US NAVY CARRIER AIRCRAFT VS IJN YAMATO CLASS BATTLESHIPS: PACIFIC THEATER 1944-45 PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Mark Stille, Jim Laurier | 80 pages | 22 Sep 2015 | Bloomsbury Publishing PLC | 9781472808493 | English | Oxford, United Kingdom Death of the Super Battleship Yamato and Musashi Here, Jan Morris not only tells the dramatic story of the magnificent ship itself - from secret wartime launch to futile sacrifice at Okinawa - but, more fundamentally, interprets the ship as an allegorical figure of war itself, in its splendour and its squalor, its heroism and its waste. Drawing on rich naval history and rhapsodic metaphors from international music and art, "Battleship Yamato" is a work of grand ironic elegy. They also served as a metaphor for the profound changes in naval technology and doctrine that the war had brought about. The two opposing forces were the most powerful of their kind - the Japanese Yamato and Musashi were the biggest most heavily armored and armed battleships ever built, while US carrier aviation had evolved into a well-oiled, war-winning machine. With detailed analysis of the technical features of the opposing war machines and a gripping account of the fighting itself, this vividly illustrated work presents views from the cockpits of US Navy Divebombers, and down the sights of IJN anti-aircraft guns, during two of the most dramatic naval engagements ever fought. Abonnez- vous ici sur notre info-lettre gratuite. Cependant, suite au coronavirus des retards sont possibles. Ce site utilise des cookies, essentiels pour le bon fonctionnement de la boutique en ligne. Plus d'information. Stock important - commande facile - emballage solide - livraison rapide avec suivi par internet. Grand choix parmi plus de Nos partenaires logistiques :. Besoin d'aide? Cookies Ce site utilise des cookies, essentiels pour le bon fonctionnement de la boutique en ligne. The Barracudas indeed were large ocean vessels with a mixed diesel-electric propulsion. They gave rise to a long line, ending with the Gato class. She was so large as to be used as a commando carrier for spec ops Makin Island during the war. They had no descendants. These large oceanic submersibles 90 meters — tons ruled the pacific and did their share to victory. Japanese convoys paid them a very heavy price, but also cruisers, battleships, aircraft carriers and innumerable destroyers fell to their torpedoes. Traditionally, American submarines carried names of marine species until the s. The Gato and assimilated were robust, and spacious enough to be upgraded in the 60s and 70s Guppy , to face the Soviet submersible threat during the Cold War. To this picture, we must add seldom-heard of ships of small tonnage that still populated the US Navy in the interwar. As a backup, the fleet had fast minelayers derived from the ww1 Clemson and Wickes class destroyers. Their duties included supplying the fleet of Catalina PBYs that were the eyes of the fleet in these immensities. The Coast Guard had its own large and active fleet it played a very special role during prohibition, especially on the lakes, with nearly 33 small active class units The Gresham and Tampa classes, and the USS Ossippee and Unagla. The coast guards also operated the Thetis, Algonquin, and Treasury fitted as icebreakers , And the recent Northland based in Alaska. This was before the US Navy took over the escort, ensuring that at least its own vessels safely reached territorial waters. But destroyers captains often well beyond these waters. However, throughout as the Atlantic campaign intensified, many commanders of US destroyers or cruisers witnessed attacks at the boundaries or even within the territorial waters of the United States. Some had even taken the initiative of launching grenades on German submarines, long before the US entered the war. The United States has been dragged to war by two naval events, and the technology behind these was quite symbolic and revolutionary. The first time in , it was the threat of submarine warfare. The second time, it was to be the apogee of naval air warfare. Pearl Harbour, beyond the human catastrophy, the battlehip losses, and the character of surprise, completely stunned traditional naval analysts. Never ever an airborne attack could have been so massive and so daring as to be successful. These analysts should have been short-sighted however, as to not see the Tarento attack, the same year but more than one year before, in November This was a coup from the Royal Navy, which effectively sunk or damaged the whole of the Italian fleet anchored in Tarento, ruling the central Mediterranean area. And this was done, like the successful attack of the Bismark later, by a handful of antiquated biplanes, the Swordfish. Torpedo-bombers and Zero fighters preparing to launch their second wave on boad Akagi, December, 7, Yamamoto Isoroku , a visionary admiral that hard-pressed for the creation of a first rate naval air arm, did not lost anything of the British attack. Seeing the war inevitable he planned a knockout blow, comforted by most top brass believing the Americans would gave up soon. The scale of the attack had simply been multiplied by the number of aircraft carriers engaged, a very advanced training and total surprise. After two attacks and very few losses, the success of the operation had been total. Henceforth nothing could stop the giant to wake up and strike back. However severe the shock of Pearl Harbour was for the public opinion war, some historians would endlessly debates about the strategic results of the attack and the failure of the Japanese high command to achieve better results. This air attack was merely a very lucky diversion that achieved to restore some numerical advantage to the Imperial Japanese Navy in prevision of a future battles and clearing combined operations throughout the pacific. Such attack indeed would have targeted the massive nearby fuel tanks of the fleet, which were still unprotected. Without oil, what left of operational ships would have been rendered immobile, including crucially the three aircraft carriers that were not there luckily for the Americans this day. If the attack had been bold, both public opinion and the old naval admiralty were indeed mistaken: Certainly, most battleships present half of which the US Navy had had been neutralized, and theoretically, the Pacific fleet had been eliminated. No one at that time could have predicted what the few aircraft carriers absent that day could contribute in the hard fighting of , and until Afterwards, the roller-coaster of American industry outclassed several times numerically the enemy and the conclusion was logical. The battleships themselves were, for the most part, refloated, repaired, and completely rebuilt and modernized. They do returned to combat and participated in all subsequent engagements of the US Navy in the Pacific. Pearl Harbor was certainly the last nail in the battleship coffin. Indeed, as early as , the submarine warfare against British traffic to the American continent — north and south — was the biggest threat for the Island Nation by far, the one that Churchill really feared: The absence of escort other than large ships in the middle of the Atlantic, and crucially the shortage of destroyers. Merchant ships, although in convoy were no longer protected because of the insufficient range of action of aviation and destroyers. The U-boats, often refueled at sea, could therefore ambush these and with their wolf-pack tactics, could locate and attack these convoys in this sensitive area. If the government, according to American opinion, was determined to stay fiercely neutral, the Admiralty, like sailors, and captains of these ships, that collected the shipwrecked of the unfortunate torpedoed vessels at the limit of their territorial waters could not stay so for long despite strict orders. Sometimes bold U-Boats were spotted inside territorial waters. USS Greer, in the interwar. A report stated that the American escort commander ordered all destroyers in the vicinity to rush out and open fire towards the spotted periscopes. By seafarer solidarity, captains of these ships could not remain insensitive to the fate of the British. Long before any entry into the war, some U-Bootes had been reported gunned or squarely sent to the bottom. These actions intensified throughout the second half of American destroyers then often crossed the outer limit of the terrific waters, trying to extend their sphere of protection to the unprotected areas. USS Anders in a neutrality patrol in June December came obviously as a shock. If the bulk of the effort will lean towards the Pacific due to the quasi-destruction of the fleet, the declaration of war also concerned Germany and Italy. Vessels of the Atlantic fleet in addition to the coast guards, were now free to escort ships up to and through the unprotected area, which was partly reduced. Aviation was also mobilized, notably the long range PBY Catalinas, perfectly able to cross the Atlantic. But conversely, U-Boote commanders had seen their restrictions lifted. And they wreaked havoc for the freighters that at first continued to sail without a convoy, well spotted on the cities background, or all their lights burning. The U-boats also used coastal lights to orient themselves at night and placed in ambush. One single about in a day was able to sink without difficulty all freighters and especially oilers leaving New York harbour. In fact, losses of the combined allies had been never so high. From February onwards, however, the Americans organized themselves better and adopted the system of convoys, despite the resistance of certain captains. The better-organized allies were going to strike from the end of to mid, recording decisive successes in underwater warfare. At stake, new tactics, new equipment, and unexpected deciphering.