Born free and equal? On the ethical consistency of animal equality Stijn Bruers Proefschrift voorgelegd tot het bekomen van de graad van Doctor in de Moraalwetenschappen Promotor: Prof. dr. Johan Braeckman Promotor Prof. dr. Johan Braeckman Vakgroep Wijsbegeerte en Moraalwetenschap Decaan Prof. dr. Marc Boone Rector Prof. dr. Anne De Paepe Nederlandse vertaling: Vrij en gelijk geboren? Over ethische consistentie en dierenrechten Faculteit Letteren & Wijsbegeerte Stijn Bruers Born free and equal? On the ethical consistency of animal equality Proefschrift voorgelegd tot het behalen van de graad van Doctor in de moraalwetenschappen 2014 Acknowledgements First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Dr. Johan Braeckman. He allowed me to explore many new paths in ethics and philosophy and he took time to guide me through the research. His assistance and advice were precious. Second, I owe gratitude to Prof. Dr. Tom Claes and Tim De Smet for comments and Dianne Scatrine and Scott Bell for proofreading. Thanks to Gitte for helping me with the lay-out and cover. Thanks to the University of Ghent for giving opportunities, knowledge and assistance. From all philosophers I know, perhaps Floris van den Berg has ethical ideas closest to mine. I enjoyed our collaboration and meetings with him. Also the many discussions with animal rights activists of Bite Back, with the participants at the International Animal Rights Conferences and Gatherings and with the many meat eaters I encountered during the years allowed me to refine my theories. Furthermore, I am grateful to anonymous reviewers for some useful comments on my research papers. Let me also thank the many authors listed in the bibliography, because without their work my hands would be empty. And finally, of course, a warm thank you to all my family, friends and fellow activists for their support and frienship: my parents, my sister (and her little Floris), An, An- Katrien, Rosie, Dennis, Tim, Benjamin, Ralph, Tobias,… v Abstract This dissertation investigates the possibility of constructing a consistent ethical system that offers clear notions of equality and incorporates an animal ethic. The first part is more meta-ethical in nature, reflecting on notions such as moral intuitions, universalism, consistency and coherence. It demonstrates that moral illusions might exist and offers a method to discover such moral illusions. The second part turns to normative ethics, dealing with principles of welfare, justice and basic rights. It tackles problems ranging from population ethics to non-ideal theory. Finally, the third part moves to applied (animal) ethics, In analogy to optical illusions, I demonstrate that speciesism is not only a kind of prejudicial discrimination but also a moral illusion: an obstinate intuitive judgment that is inconsistent with a coherent system. The third part also tackles the predation problem and the sentience problem in animal ethics. The end result of this work is a pluralist principlist ethical system that can be captured in a metaphor of five moral fingers working together as the moral hand. This moral hand is a constructed, coherent ethical system of five universalized ethical principles based on strong moral intuitions. The thumb represents the principle of universalism, which is a basic ingredient of coherentism, and generates an anti- discrimination rule. The index finger symbolizes a consequentialist welfare ethic, based on the coherence of impartiality and empathy. The middle finger is the mere means principle of a deontological rights ethic: humans (and animals) have a right not to be used as merely means to someone else’s ends. This principle captures a lot of moral intuitions that pop up in famous dilemmas. A fourth principle, the ring finger, refers to the value of biodiversity and adopts some elements of carnism, the opposite of veganism as ideology. This fourth principle solves the predation problem and is coherent with some other moral intuitions. Finally, the little finger represents the principle of tolerated partiality which can be used in some final moral dilemmas. With these five fingers of ethics, we can grasp the moral problem of consuming animal products, and answer the question whether veganism is a moral duty. vii Table of Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 Summary: towards a coherent theory of animal equality ................................................. 9 Part 1 Ethical consistency ......................................................................................... 23 Chapter 1 The basic elements .......................................................................................... 25 1.1 The input data: moral intuitions ................................................................................ 25 1.2 The method: rule universalism ................................................................................... 30 1.2.1 Universalizations made by meat eaters ........................................................ 35 1.2.2 Universalizations made by animal ethicists ................................................. 38 Chapter 2 The goal: consistency and coherence ........................................................... 41 Chapter 3 The problem: moral illusions ......................................................................... 47 3.1 Optical illusions ............................................................................................................. 48 3.2 Moral illusions ............................................................................................................... 54 3.3 An example of moral illusions in the trolley dilemma ........................................... 57 3.4 Is the deontological right a moral illusion? .............................................................. 63 3.5 Heuristics in thought experiments ............................................................................ 65 Summary of part one ................................................................................................................. 69 Part 2 Theories of equality ....................................................................................... 73 Chapter 4 Impartiality and prioritarian equality .......................................................... 77 4.1 Contractarianism universalized ................................................................................. 77 4.2 From feelings and well-being to the value of life .................................................... 79 4.2.1 Affective qualia: from experienced feelings to experienced pleasure ..... 79 4.2.2 The importance of preferences: from experienced pleasure to momentaneous well-being .............................................................................. 80 ix 4.2.3 The problem of interpersonal comparability: from individual well- being to comparable momentaneous well-being ........................................ 82 4.2.4 The lifetime perspective: from momentaneous well-being to the value of life ........................................................................................................ 85 4.2.5 Personal identity and psychological continuity .......................................... 89 4.3 The maximin principle ................................................................................................ 92 4.4 The quasi-maximin principle and prioritarianism .................................................. 94 4.5 Applications of the quasi-maximin theory ............................................................... 96 4.5.1 Rawls’ theory of justice ................................................................................... 96 4.5.2 Responsibility and desert ................................................................................ 97 4.5.3 Future orientation and restorative justice ................................................. 101 4.6 Aversions behind the veil of ignorance: a mathematical description for a theory of justice .......................................................................................................... 102 4.6.1 Why a mathematical model? ........................................................................ 102 4.6.2 The mathematics of consequentialist welfare ethics ............................... 103 4.6.3 The impartial observer behind the veil of ignorance ............................... 106 4.6.4 Deriving the welfare function behind the veil of ignorance ................... 108 4.6.5 The reflection effect and risk neutrality for negative well-being levels ................................................................................................................. 114 4.6.6 Loss aversion ................................................................................................... 114 4.6.7 Problematic properties of number-dampened prioritarianism .............. 121 4.6.8 Intermezzo: a more complex formulation to solve the replaceability problem ............................................................................................................ 127 4.6.9 Uncertainty aversion ..................................................................................... 134 4.6.10 Prioritarian theories for lotteries ................................................................ 140 4.6.11 Democratic impartial preferences of moral agents .................................. 144 4.7 Summary .....................................................................................................................