VERSUS Workshop 4 July 2019 — 1st Draft Yemen’s Salafi Network(s): Mortgaging the Country’s Future Thanos Petouris Introduction The takeover of the Yemeni capital Sanaʿa by the Huthi forces in September 2014 and their subsequent coup of February 2015 that led to the ousting of the incumbent president ʿAbd Rabbu Mansur Hadi and his government signify the beginning of the current Yemeni civil war. The restoration of president Hadi’s rule is also the ostensible primary aim of the direct military intervention by the Saudi and Emirati-led Arab coalition forces, which is also intent on defeating the Huthi movement. The rise of the Huthis, or Ansar Allah as they call themselves, has been inextricably linked with the rise and activities of Salafi activists in the northern Yemeni heartland of the Zaydi Shiʿa sect and has been depicted as a response, in part, both to the doctrinal challenge and social pressure exerted over the Zaydi community by Salafism.1 Since the beginning of the Yemeni civil war Salafi militiamen, either individually or as leaders of larger groups, have participated in numerous military operations mostly under the control of the Arab coalition forces.2 Their active involvement in the conflict marks a significant departure from the doctrinal tenets of Yemeni Salafism, which are generally characterised by a reluctance for participation in the politics of the land.3 Today, more than four years into the conflict, what can be termed as Yemen’s Salafi Network is conspicuous by its established presence both within local political movements (Southern Transitional Council; hereafter STC), and as part of coalition-led military units (Security Belt forces, local Elite forces, Giants Brigades etc). Independently of what this shift will mean for the development of the Salafi movement in Yemen, it is increasingly obvious that any future settlement among the warring parties will have to take into account the ideological and politico-military influence of Yemen’s Salafi elites. The aim of this study is therefore to map out the current configuration of the Salafi elite network(s) across the country, and especially in the southern provinces of Yemen. Although the Salafis of 1 Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Huthi Conflict (London: Hurst & Co., 2017), 99– 150. 2 For an overview of Salafi activities in the early stages of the conflict, see: Peter Salisbury, Yemen’s Southern Powder Keg (London: Chatham House, 2018). 3 Laurent Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and Religious Identity (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), 79– 107. [ 1" ] VERSUS Workshop 4 July 2019 — 1st Draft Yemen never constituted a monolithic, homogenous group of actors, since the beginning of the war new modes of fragmentation have appeared among them, mostly as a result of the political and military conditions that prevail in their particular areas of operation. With the use of social network analysis, this study will try to provide a comprehensive illustration of the current state of the Salafi network in Yemen, the extent of its influence and actual presence on the ground, and its links with regional actors that have interfered in the Yemeni civil war. Salafism in Yemen The beginnings of Yemeni engagement with the broader Salafi movement in the sense of Islamic spiritual renewal and religious reform can be traced back at least to the emergence of Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din as the spiritual leader of the Zaydi Imamate in the early 20th century.4 Less convincingly, colonial Aden’s modernising elites of the same period have also been connected to the reformist discourse of Salafism, albeit tentatively.5 This serves to show that in spite of its perceived geographical and political isolation, Yemeni society and especially its religious elites have always been in dialectical connection with contemporary Islamic thought beyond the confines of the country.6 Contemporary Yemeni Salafism is inextricably linked with the figure of Muqbil b. Hadi al-Wadi!i (d. 2001), a Zaydi from the area of Sa!da in the north-western highlands of Yemen.7 After two decades in Saudi Arabia, during which he studied at various institutes, al-Wadi!i was expelled for his alleged anti-Saudi government tendencies and returned to his native region. There, in the village of Dammaj he founded in 1980 his own Salafi school of learning, the Dar al-Hadith. Al- Wadi!i’s notable contribution to local and global Salafi discourse is his adherence to and development of what may be termed the “quietist” strand of Salafism. Indeed, both because of his personal charisma and local historical conditions, Yemen appears as an exception in the Arab World as the country where quietist Salafis have dominated local religious discourse.8 4 John Willis, Unmaking North and South: Cartographies of the Yemeni Past (London: Hurst & Co., 2012), 139– 157. 5 Scott Reese, “Salafi Transformations: Aden and the Changing Voices of Religious Reform in the Interwar Indian Ocean,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 44, no. 1 (2012): 71–92. 6 Alexander Knysh, “Contextualizing the Salafi–Sufi Conflict (From the Northern Caucasus to Hadramawt),” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 43, no. 4 (2007): 503–530. 7 Laurent Bonnefoy, “Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi!i: Founder of Salafism in Yemen,” in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 431–432. 8 Laurent Bonnefoy & Judit Kuschnitizki, “Salafis and the ‘Arab Spring’ in Yemen: Progressive Politicization and Resilient Quietism,” Arabian Humanities vol. 4 (2015). Available at: http://cy.revues.org/2811. [ 2" ] VERSUS Workshop 4 July 2019 — 1st Draft Simply put, the basic tenet of Wadi!i’s doctrine is for the faithful to refrain from hizbiyya, any occupation with worldly political affairs. It is furthermore exemplified by its rejection of the Zaydi concept of rising against a unjust ruler, in that it encourages loyalty to the existing leader.9 Of course, the rejection of political action and engagement with the affairs of the state has not meant the emergence of a completely depoliticised religious movement and the doctrine of quietism has often been contradicted by the very actions and pronouncements of its adherents, including its founder.10 Nonetheless, the Salafis’ apparent willingness to abstain from overt political action proved useful to the regime of president !Ali !Abdallah Salih. During his tenure, al-Wadi!i’ and his spiritual descendants were able to create and expand a network of Dar al-Hadith institutes in various parts of the country including in Ma#rib, Lahj (Fayush), Ta!izz, Ibb, Shihr and elsewhere. Salih’s ally and current vice-president of the country, Gen. !Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar is often cited as the connecting link between the regime and Salafis.11 However, there is a tendency to conflate his connections with groups of jihadi militias of former Afghan Arabs that actively participated in bringing back into the fold of unity the southern provinces of the country during the 1994 civil war and al- Wadi!i’s network. In any case, the rejection of political interference eventually translated into often explicit support for Salih’s regime and its actions, particularly against the insurgent Huthi movement that threatened the very existence of the Salafi school in Dammaj situated as it was in the middle of Yemen’s Zaydi heartland.12 Although the quietist doctrine was being challenged already during al-Wadi!i’s lifetime, it was seriously tested in the course of the youth uprisings that gripped the country and most of the Arab world during 2011. Thus, the need for coordination among the Salafi youth who participated in local protests across the country and their politicisation in the framework of the Yemeni ‘Arab Spring’ led to the establishment of the first Salafi political party in the country, the al-Rashad 9 For a comprehensive analysis of the doctrine, see: Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen, 86–90. 10 Laurent Bonnefoy, “L’Illusion Apolitique: Adaptations, Évolutions et Instrumentalisations du Salafisme Yéménite,” in Qu’est-ce que le Salafisme? ed. Bernard Rougier (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008), 144–148. 11 Ginny Hill, Yemen Endures: Civil War, Saudi Adventurism and the Future of Arabia (London: Hurst & Co., 2017), 189. 12 For ways in which Yemeni Salafis collaborated with Salih’s regime, see: Laurent Bonnefoy, “Violence in Contemporary Yemen: State, Society and Salafis,” The Muslim World vol. 101, no. 2 (2011): 340–343. [ 3" ] VERSUS Workshop 4 July 2019 — 1st Draft Union.13 A further significant stage in the development of Yemen’s Salafi movement constituted the descent of the Huthis to Sana!a as part of which they besieged the town and Salafi centre in Dammaj in late 2013. The fighting, which mobilised a significant number of local tribal elements in support of both sides, ended in the defeat and evacuation of the Salafis from Dammaj. President Hadi’s government found it difficult to relocate the community, which eventually dispersed either to the capital Sana!a, or to other Salafi institutes in the south of the country.14 Apart from being a significant setback, the experience of defeat by the Huthis also led to reinforcement of the quietist doctrine through the victimisation of its adherents at the hands of another Muslim sect.15 The subsequent Huthi/Salih offensive in March 2015 with the overthrow of the Hadi government and occupation of central and southern provinces of the country mobilised a significant number of former Dammaj Salafis. The ideological framing of their participation in the conflict on the side of governmental and Saudi-led coalition forces rests on the idea of support for the legitimate leader and the permissibility of recourse to defence in the face of attack.16 Equally, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have found it expedient to recruit local fighting forces from among Salafi actors whom they presumably consider loyal and effective.