Department of Social Sciences Intrastate Conflicts and International Humanitarian Intervention: Case Studies in Indonesia Mangadar Situmorang This thesis is presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Curtin University of Technology 20 December 2007 Declaration To the best of my knowledge and belief this thesis contains no material published by any other person except where due acknowledgement has been made. This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university. Signed : ……………………………. Date : ……………………………. Abstract The differences in the international responses to the violent conflicts in East Timor (1998–1999), Maluku (1999–2003) and Aceh (1998–2005) are examined in this research. Given the growing acceptance of the significance of the use of military force for humanitarian purposes, the humanitarian crises in Maluku and Aceh might prima facie have justified humanitarian intervention similar to that in East Timor. By analysing the differences from the Indonesia’s domestic political point of view it is clear that the conscience-shocking situation caused by the violent conflicts was not the compelling factor for the international community to militarily intervene. The deployment of a multinational force in East Timor (INTERFET) was decided only after the UN and foreign major countries believed that such military intervention would not jeopardize the ongoing process of democratization in Indonesia. This suggested that Indonesia’s domestic circumstance was central to whether a similar measure in Maluku and Aceh would take place or not. Due to the reformasi (political reform) in Indonesia within which the independence of East Timor took place, two main changes within Indonesian politics, namely the growing sentiment of anti-international intervention and the continuing democratization process, helped to ensure that humanitarian intervention in the two other regions did not happen. These two conditions were fortified by the increasingly consolidated democratic politics which brought the communal conflict in Maluku to the Malino Peace Agreement. The emergence of a stronger and democratic government in Indonesia, furthermore, made cooperation with the international community possible in seeking a peaceful resolution to the armed conflict in Aceh. By involving the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) agreed to the Helsinki peace agreement and accepted the role of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) to secure its implementation. Thus, a strong democratic government made an international military intervention for humanitarian purposes unnecessary. i Acknowledgement Humanitarian intervention has been a very controversial issue in international practices and studies. In Indonesia the controversy is not an exception. Politicians and scholars have been involved in various forums, but, as at the international level, the debates have never been concluded. Due to the developing environment, both in political and academic fields, the issue of military intervention for humanitarian purposes has not yet been investigated properly. Politicians tended to avoid talking about the issue because it is a very sensitive issue in regard to their nationalist sentiments. Scholars have not fully understood the issue and at the same time tended to subject it to national politics. Nevertheless, the possibility of violent internal conflict erupting remains high, while the national capability to resolve the conflict is still very limited. Internationally, globalization leads to interventionist tendency. These two conditions tend to keep the problem unresolved, while fear still exists about the future of Indonesia as a unitary state (in territorial and political terms) within this globalized world. This research emerged out of such a circumstance. And this research was made possible by the AusAID sponsorship and support from Parahyangan Catholic University. The completion of this research was also made possible by the generous assistance in one way and another from a number of individuals and institutions. All those who made this research to be carried out and completed deserve a great gratitude. My first thank goes to Professor Colin Brown, who guided this research from the very beginning until it comes to its present form. He carefully and tirelessly read and re-read all drafts. His academic advices helped me to see the strengths and the weaknesses of these drafts. His intellectual interest in not only Indonesian politics but also in Indonesian nation-statehood helped to construct the “Indonesian view” of the issue of humanitarian intervention. I would like to give thanks to Associate Professor Jim Ife who has helped me to see the issue of humanitarian intervention from the human rights point of views. However, before this research was completed, he had retired from Curtin University of Technology. I am indebted to many people in East Timor, Ambon and Banda Aceh who provided me with time and hospitality to gather as much information as possible during my fieldworks in the three trouble regions. Although for practical reasons their names cannot be put here, Marcelino Magno from Timor Leste Development Institute (TDI) and Edegar Concenciao from University of Dili helped me to meet with many influential figures in Dili. Unus Ukru and George Corputty from Baileo Network made my fieldwork in Ambon safe and productive. Working with NGO ii activists and journalists in Ambon was very helpful in providing access to different government officials and the security force officers. In Banda Aceh, Sofyan Hadi from Forum NGO – Aceh and Syafuddin Bantasam from Aceh Human Rights NGOs provided me invaluable assistance, enabling me to meet and to talk with many human rights activists, journalists, local politicians and former student activists. My gratitude also goes to all respondents in these three cities and in Jakarta. Thanks to Mr. Chris Walker, a professional editor, for proofreading a late draft of this thesis. My family – my wife Susana Ani Berliyanti and my three children Yasinta, Yoshua and Gratia – clearly deserve a very special thank. They allowed me to immerse myself in this challenging work, very often to the effect of neglecting them, particularly in approaching the deadline of completing this work. The result of this research is the result of their deep understanding. iii Contents Abstract i Acknowledgment ii Contents iv Glossaries and Abbreviations vii CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1 A. Research problems 1 B. The objective of the research 7 C. The significances of the research 8 D. The overview of the thesis 11 CHAPTER TWO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION A. Introduction 14 B. The international or push factors of humanitarian intervention 16 1. International moral and human hights 17 2. International politics 25 C. The domestic or pull factors of humanitarian intervention 36 1. Failed state 37 2. Intrastate conflicts 40 3. Humanitarian crisis 42 D. Framing the analysis 44 CHAPTER THREE INDONESIA: A WEAK NATION AND WEAKENING STATE A. Introduction 48 B. Political character of Indonesian nation-state 50 1. Javanese hegemony 50 2. Islamic dilemma 54 3. Authoritarianism 60 4. The military 64 C. The weakening government 69 D. Indonesia’s international context 72 E. Concluding notes 80 iv CHAPTER FOUR REFORMASI AND VIOLENT CONFLICT IN EAST TIMOR, MALUKU AND ACEH A. Introduction 82 B. Reformasi 83 1. The replacement of Suharto 83 2. Institutional reform: ABRI, Golkar and Korpri 85 3. National transformation 88 4. International issues 91 C. Reformasi and the political dynamics of internal conflict 92 D. Violent internal conflict in East Timor, Maluku and Aceh 95 1. East Timor and the popular consultation 96 2. Violent communal conflict in Maluku 105 3. The separatist movement in Aceh 112 E. Concluding notes 119 CHAPTER FIVE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AND THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN EAST TIMOR (INTERFET) A. Introduction 121 B. International justification of INTERFET 123 1. The conscience shocking situation: the threshold criterion 123 2. Precautionary criteria and right authority 129 C. Justifying INTERFET: Indonesia’s domestic context 136 1. The weak transitional government of President Habibie 137 2. The reluctance of ABRI 140 3. Political leaders and parties: fishing in trouble water 145 4. Popular politics: the silent majority 148 D. Humanitarian intervention without jeopardizing Indonesia’s democratization 152 E. Concluding notes 158 CHAPTER SIX HUMANITARIAN CRISES IN MALUKU AND ACEH: DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCE A. Introduction 160 B. Factors encouraging humanitarian intervention 161 C. Conflicts in Maluku and Aceh were different 167 1. Violence as triggered by democratization 167 2. The conflicts as Indonesia’s domestic affairs 170 3. Solutions to the conflicts had to be sought domestically 173 D. The changing political environment in Indonesia 176 1. Anti-international intervention sentiment 177 2. Ongoing process of democratization 181 E. Concluding notes 193 v CHAPTER SEVEN TOWARDS CONFLICT RESOLUTIONS: BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS A. Introduction 195 B. Domestic Solution to Maluku conflict 195 1. International encouragement 196 2. Malino Agreement 200 3. Post-Malino Agreement 203 4. Concluding notes 207 C. Towards Helsinki Peace Agreement on Aceh 208 1. International support and initial domestic efforts 209 2. Consolidated democratic government and the tsunami factor 218 3. The role of the CMI and the Helsinki Peace Agreement 223 4. Aceh