Lowy Institute Paper 10 shared secrets INTELLIGENCE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY Simon Chesterman First published for Lowy Institute for International Policy 2006 PO Box 102 Double Bay New South Wales 2028 Australia www.longmedia.com.au [email protected] Tel. (+61 2) 9362 8441 Copyright © Lowy Institute for International Policy 2006 All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means (including but not limited to electronic, mechanical, photocopying, or recording), without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Cover and text design by Shane Grantham Printed and bound in Australia Typeset in Esprit Book 10 National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication data Chesterman, Simon. Shared secrets : intelligence and collective security. Bibliography. ISBN 1 921004 20 7. 1. National security. 2. Terrorism - Prevention. 3. Weapons of mass destruction. 4. Military intelligence. I. Lowy Institute for International Policy. II. Title. (Series : Lowy Institute paper ; no. 10). 327.172 Simon Chesterman is Executive Director of the Institute for International Law and Justice at New York University School of Law. His books include You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State- Building (Oxford University Press, 2004) and Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford University Press, 2001). Executive summary Is collective security possible when the evaluation of and response to threats depend on access to intelligence that cannot be shared openly? This Lowy Paper examines the role national intelligence does and could play in addressing threats to international peace and security, with particular reference to the contemporary threats of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The issue is important to those who believe that multilateral responses to emerging threats are inherently more legitimate than and therefore preferable to unilateral action. But it is also relevant to those who are wary of entrusting a nation’s security to an international organisation: debates over whether the United States should share intelligence with and through the United Nations, for example, have arisen in many administrations and been won on every occasion by those who showed that it was in the US interest to do so. The question is no longer whether intelligence should be shared, but rather how and to what effect. It is neither feasible nor desirable for the United Nations or other international organisations to develop an independent capacity to collect secret intelligence, in the sense of conducting clandestine operations. Much information gathered in the course of peace operations might properly be considered intelligence, but formalising such activity would create more problems than it would solve. Nonetheless two basic policy recommendations follow: vii SHARED SECRETS 1. Certain agencies within the United Nations and other international organisations must be able to receive sensitive information. The reforms needed to ensure the trust of those who possess such information cannot realistically be undertaken at a system-wide level. It is therefore appropriate to concentrate on those areas where such information is most important, notably counter-terrorism and counter- proliferation. Necessary reforms include protocols for the handling of sensitive information and corresponding security clearances for staff. There should be no illusion that the United Nations is ever going to make itself completely secure against espionage. When states with interests and resources are determined to acquire information they will probably succeed in doing so. Rather, the aim is to make this more diffi cult and to limit the routine leakage of information so that although secrets may still be stolen, they are not given away. 2. In order to use shared intelligence, relevant international agencies must be able to assess its accuracy, relevance, and implications. This need not include the disclosure of the sources or methods that provided the intelligence, but does require an independent analytical capacity. Such a capacity should be directed also to assessing openly available information, which comprises the majority — typically the vast majority — of information needed to provide actionable policy advice. As a middle power with a credible intelligence capacity, close ties to the United States, and a strong historical commitment to multilateralism, Australia is well positioned to infl uence debate on this topic. Bilateral intelligence sharing within our region is already used as a confi dence- building mechanism and as a response to common threats. Improving the ability of collective security institutions to handle intelligence will enhance international cooperation to combat terrorism and strengthen verifi cation regimes to prevent the spread of weapons of viii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY mass destruction. It may also increase the ability of such institutions to prevent confl ict and ameliorate natural and man-made disasters. It will not guarantee good policy. More effective use of information should, however, make it harder to ignore emerging crises or adopt unworkable policies. It may also facilitate cooperation between states to address threats that no one state can address alone. ix Contents Executive summary vii Acknowledgments xii List of acronyms xiii Introduction 1 Chapter 1: Intelligence and international organisations 7 The United Nations Intelligence sharing Improving the handling of intelligence within international organisations Chapter 2: Intelligence and evidence 39 Early warning and confl ict prevention Counter-proliferation Counter-terrorism Pre-emptive military intervention Developing analytical capacity Conclusion 69 Notes 73 Bibliography 95 xi Acknowledgments The work of the Institute for International Law and Justice at New York University School of Law is generously supported by Carnegie Corporation of New York; the views expressed are those of the author alone. Insofar as those views have merit, thanks are due to the scholars and current and former practitioners who took the time to inform them. The nature of this research calls for some measure of discretion. In 1998 the Washington Times reported that the US National Security Agency (NSA) was able to monitor Osama bin Laden’s satellite phone.1 Soon after the story was published, bin Laden ceased using that phone and largely disappeared from the reach of US intelligence. A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent who ran the bin Laden desk at the time has suggested that a direct causal link can be made between the publication and the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States.2 This is an unusually dramatic example. It is suffi cient to note that certain details of past and current operations will be glossed and that most interviews were on a not-for-attribution or off-the-record basis and thus will not be identifi ed. Since the study is primarily forward-looking, it is hoped that this will not unduly distort either analysis or prose. I am, nonetheless, extremely grateful to the many current and past practitioners who were kind enough to share their time and their insights with me in New York, Washington, DC, Ottawa, Canberra, Sydney, Singapore, and elsewhere. I received valuable research assistance work at various stages from William J. Abresch, Adrian Friedman, Liliana Jubilut, Chia Lehnardt, Priya Pillai, and Laura Thomas. A draft also benefi ted from comments from Trevor Findlay and Paul Monk. At the Lowy Institute, particular thanks are due to Michael Fullilove and Allan Gyngell for their thoughtful comments at every stage of this process. xii List of acronyms ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASIS Australian Secret Intelligence Service CIA Central Intelligence Agency CTED Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations EISAS Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters HUMINT human intelligence IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IMINT imagery intelligence JMAC Joint Mission Analysis Cell MONUC UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ONA Offi ce of National Assessments ONUC UN Operation in the Congo OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ORCI Offi ce for Research and the Collection of Information PGP Pretty Good Privacy PSI Proliferation Security Initiative SIGINT signals intelligence UKUSA United Kingdom–USA Intelligence Agreement UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda UNMOVIC UN Monitoring Verifi cation and Inspection Commission UNPROFOR UN Protection Force UNSCOM UN Special Commission in Iraq USC United States Code xiii xiv Introduction The subject of intelligence attracts attention out of proportion to its real importance. My theory is that this is because secrets are like sex. Most of us think that others get more than we do. Some of us cannot have enough of either. Both encourage fantasy. Both send the press into a feeding frenzy. All this distorts sensible discussion. — Sir Rodric Braithwaite, former Chairman of the British Joint Intelligence Committee, 20033 Six weeks before the United States and Britain, together with Australia and Poland, commenced military operations against Iraq in March 2003,