African swine fever in Italy: updated epidemiological situation Berlin 26.01.2011 F. Feliziani*, C. Patta** S. Rolesu**, D. Aloi**, A. Oggiano**, G. Puggioni**, G.M. De Mia*, ** Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale dell’Umbria e delle Marche, Perugia * Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale della Sardegna, Sassari, I Istituti Zooprofilattici Sperimentali National reference Laboratory ASF - CSF PSA Endemica area 2 ASF arrived in the south of Sardinia, probably by contaminated kitchen waste Despite the infection is still endemic, the virus never escapes from the island 3 Municipality of Sardinia and pig population density Pigs 248.356 H 17.744erds CapiPig suini density 7.000 - 22.700 (4) 1.000 - 7.000 (59) 200 - 1.000 (199) 1 - 200 (114) 4 Confined / free ranging Epidemiological evolution of ASF outbreaks Ancient Endemic Epidemic Ipo-endemic phase phase phase phase 300 248 250 198 200 145 150 88 100 57 65 outbreaks 32 50 23 30 21 11 11 11 12 0 9 3 10 0 4 06 09 003 1993 199 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2 2004 2005 20 2007 2008 20 2010 year 6 ASF - spatial distribution (1993-2009) n. outbreaks per municipality 7 Estimated population 25 000- 50 000 8 ASF IN WILD BOARS The infected areas are the following: Arzachena; Orgosolo; Urzulei; Montarbu-Aritzo; Nuxis. 9 According with the measures provided by Directive 2002/60/CE Red: PSA high risk area an HIGH RISK AREA was defined: Green: infected WB areas Main Risk factors: •Outbreaks in DP during the last 5 years •Outbreaks in WB during the last 2 years •Free ranging pigs out of legal control 10 Eradication plan activities High Risk zone: all pig farms were serologically controlled (max. 12 samples/farm/year) Other zones: New Accreditation farms ► 2 serological samples between 28-42 days; Annual confirmation ►1 serological sample once or twice /year serological survey in a randomized sample of “non accredited farms“ (at slaughterhouse) 11 Serosurveillance in the high risk zone 12 Serosurveillance at slaughterhouse 13 WILD BOAR SURVEILLANCE Hunting season 2009 -2010 2,835 samples collected within the 32 macroareas 13 serum + 2 virus + macroareas where sero + were found 14 CONCLUSIONS - 1 Epidemiological point of view: •There is an historical endemic area (high risk) identified as essential for viral persistence •The occurrence of primary outbreaks outside the high risk area is sporadic (no viral persistence) •At the moment there is the evidence of an ipo-endemic situation 15 CONCLUSIONS - 2 Spread and persistence of ASF in Sardinia are mainly due to: ILLEGALITY: free range of pigs in high risk area (low biosecurity level permits contacts with other pigs and wild boars) introduction of infected pigs from unknown sources uncontrolled movement of pigs feeding with infected waste food 16 CONCLUSIONS - 3 Wild boars role: •wild boar share their habitat with free-ranging pigs: contacts and crossbreeding between wild boar and domestic animals are likely •the wild boar role has not been so crucial in maintaining the disease (serological and virological surveillance) 17 CONCLUSIONS - 4 •2,987 herds and 171,471 pigs tested during the last 10 years •No seropositive animals at slaughterhouse in this period •Very low risk of ASFV transmission through meat and meat products 18 FINAL SUGGESTION: IN CASE OF ASF OUTBREAK THE FIRE IS THE BETTER METHOD FOR DISINFECTION Sardinian “PORCEDDDU” 19.