Gurion told U.S. Ambassador to the United cient state institutions which could maintain Nations Adlai Stevenson, "Lebanon is ready military forces second to none in the region. to live in peace with Israel now."8 Perhaps National conscription was required of all even more indicative of the Israeli perspec- Jewish Israeli citizens. By contrast, the Leba- tive on the Israeli-Lebanese border, and rela- nese preferred a weak army and state and saw tions with Lebanon in general, were the no need for a draft. views of Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir. These differences had three important She told President John Kennedy in a January consequences. First, Lebanon was able to 1963 meeting: absorb 110,000 Palestinian refugees during and after the 1948 war. Second, Lebanon's 46 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) It Would Surely Be the Second: Lebanon, Israel, and the Arab-Israeli Israel has never had real trouble with acutely aware of the ability of other govern- Lebanon. Cows occasionally wander ments to influence Lebanese politics. More- over the border from Lebanon and are over, the events of 1958 and the attempted sent back, Meir said. Girls in the Is- coup of 1962 reinforced their fear of Leba- raeli army may get lost and wander nese nationals committed to involving Leba- across the Lebanese border, but they non deeply in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 15 are very politely returned. None of the While many of the Palestinian refugees had incidents are serious. 9 found new lives in Lebanon, the fact that most of them were Muslim threatened the Was this serene, bucolic image of peaceful nation's communal balance. In addition, the relations shared by the Lebanese government 1949 Armistice cut off southern Lebanon officials? The answer is both yes and no. from its traditional trading partners in Pales- Lebanese officials acknowledged their weak tine. Consequently, many of southern Leba- position in regional politics. Their nation's non's Shia immigrated to Lebanese cities in foreign policy—while officially neutral—was search of better livelihoods. All of these pro-Western, and, in the words of Lebanese problems were compounded by the uneven Foreign Minister Hakim, "closest of all Arab growth of Lebanon's economy (in favor of states to U.S. policies and ideals."10 Any sug- tertiary trade and cities) and the Lebanese gestion otherwise, Lebanese President Che- government's failure to implement meaning- hab told a U.S. official in 1962, was only ful social and economic reforms.16 "protocolaire."11 These twin factors govern- These conditions led to "a loss in confi- ing Lebanon's foreign policy ensured that dence" in the country's central government Lebanon favored a peaceful solution to the and contributed to the growth of organiza- Arab-Israeli dispute which did not assume tions critical of Lebanon's pro-Western Israel's destruction.12 However, Lebanon orientation and the political arrangements en- "could not take any lead but would go along shrined in the 1943 National Pact. By April with anything acceptable to other Arab coun- 1967, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, Dwight tries."13 Lebanese delegates to the MAC Porter, bitterly complained to Lebanese "perpetuated the sense that there was no real President Charles Helou about the growing fight between Israel and Lebanon; [they] en- anti-American tone of the Lebanese press and couraged the Israelis in the oft-repeated society. 17 In early June of that year, U.S. offi- maxim that while Lebanon could not be the cials noted that a number of leading moderate first Arab country to make peace with Israel, Lebanese believed that U.S. policies were it would surely be the second."14 biased and supported "a minority [Jews] for Lebanese officials also had strong dome s- political purposes."18 At the same time, Por- tic reasons to seek a solution to the Arab- ter and other senior U.S. officials repeatedly Israeli dispute in the 1960s. They were stressed to the Lebanese government that no Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2005) 47 Sean Foley solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute proposed mander of the Lebanese Army, who saw a by the United States would "endanger" Leba- Lebanese attack on Israel in June 1967 as non's internal balance.19 suicidal. 23 Because the Lebanese army failed to at- ENTERING THE 1967 WAR THROUGH tack Israel, Lebanon emerged from the war as THE BACKDOOR the only Arab state in the Levant that did not Still, Lebanese, U.S., and Israeli officials lose prestige and territory to successful Israeli failed to recognize the fundamental danger to attacks.24 U.S. officials speculated as early as the peace on the Lebanese-Israeli border and mid-June 1967 that a Lebanese-Israeli settle- to the future of any durable peace between ment was possible, and they worked to re- Israel and Lebanon, and ultimately between store U.S. financial and military assistance to Arabs and Israel in general: Lebanon's weak Lebanon quickly.25 McGeorge Bundy, Presi- military.