NOU-17-1993 16=26 UK MISSION _ 212 745 9332 P. 01/16 House of Commons Hansard Debates for 1 6 Nov 1 ... -V JW ftl Ittu pag? 2 of $ the introduction of a new class IB employers' national insurance contribution, so that treatment of contributions on payments and benefits to employees included in a pay-as-you-eam settlement agreement can be aligned with the tax treatment. Regulations to give effect to all those changes will be laid before both Houses in due course. Mr. Mackinlay: I concentrated on that reply with considerable vigour. May I ask the Minister what he will do about employers—such as P and O Stena, and Cable and Wireless-who have the practice of paying their employees offshore, thereby avoiding paying national insurance contributions? That practice is not only unfair but unpatriotic, Should it not be stopped, immediately, by legislation? What does he say? Mr. Timms: I am aware of the concerns expressed by hon. Friend, which we are closely examining. Iraq 3,30 pm The Prime Minister (Mr. Tony Blair): Madam Speaker, with your permission, I shall make a statement on the situation in Iraq. As the House will know, on Saturday I had authorised substantial military action as part of a joint US-UK strike against targets in Iraq. British Tornado fighter bombers were about to take to the air, and 1 had already spoken to the detachment commander to thank the detachment for its bravery and professionalism, when we received word that the Iraqis were telling the United Nations Secretary-General that they had backed down. I should like to explain to the House why we were ready to take such action, why we decided to stay our hand, and why we remain ready to strike if the Iraqis do not fully comply with their obligations. Let me first.put the events in context. Security Council resolution 687 of April 1991, containing the ceasefire terms for the Gulf war, obliged Iraq to accept the destruction of all its weapons of mass destruction and not to develop such weapons in the future. The United Nations Special Commission was established to oversee those processes, with the International Atomic Energy Agency. A further resolution required immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any places and records in Iraq that inspectors wished to inspect ; The seven years since then have been a constant struggle between Iraq and the weapons inspectors, who have been backed by the full authority of the UN. The inspectors themselves have been harassed and threatened. Iraq has deceived and concealed and lied at every turn. A deliberate mechanism to hide existing weapons and to develop new ones has been in place, involving organisations close to Saddam Hussein, particularly his Special Republican Guard. Despite all the obstruction, UN S COM and the IAEA have been remarkably successful in uncovering and destroying massive amounts of weaponry, particularly following the defection of Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, in. 1995. He was murdered on his return to Iraq the following year. UNSCOM has destroyed, for example, more than 38,000 chemical weapon munitions, 690 tonnes of chemical weapon agents and 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals. Furthermore, 48 Scud missiles have been destroyed, as has a biological weapons factory designed to produce up to 50,000 litres of anthrax, botulism toxin and other agents. Without the weapons inspectors, that deadly arsenal would have been available to Saddam Hussein to use against his. neighbours. Who can say with any confidence that he would not already have used it? Huge question marks remain, for example, over 610 tonnes of unaccounted-for precursor chemicals for the nerve gas VX; over imports of growth media capable of producing huge amounts of anthrax; and over missile warheads, particularly those designed for chemical and biological weapons, Iraq has http://www.parliamentme-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cml99798/cinhansrd/cm98n I/17/98.htm 17/11 '98 TUB 16:23 [TX/RX NO 5737] i]001 NOU-17-1998 16=29 UK MISSION 212 745 9332 P.02/16 House of Commons Hansard Debates for 16 Nov 1... Page 3 of 5 denied weaponising VX, but analysis of missile warhead fragments in a US laboratory showed traces of VX. Further tests were carried out in French and Swiss laboratories. A multinational group of experts concluded in late October that the original US tests were accurate, that the French laboratory UNCLASSIFIED LtJJLW II FAX LEADER United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations New York PO Box 5238 New York, NY 10150-5238 Telephone: (212) 745-9200 Facsimile: (212) 745-9316 Date: . From: Fax No: . Subject: Pages (including leader): ./.9,, Further Instructions/Details Please do not write below this line Sent at: Signature: 17/11 '98 TUB 16:23 [TX/RX NO 5737] @]002 NOU-17-193B 16=29 UK MISSION 212 745 9332 P.03/16 1 House of Commons Hansard Debates for 16 Nov 1... Page 4 of 5 comprehensive revieWj we and the Americans decided that if Saddam Hussein did not return to full compliance very quickly, we were ready to mount an air attack to reduce substantially Iraq's threat to its neighbours, in particular by degrading its weapons of mass destruction capability, and its ability to develop, control and deliver such weapons. We did not want a lengthy military build-up of the kind that there had been in February, or endless rhetorical warnings, but we did make it clear that if Iraq did not return to full compliance very quickly indeed, it would face a substantial military strike. A private warning was delivered directly to the Iraqi permanent representative at the UN on Thursday 12 November, giving no details about timing) but leaving no doubt about the scale of what was intended. Saturday afternoon, London time, was set for the start of the attack. I gave final authorisation that morning for the use of force. I did so with regret, and with a deep sense of responsibility. I saw no credible alternative. The UK's weight in the planned strike would have been substantial, including nearly 20 per cent, of the tactical bomber effort. Just over two hours before the attack was due to start, we received word that the Iraqis had told the United Nations Secretary-General that they were responding positively to a final letter of appeal which he had sent to them the previous night. We decided that the attack should be put on hold for 24 hours to give us a chance to study the details of the Iraqi response. The first Iraqi letter appeared to agree to resume co-operation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. It was described as unconditional by Iraqi spokesmen, but the full text of the letter, and in particular nine assurances that the Iraqis were seeking about the comprehensive review—they were listed in an annex-left that unclear. We and the Americans spelled out that that was unacceptable, and that there could be no question of any conditions. During the course of Saturday night and Sunday morning, the Iraqis offered a stream of further written and oral clarifications, making it clear that their compliance was unconditional, that the nine points were merely a wish-list, not conditions, that their decisions of August and October to withdraw co-operation had been formally rescinded, and that the weapons inspectors would be allowed to resume the full range of their activities in accordance with UN resolutions, without let or hindrance. I have placed the text of the Iraqi letters in the Library of the House. The clarifications, taken together, mean that Saddam Hussein has completely withdrawn his positions of August and October. No concessions of any kind were offered to him in exchange. There was no negotiation of any kind. Nor could there have been. Nor will there be in future. We do not take Iraqi words at face value. Long experience has taught us to do the opposite. However, we had asked for unconditional resumption of co-operation, and, in the face of the credible threat of force—in this case very imminent force—Iraq offered that resumption. In those circumstances, we and the Americans have suspended further military action while we bolt down every detail of what the Iraqis have said, and while we 16 Nov 199S : Column 610 test the words in practice. The Security Council decided last night that UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors should resume their work in Iraq immediately. They will be in Iraq tomorrow, and they must be afforded full co-operation in every respect. As ever, we do not rely on the good faith of Saddam Hussein. He has none. We know, however, that under threat of force, we can make him move. We will be watching with extreme care and a high degree of scepticism. Our forces remain in place and on high alert. We and the Americans remain ready, willing and able to go back to the use offeree at any time. There will be no further warnings. The inspectors will now carry out their work. http://www.parliament.me-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cml99798/cmhaiisrd/cm981116/d^text/SIl/17/98.htm 17/11 '98 TUB 16:23 [TX/RX NO 5737] @]003 NOU-17-199B 16:30 UK MISSION 212 745 9332 P.04/16 House of Commons Hansard Debates for 16 Nov 1... Page 5 of 5 There are in my view two substantial and fundamental differences between the Iraqi climbdown this time and the climbdown in February. First, there is now a very clear diplomatic basis for action without further need for long discussion in the Security Council or elsewhere.