University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Open Access Dissertations 2-2011 Pyrrhonian and Naturalistic Themes in the Final Writings of Wittgenstein Indrani Bhattacharjee University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Bhattacharjee, Indrani, "Pyrrhonian and Naturalistic Themes in the Final Writings of Wittgenstein" (2011). Open Access Dissertations. 325. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations/325 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open Access Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. PYRRHONIAN AND NATURALISTIC THEMES IN THE FINAL WRITINGS OF WITTGENSTEIN A Dissertation Presented by INDRANI BHATTACHARJEE Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY February 2011 Philosophy © Copyright by Indrani Bhattacharjee 2011 All Rights Reserved PYRRHONIAN AND NATURALISTIC THEMES IN THE FINAL WRITINGS OF WITTGENSTEIN A Dissertation Presented by INDRANI BHATTACHARJEE Approved as to style and content by: _______________________________________ Hilary Kornblith, Chair _______________________________________ Lynne Baker, Member _______________________________________ Jay L. Garfield, Member _______________________________________ Banu Subramaniam, Member ____________________________________ Hilary Kornblith, Department Head Philosophy DEDICATION To my parents ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my advisor, Hilary Kornblith, for his patient advice and guidance through the years. I am also grateful to Jay Garfield, whose generous help proved indispensable at all stages of this project, and to Lynne Baker, whose encouragement and helpful suggestions have made this a better project than it might have been. Thanks to Banu Subramaniam, my fourth committee member, for kindnesses too numerous to mention. Special thanks to Elisabeta Sarca for many hours of helpful conversation, and for her friendship and support. Finally, thanks are due to Eileen O’Neill for “chatting about Hume” with me, and for her warm encouragement since the inception of the project. v ABSTRACT PYRRHONIAN AND NATURALISTIC THEMES IN THE FINAL WRITINGS OF WITTGENSTEIN FEBRUARY 2011 INDRANI BHATTACHARJEE, B.A., BOMBAY UNIVERSITY M.A., PUNE UNIVERSITY Ph.D., JADAVPUR UNIVERSITY Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Directed by: Professor Hilary Kornblith The following inquiry pursues two interlinked aims. The first is to understand Wittgenstein’s idea of non-foundational certainty in the context of a reading of On Certainty that emphasizes its Pyrrhonian elements. The second is to read Wittgenstein’s remarks on idealism/radical skepticism in On Certainty in parallel with the discussion of rule-following in Philosophical Investigations in order to demonstrate an underlying similarity of philosophical concerns and methods. I argue that for the later Wittgenstein, what is held certain in a given context of inquiry or action is a locally transcendental condition of the inquiry or action in question. In On Certainty , Wittgenstein’s analysis of the difference between knowledge and certainty forms the basis of his critique of both Moore’s “Proof” and radical skepticism. This critique takes the shape of rejection of a presupposition shared by both parties, and utilizes what I identify as a Pyrrhonian-style argument against opposed dogmatic views. Wittgenstein’s method in this text involves describing epistemic language-games. I demonstrate that this is consistent with the vi rejection of epistemological theorizing, arguing that a Wittgensteinian “picture” is not a theory, but an impressionistic description that accomplishes two things: (i) throwing into relief problems with dogmatic theories and their presuppositions, and (ii) describing the provenance of linguistic and epistemic practices in terms of norms grounded in convention. Convention, in turn, is not arbitrary, but grounded in the biological and social natures of human beings—in what Wittgenstein calls forms of life. Thus there is a kind of naturalism in the work of the later Wittgenstein. It is a naturalism that comes neatly dovetailed with Pyrrhonism—a combination of strategies traceable to Hume’s work in the Treatise . I read Hume as someone who develops the Pyrrhonian method to include philosophy done “in a careless manner,” and argue that Wittgenstein adopts a similar method in his later works. Finally, I explain the deference to convention in the work of both Hume and Wittgenstein by reference to a passage in Sextus’ Outlines , on which I provide a gloss in the final chapter of this work. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................v ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... vi CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................1 1.1 Two Texts and an Orientation............................................................................1 1.2 Outline of the Dissertation .................................................................................9 2. A READING OF ON CERTAINTY ...............................................................................14 2.1. Introducing On Certainty . ...............................................................................14 2.1.1 Wittgenstein on Moore’s Refutation of Idealism ..............................15 2.1.2. Moore By Way of Kripke ..................................................................23 2.2 Hinge propositions ...........................................................................................33 2.2.1. Hinges and Sayability ......................................................................35 2.2.2 Distinguishing Knowledge and Certainty .........................................43 2.2.3. Rational Thought, Common Sense and Special Contexts of Inquiry ..................................................................................................49 2.3 Foundations, Webs and the Question of Wittgenstein’s Epistemology ...........52 2.3.1 Foundationalism versus the Groundlessness of Belief .....................52 2.3.2. Concluding Remarks ........................................................................63 3. HUME ON THE ORDINARY BELIEF IN EXTERNAL THINGS .............................64 3.1 A Global Humean Hinge .................................................................................64 3.1.1 A Reading of Treatise 1.4.2 ...............................................................65 3.1.2 Some Analogies .................................................................................80 3.2 A Further Historical Connection ......................................................................85 3.2.1 The Pyrrhonist’s Epoch ē Again ........................................................85 3.2.2 Concluding Remarks .........................................................................90 4. THE TREATMENT OF NORMATIVITY IN PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS .............................................................................................................95 4.1 Preliminary Materials.......................................................................................97 4.1.1 A Humean Analogy ...........................................................................97 viii 4.1.2 Forms of Life: A First Pass .............................................................110 4.1.3 First Interlude: A Note on “Pictures” and Depicting ....................115 4.2 Linguistic Normativity ...................................................................................122 4.2.1 PI §§198 and 201 ............................................................................122 4.2.2 Second Interlude: Wittgensteinian Explanations ............................128 4.2.3 The Communitarian View ...............................................................133 4.2.4 Forms of Life Again ........................................................................139 4.3 Concluding Remarks ......................................................................................144 5. KNOWLEDGE, NORMS AND METHOD: REFLECTIONS ON THE META- EPISTEMOLOGY OF ON CERTAINTY ........................................................................145 5.1 On Naturalism and Transcendental Questions: A Brief Historical Survey ............................................................................................................145 5.1.1 A Second Humean Analogy .............................................................147 5.1.2 Transcendental Concerns in Kant and Wittgenstein ......................153 5.2 A Social Naturalist View of Epistemic Norms ..............................................158 5.2.1 A Passing Note on the Selective Advantages of Norm- Governed Behavior ............................................................................158 5.2.2 Wittgenstein on Epistemic Norms ...................................................162 5.3 Concluding Remarks: A Descriptive Approach to Explanations in Philosophy......................................................................................................175