Canadian Military History Volume 20 Issue 1 Article 3 2011 No easy thing: Senior Command in the Canadian Army, 1939–1945 Randall Wakelam Royal Military College of Canada Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Wakelam, Randall "No easy thing: Senior Command in the Canadian Army, 1939–1945." Canadian Military History 20, 1 (2011) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Wakelam: No easy thing No easy thing Senior Command in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945 Randall Wakelam istorians have tended to equate generalship.”3 Nonetheless, generals success with winning battles, Abstract: There is relatively little also needed a range of personal H Canadian military history which looks failure with defeat, and yet there attributes: mental and physical specifically at the questions and is much more to being successful themes surrounding senior command robustness, physical courage, health in senior appointments than just (commanders of large formations and youth, courage of convictions, battlefield victory. Success seems to of troops – normally generals knowledge of humanity and fighting call for a trilogy of abilities: the ability or lieutenant-generals). Current spirit.4 These were necessary to “keep interpretations call for a trilogy to defend national interests in the of abilities: the ability to defend strict, though not necessarily stern highest military (and often political) national interests in the highest discipline,…[and give ungrudging] circles; the ability to organize and military (and often political) circles; praise where praise is due,” be visible manage forces both before and the ability to organize and manage to the troops, avoid sarcasm and keep during combat; and the ability to forces both before and during combat; the soldiers informed.5 These things, and the ability to lead both directly lead both directly and indirectly and indirectly those who have to he said, were hard to do given that those who have to implement the implement the plans. Were Canadians generals were far less visible to their plans. Are we right to apply this then, and are historians today, right soldiers than in times past. Finally, three-pillared standard? This article to apply this multiple standard? This Wavell reminded his audience that attempts to answer that question article looks at the three officers the general and the politician worked who commanded First Canadian by reviewing the performance of Army during the Second World War: in unique yet overlapping spheres the three generals who commanded Generals A.G.L. McNaughton, H.D.G. and that cooperation was of vital First Canadian Army during the Crerar and G.G. Simonds. Where these importance for the successful conduct Second World War: Generals A.G.L. commanders might well possess one of the war.6 Wavell painted a picture McNaughton and H.D.G. Crerar, and or two of these abilities they could as of a complex and demanding range 1 easily have little competence in the Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds. third. Overall Crerar comes out as the of competencies. While the junior man of the group best of the three. In February 1944 Guy Simonds, – Guy Simonds – appeared from shortly after assuming command the historical record to be the most of 2 Canadian Corps, prepared a successful and best regarded, what on three aspects of generalship: summary of what he saw as the criteria have been used in these personal qualities; subordinates; “Essential Qualities in the Leader.”7 determinations? and political masters. But he also All were necessary for success. It is worthwhile to consider quoted from Socrates who had said Some, such as knowledge, physical the thoughts of three distinguished that “the general must know how fitness and weapons skills, could be thinkers (two of them practitioners): to get his men their rations and learned or “acquired” while others Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell, every other kind of stores needed were “inherent.” Among the latter historian Martin van Creveld, and for war.”2 Wavell felt that effective were “moral” qualities including Guy Simonds. In the 1939 Lees administration – providing for an “resolution” and “determination”: Knowles Lectures Wavell focussed army’s needs – was the “real crux of “A man who originates good ideas Published© Canadian by Scholars Military Commons History @, Laurier,Volume 2011 20, Number 1, Winter 2011, pp.21-30. 21 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 3 and intentions but who instilling confidence is unable to get them and providing guidance put into practice may be and direction, and useful in a pure research be managers of large or in an advisory and multidimensional capacity, but is quite organizations. They useless in any executive must have a mastery command.”8 In addition of the nature and to understanding functions of military warfighting doctrine organizations and of a commander “must warfighting, and when know how to command needed of the interface – how to delegate to his between military and subordinates and his political controls. staff, how to control, During the war there how to position himself was one other criterion on the battlefield which was used to and make use of his assess Canadian and all communications, and, Commonwealth senior most importantly commanders and that of all, he must have was the British penchant an understanding of for experience. It was human nature and seen by the British as how to ‘get at’ men.”9 somewhere between Simonds’ successful odd and unacceptable commander thus to appoint senior seemed to be someone commanders who had who could use his not experienced combat knowledge of warfare and commanded to come up with at lower levels. For appropriate solutions Canadians, who had to problems and then lived in peace for two use the people around decades this was a hard him to turn these ideas Lieutenant-General Andrew McNaughton was the first to command First hurdle to get over. into effective results. Canadian Army. He was found wanting in a number of areas and replaced When “Andy” Historian Martin in 1943. McNaughton was van Creveld wrote in appointed general Command in War that “First, command says, the challenge is to find answers officer commanding-in-chief (GOC- must arrange and coordinate to these questions without resorting in-C) of First Canadian Army on 6 everything an army needs to exist… to a few examples as this sampling April 1942 it marked the culmination Second, command enables the army can “distort reality.” To study of almost three decades of military to carry out its proper mission [– the command and commanders is not service to Canada. After a stint efficient destruction of the enemy an easy undertaking he concludes. as head of the National Research force].”10 Van Creveld believed that “To make the task manageable, it is Council in the late 1930s McNaughton history is not like social science and necessary to limit the analysis to the returned to uniformed service in 1939 that there should be no reluctance to purely military side of things.”12 first as GOC of 1st Canadian Infantry look at specifics rather than broad Synthesizing these models, Division and then as commander of 1st trends: “a study of command cannot it seems that commanders must, Canadian Corps. Serving in England avoid asking the down to earth implicitly or explicitly, demonstrate McNaughton was responsible for questions: who ordered whom to do a considerable and well developed both training the growing Canadian what, when, by what means, on the intellect which permits them to deal army and for representing the needs basis of what information, what for, with complex situations. They must and interests of the army to Canadian and to what ends.”11 Conversely, he also be able to lead their subordinates, politicians and British leaders. When https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss1/322 2 Wakelam: No easy thing he was relieved of command of the deficiency in training and was subordinate formations to adequately First Canadian Army at the end no judge of the qualities required prepare for the next day’s action.21 of 1943 there were two principal of a Commander.”15 McNaughton’s Brooke was in McNaughton’s HQ, reasons: his disagreement with the training programme did not include just as the Canadian was cancelling Canadian government over the subunit or unit training and as a 2 Corps’ move across 1 Corps’ rear.22 splitting of the Army, which would result leaders at those levels had no After seeing McNaughton in action allow 1 Canadian Corps to gain chance to develop their skills in doing Brooke recorded: “He does not battle experience in Italy while at the quick estimates and hasty attacks. 16 know how to begin to cope with the same time demonstrating Canada’s McNaughton “lacked the required job and is tying his force up into the resolve in the conduct of the war, and qualities of command.”17 most awful muddle!” “I felt that I his miscues as the head of an army McNaughton’s first and only could not accept the responsibility sized formation during a major field experience where he actually of allowing the Canadian Army to exercise in England earlier that year. commanded First Canadian Army in go into action under his orders.” McNaughton did not seem able the field took place in 1943. Exercise This level of detail is exactly the or willing during 1943 to accept Spartan has been well documented precision which historians should Ottawa’s decision that it was in and allows us to look specifically at strive to find and use if we want Canada’s best interests to send a McNaughton’s personal role during to really begin to understand what corps to the Mediterranean theatre.