The Catalyst Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 2 2012 Examining Moral Necessity in the Kantian Categorical Imperative Mark E. Harris University of Southern Mississippi Follow this and additional works at: http://aquila.usm.edu/southernmisscatalyst Recommended Citation Harris, Mark E. (2012) "Examining Moral Necessity in the Kantian Categorical Imperative," The Catalyst: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 2. DOI: 10.18785/cat.0201.02 Available at: http://aquila.usm.edu/southernmisscatalyst/vol2/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been accepted for inclusion in The aC talyst by an authorized administrator of The Aquila Digital Community. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Examining Moral Necessity in the Kontion Categorical Imperative could n?t be . the basis of Mar k E. Horns a law. When these inclina­ o:al necessi~ is the idea that specific imperatives tions are dispensed with as mor­ bmd the actiOns of a moral agent regardless of his ally impertinent, only the law M or her personal goals or wishes. Contemporary ethi- and respect for the law can de­ cists have debated whether the moral system of Immanuel Kant termine the will. 7 includes rules which do in fact bind necessarily on the moral agent. This paper will argue that Kant's categorical imperative Since there IS nothing per­ does not bind necessarily. The three different formulas given for sonal about the law which binds the categorical imperative can each be used to derive different a person to duty, then the law moral rules. If varying and conflicting rules can be constructed must bind all rational beings. depending on which formula is used, then it is impossible to Kant calls this law the categori­ know which rule, if any, binds necessarily. Thus the Kantian cal imperative, since it binds re­ deontological system, though based in reason, does not show gardless of a person's interests. how moral necessity can be derived from reason. However, this Practical rules which are not uni­ failure does not preclude the existence of moral necessity. It is versally binding he refers to as even sti ll possible that necessity could rest its foundations on hypothetical imperatives, since reason, though Kant has not shown that such a foundation exists. they depend on a person's indi­ It is important to note this failure since many modem-day Kan­ vidual interests. The substance tian ethicists argue for necessary moral rules and actions based of the categorical imperative is in reason and the categorical imperative. 1 Their arguments and essentially "do your duty," but moral prescriptions must be ignored or substantially amended Kant formulates this instruction if the Kantian perspective is suspect. Furthermore, a fai lure or in various ways. The first formu­ contradiction present in Kantian philosophy would mean that a lation he gives is derived from new, sound deontological morality would be needed. his conclusion that the law must bind on all rational beings: "Act In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics ofMorals , Kant relies only m accordance with that on a foundation of a priori universal concepts to establish the maxim through which you can at categorical imperative, which is the cornerstone of his deonto­ the same time will that it become logicaJ2 moral framework.3 With this imperative, he develops a a universal law." Essentially, law-conception of ethics in which adherence to a moral law de­ this formulation states that one termines the permissibility of an action. A person will often feel must conform any particular ac­ that he or she will have to do a particular action. This having to tion to a general rule or maxim, is what Kant most wants to explain. He believes that if a law is such as "do not lie" or "do not to hold morally "as a ground of obligation," then it "must carry steal." Whatever rule one choos­ with it absolute necessity."4 He finds that a moral law based on es, one must act according to a empirical facts could not carry with it necessity since empirical rule which could be followed by facts do not apply identically to all rational agents. Thus his ethi­ all rational beings. If one acts cal system depends solely on reason.5 according to one's personal in­ In attempting to explain necessity, he assumes that there actu­ terests, which are not shared by ally are moral duties. He considers "duty" to be equivalent to all rational beings, then not all moral necessity. A duty is thus something that a person is bound moral agents can act in the same to do. 6 Necessity binds regardless of personal interests, since way. Since the moral law must a personal interest would represent a mo- tive and be able to bind on all persons, 3 this formulation stresses the re­ other, always at the same time lieves that such authorship is 14 15 quirement of universalizability as an end, never merely as a unnecessary. • Kant says that for all moral maxims. means."12 Essentially, one must the divine will, being perfectly Kant goes on to discuss how not " use" a person to get some­ good, is not determined by any­ the basis of the categorical im­ thing else, but must instead treat thing other than the law. There perative lies also in the rational every rational being with re­ is no moral "ought" imperative nature of free persons. He says spect. This applies universally on the divine will, since its vo­ that the first formula necessitat­ to the actions of every rational lition is necessarily in accor­ ing that rational beings consider agent since every rational being dance with the law; however, universally the maxim of their that an agent comes in contact neither does the law emanate 16 actions must be connected "with with has his or her own will and from the divine will. Rather, the concept of the will of a ra­ the right to self-determination the law comes from philosophy, 17 tional being as such. "8 In other that comes with it. or reason. words, one must have a will ca­ Kant's ethical law rests, then, Reason does not operate by pable of reason to even be able on reason, impartiality, and dig­ itself; rather, it is found exclu­ to consider maxims in this way. nity. The further relevant ques­ sively in rational persons. Thus A will is essentially the abil­ tion concerning the basis of his Kant believes that a rational ity to determine one's own ac­ system is who authors this law. agent authors the moral law for tions in accordance with laws Kant answers: himself or herself, rather than or rules.9 The will then becomes having any external authority Kant's basis for the second for­ impose the law on him or her. We see philosophy put in a mulation of the categorical im­ If an externality were to author precarious position, which IS perative. Kant states that "every the law, there would have to be to be firm even though there is rational being exists as an end an external incentive.18 A rule nothing in heaven or earth from in itself, not merely as a means relying on an external incentive which it depends or on which it to be used by this or that will at amounts only to a hypothetical is based. Here philosophy is to its discretion." 10 Essentially, be­ imperative, one that a person manifest its purity as sustainer cause rational persons have the will only act on if one desires of its own laws, not as herald ability to determine themselves, the attached incentive, rather of laws that an implanted sense they must not be determined by . 13 than a categorical imperative [ . ] w h1spers to It. others, since this would violate that applies universally regard­ the freedom inherent to having less of interests or desires. Thus a will. He says that "an end in In this passage Kant makes since the categorical imperative itself has not merely a relative clear that, not only does the cannot be authored externally, it worth ... but an inner worth, that moral law not rest on empiri­ must be authored by one's own is, dignity." 11 To treat a person cal or earthly facts, but it also reason. One legislates the law to as a means to some other end does not gain its authority from oneself and wills that one's ac­ would deny that they have an a divine mandate. G. E. M. Ans­ tions be conformed to the law. inner worth and tread upon his com be and Alasdair Macintyre, Though Kant articulates this or her inherent dignity. From twentieth-century detractors concept of self-legislation, he these ideas emerges the sec­ of Kant, have argued that God does not then believe that mo­ ond formula of the categorical would have to be the author of rality is relative. He believes imperative: "Act that you use the moral law in order for it to that all agents reasoning well humanity, whether in your own bind necessarily, but Kant be- will arrive at the same con- person or in the person of any 4 elusions about the moral law. each person would have some moral system cannot be derived Rather than seeing morality as a part in interpreting the categori­ from any single formula of the matter of opinion or preference cal imperative, which forms an categorical imperative. The dictated by personal interests, overarching template for laws, three formulas he gives for the he views it as the equivalent of into specific rules for the com­ categorical imperative can be mathematics or logic.