CHINA’S GROWING ROLE IN UN PEACEKEEPING Asia Report N°166 – 17 April 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................I I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. CHINA’S CHANGING ATTITUDE............................................................................... 3 A. PRE-1971: CONDEMNATION.........................................................................................................3 B. 1971-1980: OPPOSITION AND NON-PARTICIPATION.....................................................................4 C. 1981-1987: LIMITED SUPPORT.....................................................................................................5 D. 1988-2000: RISING PROFILE ........................................................................................................5 E. 2000-PRESENT: ACTIVE PARTICIPATION......................................................................................6 1. Troop contributions......................................................................................................................6 2. Financial contributions.................................................................................................................7 3. Global troop availability ..............................................................................................................8 4. Political support to peacekeeping ..............................................................................................10 III. MOTIVATIONS.............................................................................................................. 10 A. PROMOTING A MULTILATERAL AGENDA....................................................................................11 B. DESIRE TO BE SEEN AS A RESPONSIBLE POWER..........................................................................12 C. OPERATIONAL BENEFITS............................................................................................................14 D. PROTECTION OF CHINESE INTERESTS ABROAD...........................................................................15 E. ONE-CHINA POLICY...................................................................................................................17 IV. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL........................... 18 A. HOST COUNTRY CONSENT .........................................................................................................19 B. USE OF FORCE ONLY IN SELF-DEFENCE.....................................................................................22 C. INVOLVEMENT OF REGIONAL ACTORS .......................................................................................23 V. KEY AGENCIES IN CHINESE PEACEKEEPING ................................................... 25 A. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS..............................................................................................26 B. MAIN CONTRIBUTING AGENCIES ...............................................................................................27 1. People’s Liberation Army..........................................................................................................27 2. Police .........................................................................................................................................29 C. Constraints ...............................................................................................................................................30 VI. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................ 31 APPENDICES A. CHINESE CONTRIBUTIONS BY PEACEKEEPING MISSION ......................................................................35 B. CHINA’S TOTAL UN PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTIONS, 2003-2008 ......................................................36 C. CHINA’S UN PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL RANKING AMONG ALL UN MEMBER STATES ....................37 D. TOP TROOP CONTRIBUTORS TO UN PEACEKEEPING ........................................................................38 E. TOP 20 PROVIDERS OF ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UN PEACEKEEPING BUDGET ................39 F. WESTERN COUNTRIES’ CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 2000-2008” .............40 G. TROOPS DEPLOYED IN UN AND NON-UN OPERATIONS BY COUNTRIES WITH THE LARGEST MILITARIES AND P-5 COUNTRIES ........................................................................................41 H. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP.........................................................................................42 I. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA................................................................................43 J. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES................................................................................................45 Asia Report N°166 17 April 2009 CHINA’S GROWING ROLE IN UN PEACEKEEPING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Over the past twenty years China has become an active power – the “China threat” – by deploying military participant in UN peacekeeping, a development that personnel for peaceful ends. will benefit the international community. Beijing has the capacity to expand its contributions further and should While China’s expanded role in peacekeeping is wel- be encouraged to do so. China’s approach to peace- comed by the UN and many countries, there are some keeping has evolved considerably since it assumed its concerns. China’s support for problem regimes in the UN Security Council (UNSC) seat in 1971, when it developing world has fed suspicions that Chinese peace- rejected the entire concept of peacekeeping. Now, with keeping is primarily motivated by economic interests. over 2,000 peacekeepers serving in ten UN peacekeep- In fact, China’s economic and peacekeeping decision- ing operations worldwide, China’s motivations for sup- making tracks operate separately, and tensions between porting and participating in peacekeeping have led it the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), military and to adopt a case-by-case approach that balances those economic actors ensure that there is still no overall motivations against its traditional adherence to non- strategic approach to peacekeeping. Another concern intervention. This pragmatic policy shift paves the way is that in several cases, China has sent peacekeepers for China to provide much-needed personnel as well only after giving support to actors that aggravated the as political support and momentum for peacekeeping at situation. While true of all major powers, meaningful a time when both conflicts and peacekeeping operations political support for peacekeeping should involve a more are becoming more complex. China’s involvement also strategic approach to promoting stability earlier on. further binds it to the international system. At the same time, China’s relationships with difficult Demand for blue helmets far outpaces supply, and shows regimes may well benefit UN peacekeeping efforts. no sign of abating. Concurrent to the sharp increase in China can bring to the table valuable political capital peacekeeping missions since the end of the Cold War, and economic leverage, in some cases even encourag- Western countries have been withdrawing or reducing ing host countries to consent to peacekeeping operations, their commitments. While continuing to provide robust as seen in Sudan. The exposure China gains to conflict financial support to UN peacekeeping, they send far situations and to UN working methods through peace- fewer personnel. Although China’s financial support for keeping operations is also likely to encourage it to peacekeeping remains modest, it is now the second become more active in conflict resolution in the future. largest provider of peacekeepers among the five per- manent members of the UNSC. While it does not cur- Beijing is cautiously considering calls by the UN and rently provide combat troops, its provision of civilian many Western countries, including the U.S., UK, Can- police, military observers, engineering battalions and ada, Norway, France and Sweden, to increase its contri- medical units fills a key gap and is important to the bution to peacekeeping. While China benefits from its viability and success of UN peacekeeping operations. involvement in peacekeeping, particularly in terms of helping its military and police professionalise, train and China’s increasing role reflects changed foreign policy gain valuable field experience, there are several con- priorities as well as pragmatic considerations. Multi- straints on its capacity to do more. Although willing lateralism has become central to China’s efforts to to shoulder more of the responsibilities for international project its influence abroad, pursue its interests and peace and security, it worries about overstepping the cultivate its image as a “responsible great power”. boundary between responsible and threatening. There Participation in peacekeeping serves these ends as a are also practical difficulties in training personnel, relatively low-cost way of demonstrating commitment particularly in the necessary language skills. A further to the UN and to international peace and security. It limitation is the division along different branches of has also served to counter fears of China’s growing the Chinese government on the issue of peacekeeping and the extent of Chinese engagement. China’s