Emory International Law Review Volume 28 Issue 1 2014 Religion and Constitutionalism: Lessons from American and Islamic Constitutionalism Nimer Sultany Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr Recommended Citation Nimer Sultany, Religion and Constitutionalism: Lessons from American and Islamic Constitutionalism, 28 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 345 (2014). Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol28/iss1/9 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Emory International Law Review by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SULTANY GALLEYSPROOFS 7/10/2014 11:14 AM RELIGION AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN AND ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM ∗ Nimer Sultany ABSTRACT This Article examines the role of religious law in constitutionalism by focusing on Egypt and Tunisia as two main case studies: Egypt is an example of the so-called “Islamic constitutionalism” and Tunisia is an example of a more secular variety. Both cases are analyzed against the backdrop of U.S. constitutional theory and law. I begin by rejecting conceptualist approaches which focus on abstract concepts in order to assess the compatibility of religion, like Islam, with democracy. I show the futility of this kind of debate through a comparison to American debates between “living constitutionalists” and “originalists.” I then elaborate a pragmatic account that assesses the consequences of different institutional arrangements. For that purpose Part I rejects the normative and political-realist arguments supporting the constitutionalization of religion, according to which constitutionalization of religion in a largely-liberal constitution is either an ideal compromise or a historical dictate. I focus on four assumptions that underlie these arguments: that popular acceptance requires Islamic constitutionalism; that people’s identity includes religious law and should be reflected in Islamic constitutionalism; that Islamic law’s indeterminacy belittles the possible risks of its constitutionalization; and that the legal order’s transparency requires an acknowledgment of the religious aspect. Part II considers two of the primary arguments supporting the U.S. Establishment Clause: alienation; political division and distraction; and corruption of religion. The first two arguments have been subjected to growing critiques in the United States. I defend these two arguments by connecting between alienation and internal effects within religious minorities, and ∗ Lecturer, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. SJD (Harvard Law School); LL.M. (University of Virginia); LL.M. (Tel Aviv University); LL.B. (College of Management). I thank Frank Michelman, Mark Tushnet, Duncan Kennedy, Janet Halley, Mohammad Fadel, and Noah Feldman for helpful comments on previous drafts. I presented a version of this Article in the faculty workshops at Harvard Law School, SUNY Buffalo Law School, and SOAS Law School and benefited from discussions there. I wrote the bulk of this Article during my fellowship at the Baldy Center for Law & Social Policy at Buffalo Law School and I am grateful for their support. SULTANY GALLEYSPROOFS 7/10/2014 11:14 AM 346 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 between political division and instability and violence. Specifically, I argue that, first, the constitutionalization of religion is likely to produce an unequal status for religious groups given the pluralist conditions in Egypt and Tunisia. Second, constitutionalization is likely to polarize and destabilize the political system in these states. Finally, this polarization happens for the wrong reasons and may produce bad effects: the dominance of the debate over the constitutionalization of religion may distract the citizenry in these states from addressing other socio-economic and political questions that are not necessarily reduced to concerns over religious law; constitutionalization is an anti-participatory move because it empowers few jurists to make decisions rather than collective decision-making; delegating controversial religious questions to the judiciary is a form of secular escapism; and a constitutionalization of religion is part of a constitutional fetishism which— along with judicial empowerment—unduly legalizes political questions. The implication of these effects is to neglect political responsibility. Thus, the Article ends with a call for a Weberian consequences-driven ethics of responsibility. This ethical stance, in turn, should be part and parcel of the recognition of value pluralism and the attempt to transform politics into an adversarial “agonistic pluralism.” By displacing the conceptualist debate, the Article seeks to avoid the generalizing tendency of conceptual debates; evade the unwarranted optimism of the normative argument; and reject the realist argument’s despondency and uncritical acceptance of reality. Additionally, the Article seeks to demystify Islamic constitutionalism by grounding the discussion in American constitutional debates. Finally, the Article argues against Islamic constitutionalism without falling prey to essentialism. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 348 A. Overview of the Argument .......................................................... 351 B. A Brief History of Religion and Constitutionalism in Egypt and Tunisia ................................................................................. 355 1. Egypt ..................................................................................... 355 2. Tunisia .................................................................................. 360 C. From Conceptualism to Pragmatism .......................................... 363 I. NORMATIVE AND PRUDENTIAL ARGUMENTS FOR ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM ......................................................................... 367 A. Legitimation by Popular Acceptance ......................................... 368 1. Popular Will? ....................................................................... 368 SULTANY GALLEYSPROOFS 7/10/2014 11:14 AM 2014] RELIGION AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 347 2. Synchronic vs. Diachronic ................................................... 372 3. Stability and Legitimacy ....................................................... 374 4. Short Constitutional Life Span? ........................................... 375 B. Reflecting the People’s Identity .................................................. 376 1. The Effects of Identity Politics .............................................. 376 2. Identity and the Constitution ................................................ 380 C. Indeterminacy of Shari’a Interpretation and Liberalization ...... 383 1. Limits of Judicial Legitimation ............................................. 385 2. Interpretive Authority ........................................................... 388 3. What’s the Rationale? .......................................................... 390 D. Transparency and Explicit Recognition: Lessons from the U.S.? ........................................................................................... 390 1. Religion in the U.S. ............................................................... 391 2. Transparency and Bargaining Power .................................. 392 II. NORMATIVE AND PRUDENTIAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM ......................................................................... 394 A. Alienation and Religious Equality .............................................. 395 1. Alienation ............................................................................. 395 2. The Dualist Effect of a Shar’ia Clause: The Case of the Coptic Minority .................................................................... 399 B. Political Considerations: Polarization and Backlash ................ 402 1. Polarization and Violence .................................................... 403 2. Polarization and Shari’a ...................................................... 405 C. Distraction and Fetishism .......................................................... 410 1. Distraction ............................................................................ 410 2. Anti-participatory Arrangement ........................................... 416 3. Secular Escapism ................................................................. 416 4. Constitutional Fetishism and Legalization ........................... 417 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 420 SULTANY GALLEYSPROOFS 7/10/2014 11:14 AM 348 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 INTRODUCTION Since the 2010 to 2011 uprisings, the Arab world has been in flux. The role of religion in politics and constitution-making, in particular, took center stage. The previously banned Islamist movements achieved impressive results in the electoral processes that followed the uprisings—except in Libya—and gained influential positions in the emerging political and constitutional order in Tunisia and Egypt.1 However, these movements’ rule encountered fierce opposition from state institutions and secular political forces. In Tunisia, the opposition demanded the dismissal of the Al-Nahda-led coalition government and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly