Centre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 208 | 07.04.2016 www.osw.waw.pl Moldova: from oligarchic pluralism to Plahotniuc’s hegemony Kamil Całus Moldova’s political system took shape due to the six-year rule of the Alliance for European Integration coalition but it has undergone a major transformation over the past six months. Resorting to skilful political manoeuvring and capitalising on his control over the Moldovan judiciary system, Vlad Plahotniuc, one of the leaders of the nominally pro-European Democra- tic Party and the richest person in the country, was able to bring about the arrest of his main political competitor, the former prime minister Vlad Filat, in October 2015. Then he pushed through the nomination of his trusted aide, Pavel Filip, for prime minister. In effect, Plahot- niuc has concentrated political and business influence in his own hands on a scale unseen so far in Moldova’s history since 1991. All this indicates that he already not only controls the judi- ciary, the anti-corruption institutions, the Constitutional Court and the economic structures, but has also subordinated the greater part of parliament and is rapidly tightening his grip on the section of the state apparatus which until recently was influenced by Filat. Plahotniuc, whose power and position depends directly on his control of the state apparatus and financial flows in Moldova, is not interested in a structural transformation of the country or in implementing any thorough reforms; this includes the Association Agreement with the EU. This means that as his significance grows, the symbolic actions so far taken with the aim of a structural transformation of the country will become even more superficial. Furthermo- re, the Moldovan government system, which has become monopolised by a single political centre, is very unstable. This is so because Plahotniuc’s position is strengthening, while 95% of the public declare a dislike of him. Given the arrogant manner in which Plahotniuc’s camp took power in the country, all this has rekindled protest sentiments, which are nevertheless unlikely to change the political situation in Moldova. It also seems unlikely that this situation could be affected by the restrained reactions from Moldova’s Western partners. From the alliance of the two oligarchs… the largest grouping in the coalition, and Vlad Plahotniuc, the informal but real leader and When the Alliance for European Integration took sponsor of the coalition’s second largest group- power in Moldova in 2009, it kicked off the grad- ing, the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM)1. ual process of subordinating the state apparatus to the leaders of the groupings which formed 1 Plahotniuc’s influence and power are to a great extent the government coalition (which was nominal- an effect of his close co-operation with President Vo- ly pro-European and implemented the policy of ronin (the leader of the Communist Party) and his son. When the Communists lost power, Plahotniuc became EU integration). The key actors and beneficiaries engaged in promoting his own political project, the of this process were Vlad Filat, the leader of the PDM. Funds offered by Plahotniuc helped the grouping enter parliament in July 2009 and become the second Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM), largest force in the government coalition. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 208 1 The two politicians and the third, smallest, … to Plahotniuc’s autocracy coalition partner, the Liberal Party (PL) led by Mihai Ghimpu, in fact divided influence and The turning point which led to the duopoly of positions in the country amongst themselves. power breaking took place on 15 October 2015, when – upon a motion from the prosecutor general, who was believed to be controlled by Vlad Filat and Vlad Plahotniuc, the lead- Plahotniuc – Filat was deprived of parliamenta- ers of the two main groupings in the ry immunity and was subsequently arrested by pro-European government coalition, the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and sent to were the key figures in the process of the jail. He was charged with being directly involved appropriation of the state apparatus. in siphoning off US$1 billion from the Moldo- van banking system at the end of 2014 and of accepting a bribe of US$250 million from Ilan The system formed this way functioned for Shor, the Israeli-Moldovan businessman who is more than 5 years, even though it was very believed to be the architect of this intrigue. unstable and would regularly generate polit- Plahotniuc’s influence began to expand rapidly ical crises. Although Filat and Plahotniuc for- after Filat was arrested. He managed to subor- mally speaking were allies in the coalition, in dinate to himself the greater part of the polit- reality they were business and political rivals, ical scene in just three months. The PLDM fell engaged in a constant struggle for expand- apart and became a marginal party, and some ing their political influence and control of the MPs from this party decided to openly support state apparatus. However, they were forced the candidate for prime minister put forward to maintain this temporary alliance which by the PDM. There was also an unprecedent- ensured them a parliamentary majority and ed split inside the Communist Party (PCRM) enabled them to remain in power and, con- – most (14) of its MPs left the party and de- sequently, to maintain their influence and clared they were willing to co-operate with the secure their political and business interests2. PDM. It also seems almost certain that Mihai Even though it seemed that both politicians Ghimpu’s Liberal Party is at present under Pla- remained equally strong, over time it could hotniuc’s strong influence. Many local activists be detected that it was Vlad Plahotniuc who and some primars (mayors), predominantly had larger assets and greater sway (especial- from the PLDM, have decided to join the struc- ly among the judiciary and partly in the law tures of the PDM. enforcement agencies) and who was more Capitalising on his ever stronger control of successful at limiting the position of his com- parliament, Plahotniuc made an attempt to petitor. The fact that Filat was dismissed from become prime minister himself. This decision the position of prime minister as a result of contradicted his previous strategy, which had the political crisis in 2013 was one sign of this. included avoiding holding any important posi- tions in the state administration, instead dele- gating people who were completely dependent on him or were members of his clan to these 2 For more information on the functioning of the oligar- positions. However, the nomination of Plahot- chic system focused around Filat and Plahotniuc see: Ka- niuc (despite pressure and alleged blackmail) mil Całus, A captured state? Moldova’s uncertain pros- pects for modernisation, OSW Commentary, 22 April was not accepted by President Nicolae Timof- 2015, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-com- ti, who entrusted the former prime minister, mentary/2015-04-22/appropriated-state-moldovas-un- certain-prospects-modernisation Ion Sturza, with the mission of forming the OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 208 2 government on 21 December 2015. Howev- agencies, were taken by people linked to Pla- er, Sturza failed to win a vote of confidence, hotniuc or technocrats with no political base. and the Constitutional Court, which was un- As a result, in addition to the institutions they der Plahotniuc’s influence, passed a decision already controlled (the judiciary, anti-corrup- restricting the president’s right to nominate tion institutions, the National Bank of Moldo- candidates for prime minister at his discretion3. va (NBM) and the Constitutional Court6), Pla- hotniuc’s clan gained control of the fiscal and customs services (which are a serious source of Plahotniuc’s influence began to expand revenue from corruption7) and the Ministry rapidly after Filat was arrested in October of Internal Affairs and the police. All state insti- 2015. He managed to subordinate to him- tutions and the management of state-owned self the greater part of the political scene companies have undergone an overhaul of per- in just three months. sonnel aimed at removing the PLDM’s nomi- nees and replacing them with people linked to Plahotniuc’s clan. Despite public and interna- Despite this, Timofti, referring to the Consti- tional protests, Plahotniuc’ clan has been tight- tutional Court’s decision of 2013 (stating that ening their grip on the institutions he already holding senior positions in the state adminis- controls. One example of this was the re-elec- tration by individuals of dubious honesty was tion of Mihai Poalelungi on 7 February 2016 as contrary to the law)4, refused to nominate Pla- president of the Supreme Court8. At the same hotniuc as a candidate for prime minister for time, business assets owned by Filat are being the second time, and instead put forward his seized. This process is presented as a way of re- secretary Ion Paduraru as candidate5. However, gaining the funds he had allegedly stolen from Paduraru withdrew from the mission of form- the Moldovan banking system9. Plahotniuc’s ing the government in circumstances which influence in the media sector, which is vast al- are yet to be defined. The PDM put forward ready, is also being expanded (this is described a compromise candidate, Pavel Filip, Plahot- in more detail below). niuc’s close and trusted associate. The president accepted this candidate. On 20 January 2016, The pillars of Plahotniuc’s system Filip won a vote of confidence in parliament and formed a new cabinet. The key positions in Vlad Plahotniuc (born in 1966) is a billionaire the new government, including those in charge and simultaneously the most important, the of financial flows and the law enforcement most controversial and the most mysterious 3 The decision from the Constitutional Court of the Repub- lic of Moldova of 29 December 2015 on the nomination 6 A number of decisions passed by the Constitutional Court of Ion Sturza for prime minister, http://www.constcourt.