PAN-ALBANIANISM: HOW BIG A THREAT TO BALKAN STABILITY? 25 February 2004 Europe Report N°153 Tirana/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 A. THE BURDENS OF HISTORY...................................................................................................2 B. AFTER THE FALL: CHAOS AND NEW ASPIRATIONS................................................................4 II. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ANA......................................................................... 7 III. ALBANIA: THE VIEW FROM TIRANA.................................................................. 11 IV. KOSOVO: INTERNAL DIVISIONS ......................................................................... 14 V. MACEDONIA: SHOULD WE STAY OR SHOULD WE GO? ............................... 17 VI. MONTENEGRO, SOUTHERN SERBIA AND GREECE....................................... 20 A. ALL QUIET ON THE WESTERN FRONT?................................................................................20 B. THE PRESEVO VALLEY IN SOUTHERN SERBIA....................................................................22 C. THE GREEK QUESTION........................................................................................................24 VII. EMIGRES, IDENTITY AND THE POWER OF DEMOGRAPHICS ................... 25 A. THE DIASPORA: POLITICS AND CRIME.................................................................................25 B. THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSION .........................................................................................27 C. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION....................................................................................................28 D. CULTURAL LINKS ...............................................................................................................29 VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 31 APPENDICES A. MAP OF ALBANIA ...............................................................................................................33 B. GLOSSARY OF NAMES, ACRONYMS AND USEFUL TERMS ....................................................34 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................35 D. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS .................................................................................36 E. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................42 ICG Europe N°153 25 February 2004 PAN-ALBANIANISM: HOW BIG A THREAT TO BALKAN STABILITY? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Pan-Albanianism is seen by many observers as a The desire of the vast majority of Kosovo’s serious threat to Balkan stability. A century of population for independence is supported by most shifting borders has left ethnic Albanians scattered Albanians elsewhere in the Balkans. However an across Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and independent Kosovo is quite a different matter from a Greece. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the Greater Albania. The international community’s National Liberation Army (NLA) in Macedonia, and problem is to manage the process of dealing with other groups have all waged campaigns of violence Kosovo’s final status without destabilising its in support of enhanced rights for ethnic Albanians. neighbour. Where is the ceiling to their ambitions? In both Macedonia and the Presevo Valley of ICG’s research suggests that notions of pan- Southern Serbia, conflict was ended in 2001 by Albanianism are far more layered and complex than internationally brokered peace agreements, the usual broad brush characterisations of ethnic respectively the Ohrid Agreement and the Covic Albanians simply bent on achieving a greater Plan. While there is dissatisfaction with the pace of Albania or a greater Kosovo. It is instructive that implementation of these agreements, and with the both the KLA and NLA started to gain popular delivery of promised reforms, this has not yet support in Kosovo and Macedonia respectively at reached the point of crisis; the ANA’s attempts to precisely the time when they moved away from their capitalise on local discontents in Macedonia and initial pan-Albanian nationalist goals and Southern Serbia failed. Continued international concentrated on more rights for their own people. attention will be necessary to ensure that all sides The “Albanian National Army” (ANA) which deliver on their promises. Montenegrin Albanians, overtly advocated a “Greater Albania” agenda, never on the other hand, have thus far resisted any form managed to gain popular credibility. Violence in the of paramilitary activity. cause of a greater Albania, or of any shift of borders, is neither politically popular nor morally justified. The large Kosovo Albanian diaspora communities living in the United States, Germany and In Albania since the arrival of multiparty politics, Switzerland have played – and will continue to play poverty and internal political conflict have eclipsed – a key role in the current and future economic, any aspirations towards expanding the state’s social and political development of Kosovo, as well boundaries. Albania is more interested in developing as dictating military events on the ground. They cultural and economic ties with Kosovo, whilst could easily open up new fronts if they wish to keep maintaining separate statehood; and successive up the pressure on the numerous unresolved Albanian governments have opted for a strategic Albanian-related issues. For these reasons it would partnership with Macedonia as both aspire towards be advisable for the Albanian and Greek membership of NATO and the European Union. governments to try and settle the long-standing issue of the Chams displaced from Greece in 1945, before There remains a risk of conflict in Kosovo, where the it gets hijacked and exploited by extreme question of future status has not yet been resolved. nationalists, and the Chams’ legitimate grievances Pan-Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability? ICG Europe Report N°153, 25 February 2004 Page ii get lost in the struggle to further other national 7. Tighten customs controls along the causes. Administrative Boundary with Kosovo, and crack down on organised crime. In the long term, Albanian nationalism will be tamed by full implementation of internationally- To the Government of Montenegro: brokered agreements and respect for Albanians’ 8. Assist with the establishment of an Albanian- place in Macedonian, Serbian, and Montenegrin language teacher training college in Tuzi or society, together with consistent pressure on Ulcinj, in order to train future elementary and Albanian extremists and politicians who appeal to secondary school teachers. them. The process will be assisted by European integration - as the borders open between Albania To the Government of Greece: and its northern neighbours, and economic and educational opportunities increase across the 9. Take immediate measures to improve human region. Decentralising power in Macedonia, and rights for all Albanians resident in Greece. giving Kosovo conditional independence in return 10. Open negotiations on the restoration of Cham for an assurance from all the Albanian entities in property rights. the Balkans that the present borders of south- eastern Europe will remain unchanged, would also To Albanian Political Leaders throughout the help stabilise the situation. Balkans: 11. Speak out against extremist politicians and RECOMMENDATIONS violent groups which seek to undermine the peace agreements of the last five years. To the Government of Albania: To the International Community, particularly the European Union and its Member States: 1. Continue efforts to neutralise paramilitary groups and extremist politicians by cracking down on 12. Continue to insist on the implementation of the all illegal arms trafficking and hoarding of Ohrid Agreement and the Covic Plan. weapons in Albania and maintaining cooperation on law-enforcement with 13. Put firmer pressure on and increase assistance neighbouring states and the European Union. to the Albanian and neighbouring governments to crack down firmly on illegal trade and To UNMIK and KFOR: smuggling. 2. Intensify security efforts against organised 14. Facilitate the removal of obstacles to legal crime and political militants, in particular by inter-Albanian trade. securing Kosovo’s borders more effectively. 15. Ease the visa regime for residents of south- 3. Prepare for a peaceful, legal and democratically eastern Europe wanting to work in or visit the rooted process of resolving Kosovo’s final European Union. status, including if necessary a bar on Kosovo 16. Give a positive response to Macedonia’s uniting with Albania. application for membership of the European To the Government of Macedonia: Union, and encourage Albania’s aspirations to EU membership and both Albania’s and 4. Continue implementation of the Ohrid Macedonia’s aspirations to join NATO. Agreement, including security sector reforms 17. Continue monitoring the activities of and decentralisation. Albanian extremists, and the politicians who To the Government of Serbia: aid them. 5. Reconstruct the Coordination Body for Tirana/Brussels, 25 February 2004 Southern Serbia. 6. Rein in extremist elements in the security forces.