New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack June 1987 NTIS order #PB87-200267 Recommended Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, New Technology for NATO: Im- plementing Follow-On Force Attack, OTA-ISC-309 (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov- ernment Printing Office, June 1987). Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 87-619814 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325 (order form on p. 231) Foreword The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been wrestling with a fundamental dilemma: how, within the confines of a strategy constrained by po- litics and geography, to maintain deterrence against the numerically superior and increasingly technically sophisticated forces of the Warsaw Pact. Nuclear weapons underpin NATO’s deterrent, but Alliance military planners are uncomfortable with the prospect of a conventional defense that could be overwhelmed so rapidly as to require early resort to nuclear weapons. Under the leadership of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General Bernard W. Rogers, NATO has sought to remedy this situation by exploiting a broad range of emerging technol- ogies to enable it to effectively attack the follow-on forces of a Warsaw Pact offensive—those ground forces that would extend and support the successes of the initial attackers against NATO’s defenders—and thus help even the odds on those fronts where armies are actually engaged. The adoption of the Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) concept has raised a number of serious, complicated, and interrelated issues for the United States and the other members of NATO. The range of issues is broad—encompassing politi- cal, military, and technological questions—although no single issue is dramatic enough to garner headlines in any but the most specialized press. To help them make decisions on this matter, the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services, with the support of the Senate Armed Services Committee, asked OTA to help bring some insight to this array of problems, so that the United States can more clearly understand and effectively support agreed NATO policy. This is the second report of that study effort. Complementary material can be found in an earlier report “Technologies for NATO’s Follow-On Forces Attack Concept, ” published in July 1986. Because technology, military concept development, and political thinking have all been evolving, the preparation of this report has been much like boarding a moving train. The information in it is current as of February 1987. It begins from the premise that NATO has officially adopted FOFA, and the United States has supported that decision. Although some still question the wisdom of adopting FOFA, the current debate is really over how best to implement that decision. The report briefly reviews what FOFA is and how it fits into NATO strategy, but is primarily concerned with the outstanding technical issues, how our Allies view FOFA, how the Soviets might respond to it, and how the various technical de- velopments might be brought together into “packages” of systems to support specific operational concepts. OTA gratefully acknowledges the help and cooperation of the United States Army and Air Force, the Departments of Defense and State, NATO civilian and military staffs, the governments and Parliaments of our European Allies, com- panies, and numerous individuals who assisted the research and writing of this report. Director ///.,. Preface Volume II of this report consists of classified appendices that elaborate on some of the material contained in this volume. It may be requested by writing to: Congress of the United States Office of Technology Assessment International Security and Commerce Program (ATTN: Program Manager) Washington, DC 20510 providing full name and social security number and the agency or office that can certify a SECRET security clearance and U.S. citizenship. For Congressional re- quests a need-to-know must be certified by a member of Congress. For other re- quests, need to know must be briefly explained. The reader should be aware that the OTA staff did not have access to so-called “black” programs that may be relevant. It is unknown whether the results of such highly classified research could alter some of the technical discussions contained in this report. Interested members of Congress are referred to the Department of Defense for further information. OTA Project Staff for New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA Energy, Materials, and International Security Division Peter Sharfman, International Security and Commerce Program Manager Alan Shaw, Project Director Stephen Budianskyl Michael Callaham Allen Greenberg’ Peter Lert Nancy Lubin Administrative Staff Jannie Coles Cecile Parker Jackie Robinson IOTA Fellow, ‘On detail from U.S. Department of State Advisory Panel for New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack Jan M. Lodal, Chair President, INTELUS George S. Blanchard Walter B. LaBerge General, USA (retired) Vice President Corporate Development Joseph V. Braddock Lockheed Corp. Senior Vice President The BDM Corp. John Pauly General, USAF (retired) P. Robert Calaway Chief Executive Officer President Systems Control Technology Resource Management International, Inc. William J. Perry Seymour J. Deitchman CEO Vice President, Programs H&Q Technology Partners, Inc. Institute for Defense Analyses Stanley Resor Victor L. Donnell Attorney Colonel, USA (retired) Debevoise & Plimpton Lockheed Missile & Space Co., Inc. Stuart Starr Christopher Donnelly Director of Planning Director The MITRE Corp. Soviet Studies Research Centre Royal Military Academy Sandhurst Dorm Starry Exec Vice President Patrick J. Garvey Ford Aerospace & Communications Corp. Colonel, USMCR Post Commander, Camp Smith Harry Train, II New York State Division of Military and President Naval Affairs Strategic Research and Management Services, Inc. Andrew Goodpaster General, USA (retired) John R. Transue Technical Consultant Fred Haynes Falls Church, VA Vice President for Planning and Analysis LTV Aerospace & Defense Co. Ralph Wetzl Director of Systems Development Glenn Kent The BDM Corp. Lt. General, USAF (retired) Rand Corp. Ennis Whitehead, Jr. Major General, USA (retired) Ambassador Robert Komer Vice President for Analysis and Evaluation Senior Consultant Burdeshaw Associates Rand Corp. NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advi- sory panel members. The panel does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of its contents. vi Contents Chapter Page Part I: Principal Findings and Summary 1. Principal Findings . 3 2. Summary . , . 15 Part II: Analyses 3. Introduction and Background. 49 4. The Soviet/Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Threat to Europe . 55 5. Objectives for Attacks of Follow-On Forces . 75 6. Operational Concepts for Attacks of Follow-On Forces. 83 7. Soviet Responses to FOFA . ..103 8. European Views on FOFA. 111 9. Current Capabilities . 135 10. Technology Issues: Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition to Support Follow-On Forces Attack. ..143 11. Technology Issues: Munitions and Delivery Systems . 171 12. Packages of Systems and Capabilities for Attacks of Follow-On Forces . 189 Appendix 12-A: Summary of Packages for Attacks of Follow-On Forces. 199 Appendix 12-B: Flexibility and Application of Systems for Attacks of Follow-On Forces . ..203 13. Summary of Recent Studies of Follow-On Forces Attack. ..211 Glossary of Terms and Acronyms . ..221 PART I Principal Findings and Summary Chapter 1 Principal Findings CONTENTS Page How Does FOFA Contribute to NATO’s Defense Posture? . ‘4 How Might the Soviets Respond? . 5 What Are the Attitudes of Our Allies? . 5 What Is the Status of Relevant Technology and Developments? . 6 What Are the Advantages and Disadvantages of Different Approaches? . 7 What Is the Likelihood That Plausible Combinations of Systems Will Be Effective? . 8 What Are the Outstanding Issues Before Congress?. 9 Joint STARS . 9 Continuation of, or Successor to, PLSS . 10 RPV/TADARS . 10 Advanced Anti-Armor Submunitions . 11 Defense Cooperation . 11 Chapter 1 Principal Findings The North Atlantic Treaty Organization gether to provide the required capabilities, and (NATO) has adopted its Follow-On Forces At- buy enough of each to make a difference. tack (FOFA) concept as part of its program FOFA is a mission concept, not a specific to counter a growing Warsaw Pact conven- weapons system. In general terms, it is the use tional threat, and thus to avoid either an early of various conventionally armed long-range resort to nuclear weapons or even a collapse weapons to attack Warsaw Pact ground forces so rapid as to preclude escalation to nuclear weapons. But the adoption of the concept has that have not yet engaged NATO defenders. From the Air Force’s perspective it is interdic- itself raised issues that will have to be ad- tion; to the Army it is Deep Battle. The basic dressed. objective is to delay, disrupt, and destroy these The general issues are: follow-on forces so that NATO’s defenses can hold as far forward as possible. Although appli- ● the role of FOFA within NATO strategy, cable throughout NATO Europe, it is primar- ● how FOFA could be done, ily focused on the Central Region, where West ● what is needed to make FOFA practical, Germany borders