SECTION 3.5 DEVELOPMENT OF UK STRATEGY AND OPTIONS, SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 2002 – THE NEGOTIATION OF RESOLUTION 1441 Contents Introduction and key findings ....................................................................................... 199 US/UK discussion of a draft resolution ........................................................................ 200 Iraq’s agreement to the return of inspectors .......................................................... 209 Discussion of US draft of 20 September 2002 ....................................................... 215 Agreement to offer UK military forces to the US for planning purposes ................ 218 Publication of the Iraq dossier ...................................................................................... 221 Cabinet, 23 September 2002 ................................................................................. 221 Parliamentary debates, 24 September 2002 ......................................................... 228 Mr Blair’s statement, 24 September 2002 ....................................................... 228 Adjournment debate in the House of Commons, 24 September 2002 ............ 236 Debate in the House of Lords, 24 September 2002 ........................................ 240 Mr Straw’s evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, 25 September 2002 ......................................................................................... 241 Discussions between the US, the UK, France and Russia .......................................... 242 US/UK draft resolution, 25 September 2002 ......................................................... 243 Mr Blair’s speech to the Labour Party Conference, 1 October 2002 ..................... 251 Mr Blair’s conversations with President Bush, 2 October 2002 ............................. 253 Continuing difficulties in securing agreement on a draft text ....................................... 260 Iraq’s rebuttal of the UK dossier ............................................................................ 260 Discussions between Iraq, UNMOVIC and the IAEA about the return of inspectors .......................................................................................................... 261 President Bush’s speech in Cincinnati, 7 October 2002 ........................................ 265 JIC Assessment, 10 October 2002 ........................................................................ 267 JIC Assessment, 16 October 2002: ‘International Terrorism: The Current Threat from Islamic Extremists’ ................................................... 270 JIC Assessment, 11 October 2002 ........................................................................ 271 197 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Differences between the US, the UK, France and Russia remain unresolved ...... 276 Security Council open debate, 16 and 17 October 2002 ....................................... 290 The US offers compromise language for OP10 ..................................................... 302 Mr Blair’s meeting with Mr Straw and Mr Hoon, 17 October 2002 ......................... 307 Cabinet, 17 October 2002 ...................................................................................... 309 Legal views on the draft resolution ........................................................................ 310 Lord Goldsmith’s conversations with Mr Powell and Mr Straw, 17 and 18 October 2002 .................................................................................. 312 Lord Goldsmith’s meeting with Mr Blair, 22 October 2002 .............................. 316 Discussion of the US/UK draft resolution of 23 October 2002 ..................................... 320 Decision to offer a land contribution to the US for planning purposes ................... 329 Final stages of the negotiation of resolution 1441 ................................................. 331 Cabinet, 7 November 2002 ............................................................................. 336 Mr Straw’s conversation with Lord Goldsmith, 7 November 2002 ................... 337 Mr Straw’s statement to Parliament, 7 November 2002 .................................. 339 Resolution 1441 (2002) ................................................................................................ 342 Explanations of Vote .............................................................................................. 346 Statements by the Permanent Members of the Security Council .......................... 351 What was resolution 1441 intended to achieve? ................................................... 358 Lord Goldsmith’s role in the negotiation of resolution 1441 ................................... 366 The role of FCO Legal Advisers in the negotiation of resolution 1441 ................... 375 Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 386 198 3.5 | Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 – the negotiation of resolution 1441 Introduction and key findings 1. This Section addresses the negotiation of resolution 1441 following President Bush’s speech to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on 12 September, including the provision of legal advice, and the unanimous adoption of the resolution by the Security Council on 8 November 2. There were a number of other key developments during this period which are addressed elsewhere in the Report: • The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities and Iraq’s intentions for their use are set out in Section 4. The production of the Iraq dossier, published on 24 September 2002, and the presentation of its contents to Parliament are addressed in Section 4.2. The subsequent assessments of Iraq’s actions, including its attitude towards the return of weapons inspectors, are addressed in Section 4.3. • The development of options for a possible UK contribution to a US‑led military invasion of Iraq, and the decision on 31 October to offer ground forces to the US for planning purposes, are addressed in Section 6.1. • UK planning for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq is addressed in Section 6.4. 3. The discussion within the UK Government after the adoption of resolution 1441 about the legal effect of the resolution, and Lord Goldsmith’s advice on that issue and the legal basis for military action in Iraq, are addressed in Section 5. Key findings • The declared objective of the US and UK was to obtain international support within the framework of the UN for a strategy of coercive diplomacy for the disarmament of Iraq. For the UK, regime change was a means to achieve disarmament, not an objective in its own right. • The negotiation of resolution 1441 reflected a broad consensus in the UN Security Council on the need to achieve the disarmament of Iraq. • To secure consensus in the Security Council despite the different positions of the US and France and Russia, resolution 1441 was a compromise containing drafting “fixes”. • That created deliberate ambiguities on a number of key issues including: the level of non‑compliance with resolution 1441 which would constitute a material breach; by whom that determination would be made; and whether there would be a second resolution explicitly authorising the use of force. 199 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry US/UK discussion of a draft resolution 4. The US and UK were in agreement about the objective of securing a UN resolution demanding that Iraq should permit the immediate and unconditional return of weapons inspectors and setting out the consequences of non‑compliance. 5. At the beginning of the negotiations, however, there were significant differences between the US and the UK about the detailed content of a UN resolution and the approach to negotiations with China, France and Russia, the other Permanent Members, and with the wider Security Council. 6. The debate between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and No.10 on the objectives and terms for a new Security Council resolution on Iraq, between the end of July and President Bush’s speech to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on 12 September, are addressed in Section 3.4. 7. Initial discussion within the UK, and between the UK and US, about the terms of a draft resolution revolved around seven key issues: • the need for a UN determination that Iraq was in material breach of its obligations; • whether the demands for Iraq to comply should be limited to WMD (weapons of mass destruction) or address Iraq’s wider failures to meet the obligations specified in UN resolutions since 1991; • the nature of the ultimatum to Iraq on WMD and whether that should demand an immediate Iraqi declaration of its WMD holdings, and/or the return of weapons inspectors; • whether to seek more intrusive and quicker inspections than those specified in resolution 1284 (1999); • whether to seek explicit agreement to the use of “all necessary means” in the event of Iraqi non‑compliance, which would provide explicit authority for military action; • when the UN route would be deemed exhausted and the role of the Security Council in determining the seriousness of any reported Iraqi breach and in authorising the use of force; and • whether to seek one resolution which met all the objectives or to adopt a two stage approach. 8. Resolution 1284 establishing the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), to replace the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), was adopted on 17 December 1999, with China,