Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 1990 The Problem of the Imagination for Subjectivity: Kant and Heidegger on the Issue of Displacement Richard Findler Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Findler, Richard, "The Problem of the Imagination for Subjectivity: Kant and Heidegger on the Issue of Displacement" (1990). Dissertations. 2912. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/2912 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 1990 Richard Findler THE PROBLEM OF THE IMAGINATION FOR SUBJECTIVITY: KANT AND HEIDEGGER ON THE ISSUE OF DISPLACEMENT by Richard Findler A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy .'' ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I cannot go into my past and thank everyone who has in some way contributed to my dissertation, so let me thank those people who have directly contributed to it. First, I would like to thank Dr. John Sallis for having directed my dissertation. The insights and instruction I have received from him have proven to be invaluable, and there is no way I can truly thank him for everything he has done for me over the years. Second, I would like to thank my readers, Dr. Peter Maxwell and Dr. Paul Davies, for taking the time to read and comment upon my dissertation. Their questions, suggestions, and encouragement has always been greatly appreciated. Third, I would like to thank the Schmitt Committe and Loyola University for providing me with a dissertation fellowship, which helped me complete the project. I would also like to thank three people whose absence from these proceedings is still present in the dissertation. First, I would like to thank Dr. Bernard Freydberg for having introduced me to the Kantian imagination and for his useful and insightful comments on the first three chapters ii of the dissertation. Second, I would like to thank Dr. Allan Larsen for introducing me to Heidegger many years ago. Third, I would like to thank Dr. Andre Schuwer for his many Kant and Heidegger seminars I attended at Duquesne University. Finally, I dedicate my dissertation to my wife, Jean. Without her moral and editorial assistance, both of which are equiprimordially, this dissertation would be hundreds of pages shorter, and I would not be here at the moment. iii VITA The author, Richard Samuel Findler, is the son of Samuel H. Findler and Sydell R. Rehbein. He was born November 14, 1954 in Asbury Park, New Jersey. He is married to Jean Findler and has one daughter, Leah. His elementary education was obtained in the Asbury Park and Ocean Township public school systems of New Jersey. His secondary education was completed in 1972 at the Ocean Township High School, Oakhurst, New Jersey. Mr. Findler completed his undergraduate program in Philosophy at Slippery Rock State University, receiving the Bachelor of Arts degree and graduating summa cum laude in 1980. He also received many awards for academic achievement while at Slippery Rock State University. He began graduate study in 1981 in the Philosophy Department at Duquesne University, and was awarded the Masters of Art in Philosophy with honors in 1984. While attending Duquesne University in 1984, he was inducted into Phi Sigma Tau, the National Honor Society in Philosophy. Mr. Findler has taught full-time at National Technical College and Loyola University of Chicago. He is the author of book reviews in the Modern Schoolman and has published a translation of an article by Christoph Jamme entitled "Hegel and Holderlin in CLIO. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ii VITA iv ABBREVIATIONS OF WORKS CITED IN TEXT vi INTRODUCTION 1 Chapter I . THE CLOSURE OF THE METAPHYSICS OF SUBJECTIVITY 8 A. Introduction 8 B. The Locus of Contemporary Thought: The Closure of Metaphysics 13 c. Decentering .... 19 D. Reading the History of Philosophy 28 II. KANT'S COPERNICAN REVOLUTION 39 A. Introduction . 39 B. The Decentering/Recentering of the Metaphysics of Subjectivity: The Kantian Copernican Revolution . 40 C. The Empirical Imagination 54 II~. THE ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY OF THE IMAGINATION 69 A. Introduction . 69 B. The Metaphysical Deduction . 73 C. The First Edition Transcendental Deduction 95 D. The Second Edition Transcendental Deduction . 128 IV. DOUBLE READINGS OF THE KANTIAN IMAGINATION 161 A. Introduction . 161 B. Imagination and Transcendence 164 C. The Heideggerian Retrieval of the Imagination . 190 D. The Deconstructive Reading of the Kantian Imagination 227 SUMMARY . 250 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 252 ABBREVIATIONS OF WORKS CITED IN TEXT All bibliographical information appears at the end of the work. Works frequently cited are identified by the following abbreviations: APP Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Immanuel Kant. BP Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Martin Heidegger. BT Being and Time, Martin Heidegger. CPR Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant. KPM Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Martin Heidegger. KrV Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Immanuel Kant. MFL Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Martin Heidegger. SP Speech and Phenomenon, Jacques Derrida. SZ Sein und Zeit, Martin Heidegger. WG Vom Wesen des Grundes, Martin Heidegger. vi INTRODUCTION The general purpose of my dissertation is to investigate how we come to understand ourselves once the conception of subjectivity has been displaced from its foundational position in metaphysics. I call this problem the displacement of subjectivity, and I examine the problem of the displacement of subjectivity by enacting a reading of Heidegger's readings of Kant. I choose this approach to the problem because Heidegger was one of the first thinkers to 1 investigate the problem of displacement. Further, Heidegger enacted his investigation into the issue of the self through a critical retrieval of Kant, who was one of the first thinkers to institute radically the conception of subjectivity as the ground of metaphysics. Thus an investigation of Heidegger's readings of Kant will show how the conception of subjectivity is displaced, and how the 1 Heidegger does not use the term displacement. However, Heidegger brings the idea of the metaphysics of subjectivity into question and raises the issue of self­ understanding within his own thought. Displacement is a term I use to encapsulate the problem of the transposed understanding of the self, once that self-understanding lies outside the framework of the metaphysics of subjectivity. 1 2 displacement results in a different understanding of the self. I develop my approach to the problem of the displacement of subjectivity in four parts. In the first chapter, I reintroduce and clarify the problem of displacement in the following way: first I specify the problem; second I situate my dissertation within my understanding of contemporary thought; third I describe the phenomenon of displacement through the phenomenon of decentering; and fourth I discuss three modes of reading the history of philosophy and justify why I choose certain ways of reading over other ways of reading the history of philosophy. In the second chapter I begin my examination of Kant. In order to understand how the displacement of subjectivity takes place within the Kantian project, we must first understand Kant's new conception of metaphysics. Once we understand the Kantian project, we can begin to gain an understanding of the Kantian conception of the imagination. I concentrate on the imagination because, as we come to see, the imagination is the factor that displaces subjectivity. In order to come to the point where we can understand the displacing effect of the imagination within subjectivity, we must first understand the role of the imagination. The examination of the imagination in this chapter focuses on its empirical and anthropological function, as the 3 imagination appears in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. In the third chapter I examine Kant's conception of the imagination within the Critique of Pure Reason. I concentrate on the Kantian conception of the imagination because I am examining Heidegger's retrieval of the imagination in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. My particular focus is on Kant's presentation of the epistemic and ontological functions of the imagination. The investigation of the Kantian conception of the imagination in the second and third chapters has three purposes. First I examine Kant's understanding of the empirical employment of the imagination. This investigation takes place at the end of chapter two. The study of the imagination in the APP serves to establish a contrast between the empirical and transcendental employment of the imagination. Further, the examination of the imagination in the APP serves as a clue to Kant's consistency regarding the imagination in the CPR. Second I investigate the imagination in the first edition deduction of the CPR. This investigation occurs in the first part of chapter three. I must point out that the two deductions written by Kant share the same metaphysical deduction, and thus Kant changes only the transcendental deductions. In this section, the examination of the metaphysical deduction of the categories applies to the two transcendental deductions. After 4 examining the metaphysical deduction, I give the argument of 1 the A Deduction." Third I examine the place of the imagination in the second edition deduction. I have two purposes for examining the imagination in the B edition of the CPR. On the one hand, I want to see the differences between the two deductions. On the other hand, I want to show how the imagination does not lose its place of priority in Kant's ontology.