#123 7 Nov 2001 USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL Air University Air War College Maxwell AFB, Alabama Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Lt Col Michael W. Ritz, ANG Special Assistant to Director of CPC or Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved CONTENTS Israeli Intelligence Officer: No Evidence Of Missing Nukes Report Finds 'Weakness' In Nuclear Controls Senate Delays Plan To Fumigate Its Hart Office Building On The Front Lines Of Anthrax War Anthrax Investigators Are Hoping Bronx Case Leads Them To Source Anthrax Danger Delays Inspection Of Millions Of Letters U.S. Looks For More Vaccine Sources Struggling To Reach A Consensus On Getting Ready For Bioterrorism Osama's Nuclear Quest Nuclear Experts' Nightmare: Terrorists Steal A Warhead Pakistani Nuclear Scientist Denies Links To The Taliban Nuke-Toting Gangs In Russia Pose A Threat To The West Pentagon And Weapons Contractors Weigh Restructuring Of Missile-Defense Program Panel Recommends Ending Satellite Plan Russia Denies Helping Iran Develop Weapons Bush Warns Bin Laden Is Seeking 'Biological And Nuclear Weapons' Inability To Trace Anthrax Poses Large Security Threat, Experts Say Arms Control: The First Line Of Defense Senators Told Of Lack Of Answers In F.B.I. Inquiry On Bioterrorism Biologists Warned To Exercise Greater Vigilance Tainted Letter Suggests Foreign Source For Anthrax Feds' Biological Defense Criticized Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs to Clarify Expectations for Medical Readiness (GAO Report) Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and Long-Term National Needs (GAO Report) Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Should Clarify Expectations for Medical Readiness (GAO Report) DefenseNews.com November 5, 2001 Israeli Intelligence Officer: No Evidence Of Missing Nukes By Barbara Opall-Rome, DefenseNews.com Senior Correspondent TEL AVIV — A senior Israeli intelligence official has dismissed as baseless international reports about the possible theft or unauthorized transfer of nuclear warheads to supporters of Osama bin Laden or Afghanistan’s Taliban regime. "We’ve checked out the reports, and don’t have any evidence to support concerns over lost, stolen or misappropriated nuclear devices," Brig. Gen. Yossi Cooperwasser, chief of research for Israel’s Military Intelligence, told business executives here. Responding to a question at a Nov. 4 breakfast meeting of the Israel Managing-Directors Club, Cooperwasser added, "We don’t know of any tactical nuclear missiles or warheads in Pakistan or in the former Soviet Union that have gone missing or have gotten into the wrong hands." In a Nov. 5 issue of The New Yorker magazine, veteran investigative journalist Seymour Hersh quoted several current and former U.S. officials who expressed concern about Pakistani nuclear devices winding up in the hands of bin Laden, the Taliban, or other state-sponsors of Islamic fundamentalist terror groups. Hersh reported that U.S. special operations forces — assisted by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and "apparently … Israel’s most successful special operations unit, the storied Sayeret Matkal" — were planning a possible "exfiltration" of Pakistani nuclear warheads. An Israeli military spokesman here declined to discuss the Hersh report or other international reports referencing Israel’s elite commando unit. "We’re not in the practice of responding to these kinds of reports," the spokesman told DefenseNews.com. On related matters, Cooperwasser told the Israeli business executives that security officials here have drafted a number of contingency plans to respond to several scenarios linked to Osama bin Laden that could directly endanger Israel’s national security. The worst, "most catastrophic scenario," according to Cooperwasser, is the possibility of bin Laden winning control of an Islamic country and having his radical movement take over the trappings, infrastructure and legitimacy of a nation state. Yet another negative scenario presupposes the capture or death of bin Laden, which could precipitate a wave of revenge attacks by his followers. "If bin Laden is captured or defeated, his followers are likely to react with extreme measures, most likely through a new spate of suicide operations," Cooperwasser said. The third scenario Cooperwasser discussed with executives here involves Iraqi attacks on Israel in retaliation for a potential U.S. attack. "There’s still a capability in Iraq to endanger Israel … and we must be ready for this scenario," he said. Washington Post November 6, 2001 Pg. 7 Report Finds 'Weakness' In Nuclear Controls Plutonium, Uranium Not Accounted For By Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff Writer Government records about plutonium and uranium loaned to U.S. academic institutions, private companies, hospitals and other government agencies cannot account for "substantial" amounts of the material, according to a report released yesterday by the Energy Department inspector general. The investigation into the matter, which began before the Sept. 11 terrorist acts, did not conclude that the radioactive materials were lost or stolen from the facilities. Instead, it said there was "a weakness in controls over potentially dangerous materials" in record-keeping by a private contractor used to track the materials. Although one official said the lapse might turn out to be only "sloppy bookkeeping," officials said the Energy Department is taking the report seriously because of concerns that terrorists may be trying to acquire radioactive materials. The Energy Department has called for an early meeting with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which licensed the research institutions, and the private contractor whose job it is to keep track of the materials. The identity of the contractor was not disclosed. Although some of the record-keeping problems were discovered before 1994, "It was not until 2001 when, in response to our report . [that Energy's] security operation was tasked to correct these problems," the report said. In one case, a Sept. 30, 2000, management record showed a "significant quantity of plutonium" at a facility that the NRC said "had not held plutonium since 1966," the report said. Energy Department officials said the unaccounted-for plutonium may have been washed away during decontamination and decommissioning of the facilities, according to the report. At another site, the report said, management records show significant amounts of plutonium while the NRC said the facility's license was terminated in 1993 and "no material was at this location." In neither case, the report said, could the NRC or Energy Department security operations explain the discrepancies in the records. In the case of 119 locations, the management records showed licensees returned to the Energy Department substantially more nuclear materials than originally loaned or leased. In those cases, Energy officials believed the original transfer of the material was incorrectly reported. In 35 instances where more than 2,500 grams of plutonium were reported returned, Energy Department security officials resolved all the discrepancies five months after being notified of the problem. As the result of this inquiry, the department's inspector general may have to conduct a similar audit of records of nuclear materials held by the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories, "where significantly greater numbers are involved," an Energy Department official said. Washington Post November 6, 2001 Pg. 10 Senate Delays Plan To Fumigate Its Hart Office Building EPA to Test Chlorine Dioxide Technique By Guy Gugliotta, Washington Post Staff Writer The Senate has delayed plans to fumigate the Hart Office Building while officials conduct further tests to determine whether an experimental technique using chlorine dioxide gas will be effective in killing anthrax spores, the Environmental Protection Agency said yesterday. Reviewers of the plan endorsed chlorine dioxide as a "really promising technology," but Hart houses the