CRUCIAL CONSIDERATIONS: ESSAYS ON THE ETHICS OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES KARIM A. JEBARI Licentiate Thesis Stockholm, Sweden 2012 Abstract. Jebari, Karim A. 2012. Crucial Considerations: Essays on the Ethics of Emerging Technologies Theses in Philosophy from the Royal Institute of Technology 42. 79 + vi pp. Stockholm. ISBN 978-91-637- 2006-2 Essay I explores brain machine interface (BMI) technologies. These make direct communication between the brain and a machine possible by means of electrical stimuli. This essay reviews the existing and emerging technologies in this field and offers a systematic inquiry into the relevant ethical problem ii This licentiate thesis consists of an introduction and the following essays: I. Jebari, Karim A., “Brain Machine Interface and Human Enhancement. An Ethical Review” Forthcoming in Neuroethics II. Jebari, Karim A. and Hansson, Sven Oven., “European Public Deliberation on Brain Machine Interface Technology” Submitted manuscript III. Jebari, Karim A., “Three Kinds of Moral Enhancement” Submitted manuscript © 2012 by Karim A. Jebari ISSN 1650-8831 ISBN 978-91-637-2006-2 Printed in Stockholm, Sweden by E-print AB 2012 iii CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS vi INTRODUCTION 1 I. Previous research on human enhancement 1 II. Human enhancement and public discourse 3 III. Human dignity 4 IV. Summary of the essays 7 V. Sammanfattning på svenska 9 ESSAYS I. BRAIN MACHINE INTERFACE AND HUMAN ENHANCEMENT. AN ETHICAL REVIEW 17 1. Introduction 17 2. Existing Brain Machine Interfaces 19 3. Experimental technologies 23 4. Ethical considerations 27 5. Concluding remarks 33 II. EUROPEAN PUBLIC DELIBERATION ON BRAIN MACHINE INTERFACE TECHNOLOGY 34 1. Introduction 34 2. Theoretical background 36 3. Method 38 4. Results 40 5. Conclusions 56 6. Appendix 57 III. THREE KINDS OF MORAL ENHANCEMENT 60 1. Introduction 60 2. Why moral enhancement? 61 3. Three kinds of moral enhancement 62 4. Empathy 66 5. A sense of fairness 69 6. Objections against moral enhancement 70 7. Concluding remarks 73 iv v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my supervisors, Sven-Ove Hansson and Barbro Fröding. I would also like to thank the participants at the philosophy seminar at the Royal Institute of Technology as well as the participants at the CHE-seminar. In particular I would like to thank Niklas Juth for his extensive commentary. I would also like to thank Anders Sandberg and Nick Bostrom for being great sources of inspiration for my work. My greatest thanks are to the many anonymous reviewers who have helped me more than anyone in clarifying my thoughts on these topics. vi INTRODUCTION The topic of these essays concerns the ethical issues on a range of technological developments that has the potential to redefine the human condition: Brain Machine Interface (BMI). The ability to connect the nervous system to a computer may surpass the impact of both nanotechnology and biotechnology. It is in the nature of technological development that it is difficult to predict and has a potential to revolutionize the human condition. Due to the high impact of possible applications of BMI technology, we do not have the luxury of waiting for this technology to emerge before thinking about the ethical consequences of its widespread adoption. The three essays in this thesis form part of a research effort aimed at thinking about the impact of BMI technology from a broad perspective. In particular, they seek to explore the ethical and social and ramifications associated with present and future technology. This introduction consists of the following five parts. The first part is a short review on the literature of human enhancement. The second part explores three difficulties that I have encountered in discussions with the public, when probing the risks and possibilities with BMI and human enhancement technology. The third part is a detailed discussion of a more daunting aspect of human enhancement; the issue of whether it threatens human dignity. The fourth part of this introduction is a short summary of each essay. The fifth part is a popular summary of the three essays in Swedish. I. Previous research on human enhancement Although the term “transhumanism” was first coined by the biologist Julian Huxley in 1957, systematic philosophical enquiries on transhumanism and human enhancement were first formulated in the last decade of the twentieth century.1 The British philosopher Max More is credited by James Hughes, former executive director of the World Transhumanist Association, to have presented the first modern systematic philosophical defense of human enhancement and transhumanism in the early 1990’s.2 The early defendants of human enhancement have often argued from the radically individualist position of “morphological freedom”, the notion that an individual’s desire to enhance is a private concern.3 These radical pro-enhancement ideas are often combined with “the proactionary principle” which states that “Our freedom to innovate technologically is valuable to humanity. The burden of proof therefore belongs to those who propose restrictive measures”.4 By the beginning of the twenty first century, the debate was transformed by the creation of several academic institutions that have been actively promoting these 1 ideas, of which the Future of Humanity Institute under its director Nick Bostrom is the most prominent.5 These academic institutions have lifted the profile of human enhancement and transhumanism, from being in the fringe of academia, to a topic taken seriously in prominent bioethical peer reviewed journals and many courses in bioethics at big universities. Human enhancement and Transhumanism entered the broader public debate after rigorous criticism by leading intellectuals such as Francis Fukuyama, Leon Kass, Michael Sandel, Bill McKibben and Jürgen Habermas. These have been labeled as “bioconservatives” by proponents of human enhancement, as they all seem to subscribe to the “bioconservatives thesis”: “Even if it were technically possible and legally permissible for people to engage in biomedical enhancement, it would not be morally permissible for them to do so”.6 These intellectuals, although from radically different ideological camps, have argued in favor of a general restriction of human enhancement with remarkably similar arguments. Michael Sandel argues that human enhancement epitomizes the modern strive for mastery and control, and that human enhancement is contrary to traditional virtues such as humility and openness to the unbidden.7 Another potential consequence of human enhancement is the further entrenching of inequalities. Michael Sandel and Bill McKibben argue that if for example cognitive enhancement were possible, that this would create a “genetic divide” between the enhanced and the “naturals”.8, 9 The 1997 film Gattaca's depiction of a dystopian society in which one's social class depends entirely on genetic modifications is often cited by critics in support of a combination of these views. Francis Fukuyama suggests that human enhancement threats to undermine the idea that all humans have equal moral worth, by undermining the idea of a “human essence”.10 Jürgen Habermas argues that moral autonomy depends on not being subject to another person’s specifications. This autonomy is threatened by the genetic enhancement of embryos.11 Leon Kass’ main objection to human enhancement is that it undermines human dignity.12 This objection will be discussed in greater detail in section III of this introduction. In the last few years, more moderate proponents of human enhancement have made the debate more mature. Philosopher Nicholas Agar argues that although some enhancement is permissible and even desirable, radical enhancement risks undermining the values that we today hold dear.13 Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson has warned about the dangers of cognitive enhancement and proposed moral enhancement to reduce some of the risks that technological development entails.14 Allen Buchanan is another philosopher who has a moderate and cautious approach to human enhancement. He argues that we have to take a more fine-grained approach, because there is no general answer on what to do with regards to human enhancement, as different modes of enhancement in different contexts are going to have different risk benefit 2 profiles.15 The debate on human enhancement has often focused on genetic engineering and the use of performance enhancing or psychoactive drugs. As BMI technology has developed, its enhancement potential has been recognized by the authors in this debate. However, although some ethical concerns regarding BMI are familiar to the human enhancement debate, others are not. These essays will try to explore some of the novel ethical problems that BMI poses. II. Human enhancement and public discourse In my discussions with the general public three broad reactions to human enhancement were prominent in driving intuitions and affecting the judgment of those whom I engaged with. During the writing of these essays, and in particular essay II, that describes the convergence seminars, I have encountered these reactions consistently. The convergence seminars (described in more detail in essay II) are a form of scenario-based discussion technique. One of the ideas of this discussion technique is to bring out moral intuitions and allow the participants to critically reflect on them. Although disgust may be just as any other motion a valid starting point in an ethical discussion, it ought not to be the final word. However, this is often the case. In