abbreviated edition The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus driving forces and strategies March 2013 Project Director Authors Project Manager Stephen J. Flanagan Bulent Aliriza T.J. Cipoletti Jon B. Alterman Andrew C. Kuchins CHARTING our future abbreviated edition The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus driving forces and strategies March 2013 Project Director Authors Project Manager Stephen J. Flanagan Bulent Aliriza T.J. Cipoletti Jon B. Alterman Andrew C. Kuchins CHARTING our future About CSIS—50th Anniversary Year For 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. As we celebrate this milestone, CSIS scholars are developing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full- time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from en- ergy and climate to global health and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. Former deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive of- ficer in April 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2013 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Cover photo: (Top left) Moscow Kremlin, Moscow river at winter evening, http://www.flickr.com/ photos/koraxdc/8280621169/. (Bottom left) Ortakoy mosque and the Bosphorus bridge, http:// www.istockphoto.com/stock-photo-2869757-ortakoy-mosque-and-the-bosphorus-bridge.php. (Right) Iran Presedential Elections Rally, http://www.flickr.com/photos/kosoof/3632623300/. Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (202) 887-0200 Fax: (202) 775-3199 Web: www.csis.org 2 contents Preface to the Abbreviated Edition iv Executive Summary v Driving Forces and Strategies in Turkey, Russia, Iran Relations 1 Introduction 1 Stephen J. Flanagan Turkey’s Evolving Relations with Russia and Iran 3 Bulent Aliriza and Stephen J. Flanagan Russia’s Contrasting Relations with Turkey and Iran 13 Andrew C. Kuchins Iran and the Turkey-Russia-Iran Triangle 21 Jon B. Alterman Conclusion 28 About the Authors 30 | iii preface to the abbreviated edition his report presents the key findings of an 18-month CSIS project to assess the forces and Tinterests shaping relations among Turkey, Russia, and Iran; the strategies that these govern- ments are pursuing to manage differences and sustain cooperation; and, how these dynamics are influencing regional developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, Caucasus, and Central Asia. It includes an executive summary and the second chapter, “Strategies and Driving Forces in Tur- key, Russia, Iran Relations,” of a longer report that will be published in June. The full report will examine the regional and geostrategic implications of these dynamics and offer further recom- mendations for managing U.S. relations with each of the three countries and influencing regional developments in the advancement of critical U.S. interests. The project has involved five CSIS programs and been enriched by our partnership with the Eco- nomic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) and the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IVRAN). With generous support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the CSIS team worked with our partners to organize workshops in Ankara and Moscow that brought together a diverse group of analysts and officials. The workshops promoted a rich dialogue that, together with several commissioned papers, has enhanced our analysis and given it a deeper multinational character. We are most grateful to Dr. Guven Sak, managing director of TEPAV, and Academician Vitaly Naumkin, director of IVRAN, and all their colleagues, as well as the many other scholars, officials, and journalists who shared their insights. The project has been led by Stephen J. Flanagan, Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Diplomacy and National Security, and included Bulent Aliriza, director and senior associate, Turkey Project; Jon B. Alterman, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and director, Middle East Program; Andrew C. Kuchins, director and senior fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program; Jef- frey Mankoff, deputy director and fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program; and Edward C. Chow, senior fellow, Energy and National Security Program. The senior scholars benefitted from superb research and program support from T.J. Cipoletti, program manager; Craig Bonfield, Andrew Haimes, Leigh Hendrix, Daniel Holodnik, Deni Koenhemsi, Sung In Marshall, Rebecka Shirazi, and Aigerim Zikibayeva, research assistants, as well as a number of talented interns. We are also grateful to James Dunton, CSIS director of publications, for his sound editorial guidance and to Alison Bours, creative director, for her design work. Stephen J. Flanagan March 2013 iv | executive summary Why This Triangle? Complex and often-contradictory interactions among Turkey, Russia, and Iran are shaping regional dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean, Caucasus, and Central Asia, as they have for centuries. The nexus of the three pairs of relations are influencing each country’s dealings with the other two as well as with the United States, and are being whipsawed by unfolding events that continue to surprise the leaders of these historic rivals. Starkly differing policies toward the Syrian civil war and the Arab Spring have strained Ankara’s previously cooperative relations with Moscow and Tehran. Understanding these dynamics is essential to avoiding a wider war in the Middle East, re- newed conflict in the Caucasus, and instability in Central Asia. Most immediately, in order to broker a political transition in Syria and resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis peacefully, the United States and the international community will need to engage these three powers effectively. Driving Forces and Strategies Turkey-Russia: The Limits of “Strategic Partnership” The current Turkish government has made improving relations with Russia a priority since it took office in 2002. Trade with Russia began to grow in the last decade of the Soviet period, and Ankara has sought to use deepening economic and energy ties to pave the way for cooperation on politi- cal and security issues. The Kremlin has tried to leverage those ties to encourage Ankara to pursue a more independent stance in international politics, periodically challenging U.S. and European policies. Trade, investment, and tourism between Turkey and Russia have grown enormously over the past decade. Russia has been Turkey’s leading trade partner (after the European Union as a bloc) since 2008. Total bilateral trade topped $33 billion in 2012, with Turkish energy imports account- ing for about 80 percent of this volume. Still, Russia is Turkey’s third-biggest export market and each country has sizable direct investments in the other. The two governments aim to triple trade by 2015, but this goal is unrealistic. Bilateral energy relations reflect some mutual interests, but are also competitive. Turkey’s energy strategy seeks to balance its needs for secure supplies from Russia with its ambition to be- come a vital energy bridge to Europe and the West. Turkey seeks to reduce its heavy dependency on Russian natural gas and oil through diversification. Meanwhile, Russian efforts to control the flow of energy from the Black Sea and Caspian Basin regions threaten Turkey’s ambition to play a key role in expanding the East–West energy transit corridor—even as it further develops its own North–South energy axis with Russia. | v The two governments have been successful in insulating mutually beneficial commercial and energy ties from sharp differences over Syria and the Arab Spring. This will be increasingly diffi- cult unless Moscow elects to work with the international community to foster a political transition in Syria and play a more constructive role in the Eastern Mediterranean and unless they develop some rules of the road in the Caucasus. ■ Despite the declaration of a “strategic partnership” in 2010, the relationship remains more tactical than strategic, as the two countries lack a common political agenda and have more divergent than convergent interests. Iran-Turkey: A Wary Partnership under Strain Turkey’s relations with Iran have had their ups and downs. There are, however, fundamental limita- tions on what remains a wary partnership, given enduring rivalry, suspicion, and deep sectarian and cultural differences. Both governments have a strategy of using mutually beneficial economic and energy ties as a way to keep their competition peaceful. Iran’s ties to Turkey are also important in avoiding further international isolation. The Turks have been repeatedly disappointed in a number of trade and investment deals with Iran over the past decade. Still, Iran has