Extending Russia Competing from Advantageous Ground James Dobbins, Raphael S. Cohen, Nathan Chandler, Bryan Frederick, Edward Geist, Paul DeLuca, Forrest E. Morgan, Howard J. Shatz, Brent Williams C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR3063 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0021-5 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2019 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: Pete Soriano/Adobe Stock Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of the RAND Corporation research project Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Ground, sponsored by the Army Quadrennial Defense Review Office, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-8, Headquarters, Department of the Army. The purpose of the project was to examine a range of possible means to extend Russia. By this, we mean nonviolent measures that could stress Russia’s military or econ- omy or the regime’s political standing at home and abroad. The steps we posit would not have either defense or deterrence as their prime purpose, although they might contribute to both. Rather, these steps are conceived of as measures that would lead Russia to compete in domains or regions where the United States has a competitive advan- tage, causing Russia to overextend itself militarily or economically or causing the regime to lose domestic and/or international prestige and influence. This report deliberately covers a wide range of military, eco- nomic, and political policy options. Its recommendations are directly relevant to everything from military modernization and force posture to economic sanctions and diplomacy; consequently, it speaks to all the military services, other parts of U.S. government that have a hand in foreign policy, and the broader foreign and defense policy audience. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is HQD177526. This research was conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, iii iv Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Ground part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) sponsored by the U.S. Army. The RAND Corporation operates under a “Federal-Wide Assur- ance” (FWA00003425) and complies with the Code of Federal Regu- lations for the Protection of Human Subjects Under United States Law (45 CFR 46), also known as “the Common Rule,” as well as with the implementation guidance set forth in U.S. Department of Defense Instruction 3216.02. As applicable, this compliance includes reviews and approvals by RAND’s Institutional Review Board (the Human Subjects Protection Committee) and by the U.S. Army. The views of sources utilized in this study are solely their own and do not represent the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures and Tables ............................................................... ix Summary .......................................................................... xi Acknowledgments ............................................................ xxiii Abbreviations ................................................................... xxv CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Methodology ....................................................................... 3 Overview and the Central Argument of the Report ........................... 5 CHAPTER TWO Russia’s Anxieties and Vulnerabilities ........................................ 7 Russia Since 1991 .................................................................10 Contemporary Russian Military ................................................14 Contemporary Russian Economy ...............................................21 Contemporary Russian Politics ..................................................29 Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy .........................................37 Russian Anxieties ................................................................ 43 CHAPTER THREE Economic Measures .............................................................47 Recent Russian Economic Performance ....................................... 48 Measure 1: Hinder Petroleum Exports ........................................ 54 Measure 2: Reduce Natural Gas Exports and Hinder Pipeline Expansions ..........................................................59 v vi Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Ground Measure 3: Impose Sanctions ....................................................69 Measure 4: Enhance Russian Brain Drain .....................................85 Recommendations ............................................................... 90 CHAPTER FOUR Geopolitical Measures ..........................................................95 Measure 1: Provide Lethal Aid to Ukraine ................................... 96 Measure 2: Increase Support to the Syrian Rebels .......................... 103 Measure 3: Promote Regime Change in Belarus ............................ 109 Measure 4: Exploit Tensions in the South Caucasus ........................ 115 Measure 5: Reduce Russian Influence in Central Asia ..................... 121 Measure 6: Challenge Russian Presence in Moldova ....................... 130 Recommendations .............................................................. 135 CHAPTER FIVE Ideological and Informational Measures .................................. 137 Pathways for Influence Operations ............................................ 138 Current Status of Russian Regime Legitimacy .............................. 140 Russian Domestic Environment ............................................... 144 Policy Measures to Diminish Domestic and Foreign Support for the Russian Regime ............................................................ 158 Recommendations .............................................................. 170 CHAPTER SIX Air and Space Measures ...................................................... 173 Measure 1: Change Air and Space Force Posture and Operations ........ 175 Measure 2: Increase Aerospace Research and Development ............... 182 Measure 3: Increase Air and Missile Components of the Nuclear Triad ... 189 Recommendations .............................................................. 192 CHAPTER SEVEN Maritime Measures ............................................................ 195 Measure 1: Increase U.S. and Allied Naval Force Posture and Presence ... 197 Measure 2: Increase Naval Research and Development Efforts ........... 203 Measure 3: Shift Nuclear Posture Toward SSBNs .......................... 206 Measure 4: Check the Black Sea Buildup .................................... 207 Recommendations .............................................................. 211 Contents vii CHAPTER EIGHT Land and Multidomain Measures .......................................... 213 Measure 1: Increase U.S. and NATO Land Forces in Europe ............. 214 Measure 2: Increase NATO Exercises in Europe ............................ 228 Measure 3: Withdraw from the INF Treaty ................................. 238 Measure 4: Invest in New Capabilities to Manipulate Russian Risk Perceptions ................................................................. 254 Recommendations .............................................................. 267 CHAPTER NINE Conclusions ..................................................................... 271 Implications and Recommendations for the Army ......................... 276 References ....................................................................... 279 Figures and Tables Figures 2.1. Gross Domestic Product of Russian Federation, 1989–2016 ...12 2.2. 2016 Defense Spending of Russia, Saudi Arabia, India, France, and United Kingdom ......................................16 2.3. Net Inflows for Foreign Direct Investment in the Russian Federation, 1992–2016 ............................................. 23 2.4. Russian Population Natural Growth Rate and Life Expectancy, 1960–2015 ............................................ 27 2.5. Number of Terrorist Attacks and Resulting Fatalities in Russia ..................................................................35