(1 of 1-0) Case: L7-35754, LL13O|ZOI9, lD: 11104461, DktEntry: 39-1, Page 1 of 5 FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 30 201 8 MoLLY c UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS R+%YFEjplfrhES^ FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ROGER E. MAGANA, ) No. 17-35754 ) P etitioner-Appellant, ) D.C. No. 3 : 1 3-cv-07049-AC ) V ) MEMORANDUM- ) RON CREDIO; MICHAEL F. ) GOWER, Oregon Department of ) Corrections Assistant Director for ) Operations, ) ) Respondents-Appellees. ) ) Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael W. Mosman, Chief Judge, Presiding Submitted November 7, 2018.. Portland, Oregon Before: FERNANDEZ and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and SESSIONS,*** District Judge. -This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. **The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App.P. 3a@)Q). ***The Honorable William K. Sessions III, United States District Judge for the District of Vermont, sitting by designation. Appendix A Page 1 of 5 (2 of L0) Case: L7-35754, LL|3O|ZOI9,lD: LL10446l-, DktEntry: 39-1, Page 2 of 5 Roger E. Magana appeals the district court's denial and dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.r Magana claims that his trial counsel at his prosecution and conviction in the state of Oregon for numerous crimes was prejudicially ineffective because he did not challenge a prospective juror for cause and she became a juror at his trial. We disagree. In post conviction proceedings the Oregon Circuit Court found that counsel was not ineffective and that Magana was not prejudiced. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review, both without opinion.2 In order to prevail here, Maganahad to show that the Oregon courts unreasonably applied the holdings of the United States Supreme Court,3 rWe note that this case is generally governed by the standards set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 7996, Pub. L. No. 104-32,110 Stat. 7214 (codified in scattered sections of the United States Code)("AEDPA"). 2We, therefore, take the rationale of the Oregon Circuit Court as the basis for the decision of the Oregon courts. See Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188,1192,200L.F;d.2d 530 (2018);Ayalav. Chappell,829-U.S. F.3d-, -,1081, 1095 (9th Cir. 2016). 3See28 U.S.C. 5 2254(d)(l); see also Woods v. Donald, U.S. 135 S. Ct. 1372,1376, l91L.Ed.2d 464 (2015) (pet curiam); Harrington- -, v. -, Richter,562 U.S. 86, 100, 131 S. Ct.710,785,178 L. Ed. 2d624(2011);Williams v. Taylor,529 U.S. 362,407,120 S. Ct. 7495,1520,146L.8d.2d 389 (2000). We note that Magana also argues that 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(2) should offer him relief, but his factual argument is just an allotrope of his application argument, and does (continued...) 2 Appendix A Page 2 of 5 (3 of 1-0) Case: L7-35754,1,1,130120L8,|D: LLIO4461, DktEntry: 39-L, Page 3 of 5 when they determined that "counsel's representation fdid not fall] below an objective standard of reasonableness,"a and that Maganawas not prejudiceds by the empanelment of the juror. We owe the Oregon courts' decision double deference See Harrington,562 U.S. at 105, 131 S. Ct. at 788. That is,'othe question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argumentthat counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard." Id. Applying those standards, we cannot say that the Oregon courts unreasonably determined that counsel was not ineffective when he decided that he would not challenge the juror in question for cause. Those courts could reasonably decide that the juror was impartiaL See U.S. Const. amend. YI McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood,464 U.S. 548, 554,704 S. Ct. 845,849,78L. Ed. 2d 663 (1984); Irvin v. Dowd,366 U.S. 777 ,724-25, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 164344, 6 L. Ed. 2d751 (1961). Although thejuror's answers at voir dire were somewhat 3(...continued) not affect our decision. See Lopez v. Smith, _ U.S. _, S. Ct. 1, 5, 190 L. Ed. 2d I (2014) (pet curiam). -,135 ostricklandv. Washington,466 U.S. 668,688, 104 S. Ct.2052,2064,80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); see also id. at 689-90, 104 S. Ct. at 2065-66; United States v. Quintero-Barraza,78 F.3d 1344,1348 (9th Cir. 1995). s See Davis v. Woodford, 384 F .3d 628, 643 (gth Cir. 2004); see also Ybarra v. McDaniel,656 F.3d 984, 1001 (9th Cir. 2011). J Appendix A Page 3 of 5 (4 of 1-0) Case: 17-35754,IL13O120L8, lD: l-1104461, DktEntry: 39-1, Page 4 of 5 equivocal, no clearly established Supreme Court law has declared that equivocal answers require a determination that there is bias. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358,395-99,730 S. Ct. 2896,2923-25,I77 L.Ed.2d619 (2010);Patton v. Yount,467 U.S. 1025,1038-40, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 2892-93,81 L. F,d.2d847 (198a); Irvin,366 U.S. at72215, 81 S. Ct. at 164244. The juror said that she could serye as a juror, would really try to be fair and impartial, andwould do her best. Plainly, her words and demeanor and tone satisfied counsel, and the Oregon courts were satisfied with his approach. Applying the deferential standard of review that we are required to apply, we cannot say that the Oregon courts' decision was so lacking in justification under clearly established Supreme Court law that no fairminded jurist could so decide. Woods, U.S. dt S. Ct. - -,135 at 1376. We do recognize that some of our cases, which are not governed by the AEDPA standards, may point toward a different conclusion,u but, of course, those cases did not create clearly established Supreme Court law,7 and, thus, do not affect our decision. In short, the district court did not err when it denied Magana's 6See (Jnited States v. Kechedzian,902 F.3d. 1023,1029-30, (9th Cir. 2018); Fields v. Brown,503 F.3d 755,767 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); United States v. Gonzalez, 2I4 F.3d I 109, 1 I 13 & n.5, I ll4 (gthCir. 2000). 7 See Lopez, _U.S. at _, 135 S. Ct. at 4; cf. Marshall v. Rodgers,569 u.s. 58, 64,733 S. Ct. 7446,1450-51, 185 L. Ed. 2d 540 (2013). 4 Appendix A Page 4 of 5 (5 of 1-0) Case: 17-35754, Ltls}lz}1-,9, lD: 11104461-, DktEntry: 39-1, Page 5 of 5 habeas corpus petition.8 AFFIRMED 8We decline to issue an expanded certificate of appealability regarding other jurors. See 28 U.S.C. $ 2253(c)(I); see also 9th Cir. R. 22-1. Their lack of bias was even more clear and, as we see it, "'reasonable jurists"' would not grant the petition, debate doing so, or encourage the petitioner "'to proceed further."' Miller-Elv. Coclcrell,537TJ.S.322,336,123 S. Ct. 1029,1039, l54L.Ed.2d93l (2003). 5 Appendix A Page 5 of 5 Case 3:L3-cv-01049-AC Document 96 Filed 09/06/L7 Page 1 of 1 IN THE LINITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON PORTLAND DIVISION ROGER E. MAGANA, No. 3:13-cv-01049-AC Petitioner, JUDGMENT v RON CREDIO and ELLEN F. ROSENBLUM, Respondents. MOSMAN' J., Based upon my Opinion and Order of the court adopting Magistrate Judge Acosta's Findings and Recommendations [88] in part, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this case is DISMISSED. DATED 16i5 6th day of September,2077 Itl lrtichaal' W. l4oswan MICHAEL W. MOSMAN Chief United States District Judge I _ JUDGMENT Appendix B Page 1 of 7 Case 3:l-3-cv-01049-Ac Document 95 Filed 09/06/1-7 Page 1 of 6 IN THE LINITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTzuCT OF OREGON PORTLAND DIVISION ROGER E. MAGANA, No. 3:13-cv-01049-AC Petitioner, OPINION AND ORDER V RON CREDIO and ELLEN F. ROSENBLUM, ResPondents. MOSMAN, J., On May 22,2017, Magistrate Judge John Acosta issued his Findings and Recommendation ("F&R") [88], recommending that Roger E. Magana's Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ 5] should be DENIED and that a Certificate of Appealability should be DENIED. Mr. Magana objected [93] and Ellen F. Rosenblum responded 1941. I ADOPT the F&R in part. I agree that Mr. Magana's Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be DENIED and that a Certificate of Appealability should be DENIED as to Grounds I, II, III(A, C, D-T), IV, and V. However, I issue a Certificate of Appealability under 28 U.S.C. $ 2253(c) as to Ground III(B). LEGAL STANDARI) The magistrate judge makes only recommendations to the court, to which any party may file written objections. The court is not bound by the recommendations of the magistrate judge, I _ OPINION AND ORDER Appendix B Page 2 of 7 Case 3:13-cv-01049-AC Document 95 Filed 09/06/1-7 Page 2 of 6 but retains responsibility for making the final determination. The court is generally required to make a de novo determination regarding those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendation as to which an objection is made. 28 U.S.C.