Truth, Grounding & Dependence Stenwall, Robin 2015 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Stenwall, R. (2015). Truth, Grounding & Dependence. Lund University. 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LUND UNIVERSITY PO Box 117 221 00 Lund +46 46-222 00 00 Truth, Grounding & Dependence Robin Stenwall DOCTORAL DISSERTATION By due permission of the Faculty of Humanities, Lund University, Sweden. To be defended at the Department of Philosophy, LUX: B237, 2015-05-28, at 10:00. Faculty opponent Professor Helen Beebee, University of Manchester Lund University Department of Philosophy Document name: DOCTORAL DISSERTATION LUND UNIVERSITY Date of issue Author(s) Robin Stenwall Sponsoring organization Title: Truth, Grounding & Dependence Abstract The subjects of this thesis are (as indicated by the title) truth, grounding and dependence. The thesis consists of an introduction and five free-standing essays. The purpose of the introduction is not merely to summarize the papers, but to provide a general background to the discussions in the essays. The introduction is divided into four chapters, each of which splits into a number of sections and/or subsections. Chapter 1. concerns the notion of ontological dependence. I start by making a distinction between two different types of ontological dependence and discuss how well these notions deal with a number of philosophical issues. I then go on to consider the role that ontological dependence plays in hierarchies of natural kinds. In Chapter 2., I discuss a related notion, namely that of grounding. I sketch the theoretical framework by specifying the logical form of grounding statements and a set of structural principles that govern grounding. The chapter ends with a brief discussion on some philosophical applica- tions of grounding. Chapter 3. deals with the notion of truthmaking and how it squares with the grounding frame- work developed in the previous chapter. I present the reader with the so-called Truthmaker Principle, and provide answers to a number of questions that it raises. The fourth and final chapter summarizes the five papers. The six essays are thematically divided into three categories. Paper I deals with the notion of ontological dependence in hierarchies of natural kinds. Paper II concerns the notion of grounding and resemblance orderings among powers. Papers III, IV and V discuss various aspects of truthmaker theory. Key words: Truthmaking, Grounding, Ontological dependence, Propositions, Necessitarianism, Natural Kinds Classification system and/or index terms (if any) Supplementary bibliographical information Language: English ISSN and key title ISBN: 978-91-87833- 30-4 Recipient’s notes Number of pages 182 Price Security classification I, the undersigned, being the copyright owner of the abstract of the above-mentioned dissertation, hereby grant to all reference sourcespermission to publish and disseminate the abstract of the above-mentioned dissertation. Signature Date 2015-04-15 Truth, Grounding & Dependence Robin Stenwall Copyright Robin Stenwall 2015 Department of Philosophy, Lund University ISBN 978-91-87833-30-4 Printed in Sweden by Media-Tryck, Lund University Lund 2015 Contents List of Papers 7 Acknowledgements 9 Preamble 11 1. Ontological Dependence 13 1.1. Dependent Entities 14 1.1.1. Existential Dependence 14 1.1.2. Essential Dependence 17 1.2. Ontological Dependence between Natural Kinds 19 2. Grounding 23 2.1. The Logical Form of Grounding Statements 27 2.2. The Structural Principles Governing Grounding 30 2.3. Philosophical Applications of Grounding 36 2.3.1. Non-reductive Physicalism 36 2.3.2. Intrinsic Properties 38 2.3.3. Aristotelian Ontology 38 3. Truthmaking 41 3.1. (Q1) What Motivates the Truthmaker Principle? 41 3.1.1. The Truthmaker Principle in Action 43 3.1.2. Grounding Truth without Truthmakers? 46 3.1.3. Rodriguez-Pereyra on Why We Need Truthmakers 48 3.2. (Q2) What is it for a Proposition to be Made True? 51 3.2.1. Some Attempts at Analyzing (TM-G) in Modal Terms 53 3.2.2. Essentialism 59 3.3. (Q3) Does the Truthmaker Principle Cover all Truths? 60 3.3.1. Why Truthmaker Maximalism? 61 3.3.2. Grounding and Entailment 62 3.3.3. Grounds for General Truths 65 3.3.4. Grounds for Negative Truths 67 3.3.5. Grounding Truth in Causal Facts 70 4. Summary of the Papers 79 4.1. Paper I, “Aspect Kinds” 79 4.2. Paper II, “Nomological Resemblance” 80 4.3. Paper III, “Causal Truthmaking” 80 4.4. Paper IV, “Against Truthmaker Necessitarianism” 81 4.5. Paper V, “Truthmaker Internalism and the Mind-Dependence of Propositions” 81 References 83 List of Papers I. “Aspect Kinds” Robin Stenwall Originally published in Persson, J & Ylikoski, P. (ed.) Rethinking Expla- nation. Series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 252 (2007), pp. 193-203. II. “Nomological Resemblance” Robin Stenwall Originally published in Metaphysica 14 (2013), pp. 31-46. III. “Causal Truthmaking” Robin Stenwall Originally published in Metaphysica 11 (2010), pp. 211-22. IV. “Against Truthmaker Necessitarianism” Robin Stenwall Accepted for publication in Logique et Analyse. V. “Truthmaker Internalism and the Mind-Dependence of Propositions” Robin Stenwall Submitted manuscript. Papers I, II and III are reprinted with the permission of Springer Science+Business Media. Paper IV is printed with the kind permission of the editors of Logique et Ana- lyse. 7 Acknowledgements This work would not have been possible without the help, constructive criticism and patience of my supervisor, Johannes Persson. He is the main source of inspiration behind this work. I am also indebted to my assistant supervisor, Nils-Eric Sahlin for letting me use his lively intellect as a sounding board during our “mini-mini semi- nars”. A special thanks goes to Anna-Sofia Maurin for her helpful (and sometimes devastating) comments, and in particular, for her belief in me. She is, without a shad- ow of a doubt, one of the most independent and coolest persons I know. Throughout my PhD studies I have benefited from the comments offered by my colleagues, both at and outside of the Department of Philosophy in Lund. I am par- ticularly grateful to David Alm, Staffan Angere, David Armstrong, Helen Beebee, Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis, Sebastian Enqvist, Daniel Giberman, Bengt Hansson, Tobias Hansson Wahlberg, Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson, Ingvar Johansson, Martin Jöns- son, Stephen Mumford, Erik Olsson, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Paul Robinson, Stefan Schubert, Matti Sintonen, Andras Szigeti and Lena Wahlberg for their insightfulness. I would also like to thank some of the other staff members at the department that, although (or rather, because) their philosophical contributions were limited, helped me to stay sane. These are Agneta Ahlberg, Henrik Andersson, Anna Cagnan Enhörn- ing, Fredrik Eriksson, Ylva von Gerber, Åsa Harvard, Jana Holsanova, Mats Johans- son, Jonas Josefsson, Petter Kallioinen, Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup, Andreas Lind, Marja- Liisa Parkkinen Sjögren, Carlo Proietti, Eva Sjöstrand, Daniel Svensson, Ann Tobin, Frank Zenker and Anna Östberg. Ingar Brinck deserves special mentioning for her willingness to discuss my theo- ries in depth and for her advice on how to write a good paper. She did this on her spare time, for which I am forever grateful. Last but not least, I would like to thank my friends and family with special ku- dos to my parents for monetary support, as well as to Linnea Lindberg, Kajutan, Fyrverkeriministeriet, Bastugänget, Mässingshornet and the Blues Scooter Club for allowing me to blow off steam. My indebtedness to them is colossal. Most of all I am indebted to my beautiful wife Heidi Nilsson and our two fantastic children, Yrsa and Ville, for their support at times when I felt the darkness closing in on me. I could not dedicate this work to anyone else but them. Lund, March 2015 9 Preamble The thesis is a contemporary investigation into matters concerning ontological dependence, grounding and truthmaking. Those who were expecting an opin- ionated sketch of the central notions will have to wait. The preamble is dedi- cated to a brief comment on one of the aims of the thesis, as well as a presup- position. C. B. Martin once wrote that: My aim is to make do with things, properties and relations that make up and are the constituents of situations or states of affairs, all of which would be first-order (1996: 60). Although not easily argued for, I agree with many Australian-minded philosophers that this is the optimal position in ontology. Like Martin and Armstrong I am a fac- tualist in that I believe in the existence of facts or states of affairs where these are un- derstood as things having properties and/or standing in relations. I also agree with Martin that we should strive towards an ontology that is only committed to facts of the first-order. Simply put, we should only commit ourselves to states of affairs that do not have states of affairs as constituents. Armstrong, however, begs to differ.