Facilitated Learning Analysis Packer’s Cabin Serious Near Miss “I was afraid we were going to come back to burnt engines and tinfoil on the ground.” Helicopter Co-Pilot 1 Contents The Story .................................................................................................. 3 Packer's Cabin Timeline………………………………………………………………………..8 What Went Right ...................................................................................... 9 Lessons Learned By Participants ............................................................ 10 Areas of Further Inquiry…………………………………….……………………………….11 FLA Team Members…………………………………………………………..……………….15 Chetco Bar Fire Executive Summary………………….……………………………….16 To protect the privacy of the individuals involved in this incident, all names are fictional. Structure prep at Packer's Cabin. 2 The Story “Do you see any good deployment sites?” Engine Boss “Nothing is adequate for a deployment site.” Helicopter Pilot The situation deteriorated very quickly once the wind changed directions and ignited spots across the road. Everyone’s eyes were shedding tears and their lungs were burning due to the highly irritating tan oak smoke. Everything seemed fine until there was fire over the road in both directions. The engine and crew were cut off. The helicopter pilot said to get out of the area, but there were no good options for leaving. On July 12 a lightning started wildfire was reported in the Kalmiopsis Wilderness on the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest in Oregon. That fire was named the Chetco Bar Fire. Initial attack was unsuccessful due to steep terrain and dense foliage with no safety zones. Over the next month, the fire slowly grew while fire indices rose. The Forest requested and received severity money from the region to increase firefighter resource staffing in order to help with what looked like an intense fire season. One of the engines that filled the severity request was a Type 3 Department of Natural Resources (DNR) engine from the Midwest. Larry, the Engine Captain, reported having been out west many times fighting wildfires in various capacities. Once in Oregon, the DNR engine performed some initial attack and some extended attack on fires. On August 17 the DNR engine was part of a task force working on the Hope Mountain fire. Later that day the task force was asked to go help on the Chetco Bar fire. The Chetco Bar Incident Management Team (IMT) needed resources because the fire had experienced several days of significant “The fire was moving at a pace growth (see Progression Map). that we cannot comprehend.” The Task Force Leader trainee [TFLD(t)] Ted, was a local and familiar with the area as well as the Chetco Bar fire, so he led the resources into their assignment. That afternoon they were able to get a briefing and put in a few hours work prepping and installing sprinklers around Packer’s Cabin for a planned burn out the next day. Resources on the task force were impressed with the structure prep supplies that the DNR engine carried as well as their ability and willingness to get work done. Task force leadership reported that they felt like the DNR engine had good fire knowledge and background. On August 18 the task force consisted of TFLD(t) Ted, a fully qualified TFLD (Neal), the DNR engine, two other type 3 engines, and a Wildland Fire Module. The plan for the day as discussed at the morning briefing was to complete the prep work at Packer’s Cabin and then burn out near the cabin in order to create a burned buffer so when the main fire hit the area it Scouting the future burn out. would not burn the cabin. After the cabin preparation was complete there was another briefing to review the plan. The plan was for the Wildland Fire Module to burn the south side of the 1917 road, starting from the main fire edge a little over one mile east of the cabin (burning from East to West), and then burn around the cabin (see FLA Navigation Map). There was also a dozer line from the Biscuit fire that ran to the north off of the 1917 road. The plan was to keep the fire east of the dozer line. Fuel models in the vicinity included mature timber (at the start of the burn operation), tall shrubs (wax leaf ceanothus) near the dozer line in the middle, and grass in the meadow around the cabin. Due to the narrow road, Ted and Neal decided that only the DNR 3 engine would follow the burners and catch spots if they started. The other two engines would wait at the cabin in case they were needed. Two of the DNR engine’s five crew members were used as drivers ahead of the burners. In this very steep country with dense foliage and tall trees, there was no good place for a lookout that could see the whole operation. The escape route was to drive down the 1917 road to the southwest and away from the fire. All resources were in favor of the plan and felt that it would succeed. “I don’t know what we would have done different.” After a test fire, ignitions began around 10:30 am. Winds The first lighter in the burnout off of road 1917. were favorable with gusts up to 10 mph blowing downhill and away from the 1917 road. Neal, a highly experienced and highly regarded Type 1 Burn Boss, was in charge of firing operations and Ted was in charge of the holding forces. Around 11:40, as the inversion lifted the winds shifted to uphill. Larry notified everyone over the radio that the wind had shifted and then he reported the first spot fire across the 1917 road and on the west side of the dozer line. Ted assigned a heavy helicopter to Larry to work the spot and cautioned him to “not get too committed” to the spot fire. Ted wanted them to be mobile so they could easily disengage if fire behavior threatened their safety. Larry had the helicopter drop several times on the spot. Ted reiterated to Larry to not “over commit to the spot fire.” To keep the engine mobile, Larry didn’t deploy hose, he kept the crew close, and focused on using the helicopter to work the spot fire. Larry said he felt good and they were in a good spot. Then Larry and everyone at “It got hot fast and things the cabin could hear a distinct roar coming up the hill from south of the 1917 road. It was changed rapidly.” then evident to Larry that their egress to the cabin was cut off by the fire streaming across the 1917 road west of them. The helicopter came in for another drop on the spot fire but could not drop because they “It could have been worse could not see it through all the smoke. They dropped on the road ahead of if people didn’t stay calm.” them instead hoping that it would cool the road for the DNR engine to drive out. At 12:30 Larry calmly “It’s getting real skinny back here.” asked the helicopter if they could see any good deployment sites and the pilot said that “Nothing is adequate for a deployment site. You need to get out.” At 12:37 Neal radioed Larry and instructed him to drive east down the 1917 road to where the burning operation started because there was a previously burned area that would be safe from the fire. Larry had been on the Twisp River fire that took the lives of three engine crew members as they tried to drive out of an area when the wind shifted and the fire ran at them. The two year anniversary for the Twisp fatalities was on 8/19, the next day. Larry wanted to make sure that the same result did not happen to the DNR engine. Twisp kept running through his mind, but he did not mention it to his crew members because he did not want them to worry. Larry acted quickly with the knowledge of where he could safely take his “That was the longest crew. He loaded up his two crew members just as the smoke lifted enough The burnout increases inten intensity. minutes of my life.” for them to see the road, and they drove through “a tunnel of fire” to make it safely to the area of black to the east. At 12:40 as they drove into the black, Larry radioed that they were safe in the previously burned area, there was no engine damage and no one was injured. Everyone cheered and breathed a sigh of relief that they were safe. Ted said that those “ten minutes felt like two hours.” Larry decided they would stay there for a while and let things cool down. 4 During this time the rest of the task force had stopped burning and was standing by at Packer’s Cabin. Ted had a flat tire on his truck. He had some people change the tire while he was on the radio with Larry. This event is notable because they did not feel that it was urgent to get the tire changed based on the fire behavior they were seeing. They did not feel threatened by the fire and felt safe where they were. Once the DNR engine was safe the remaining resources completed the burn out around Packer’s Cabin and then left for base camp. The DNR engine spent several hours in the black. At 17:30 the fire calmed down and they were able to drive to Packer’s Cabin after bucking one log out of the road. They stayed the night at the cabin because the road below the cabin was impacted by fire.