4 Y/S ST. AUGUSTINE AND AL-GHAZALI ON 'FREEWILL': A COMPARATIVE STUDY THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF ottor of i3biloopbp IN PHILOSOPHY BY SHAYAQA JAMAL Under the Supervision of PROF. JALALUL HAQ DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH (INDIA) 2009 T8955 Dedicated to My Parents ez f/-fus6ani (Khan Ahmad Zia) DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH-202002, INDIA v Dated_._._.........._...... Certificate This is to certify that the work presented in this thesis entitled "ST. AUGUSTINE AND AL-GI{AZAL1 ON 'FREE WILL': A COMPARATIVE STUDY" is the original piece of research work carried out by Ms. Shayaqa Jamal under my supervision and guidance and has not been submitted elsewhere for the award of any other degree. (Prof. Jalalul Haq) aunAl[ -iflC'ibn"l(Omn ti i<. r.,... iccn icci ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I take this opportunity to express my most sincere and heartfelt thanks to my supervisor, Prof. Jalalul Haq, former Chairman, Department of Philosophy, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. It would have not been possible to complete the work without his support and supervision. I must express my sincere thanks to Mr. Mohammad Muqeem, Chairman, Department of Philosophy, A.M.U. Aligarh, who encouraged me from time to time and gave valuable suggestions during the preparation of this work. I am also thankful to all the teachers of the department of Philosophy, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh for their cooperation. I may be failing in my duty if I do not express my deepest gratitude to my beloved parents. Without their blessing and prayers I would not have been able to complete this work or achieve anything. I am also thankful to my elder brothers Javed Akhtar, Mohsin Akhtar and Saqib Munis. My thanks are also due to my sister-in-law, Zarrin Akhtar and Azmi Akhtar whose affection and love have always been a source of inspiration. I am also thankful to my uncles Mr. Farhat Ali Khan and Mr. Masarrat Ali Khan. I am also thankful to my all in-laws particularly my husband Khan Ahmad Zia, my mother-in-law Mrs. Jamsheed Khanam, brother-in-law, Samad Ansar and sister-in-law, Tarannum Naz as without their moral support it would be difficult to complete this work. I must thank to my innocent daughter Fakeha Iram who for me became a source of encouragement. I must also be thankful to my landlord Mr. & Mrs. Saleem for their cooperation. I would like to thank all the non-teaching staff of my department for their help and co-operation, particularly Mukhtar Apa (Seminar Librarian), Dr. Anwar Saleem (Section Officer), Gulsher Bhai, Kafeel Bhai and Arif Bhai. I am also thankful to the Officers of ICPR Library (Butler Palace, Lucknow) and Maulana Azad Library (AMU, Aligarh). I also thank different departments of A.M.U. Aligarh for providing me materials for my research work. I am extremely thankful to all my colleagues and friends particularly Saba Iqbal, Razia Shahni and Nikhat Parveen. Also, in the end, I would like to express my thanks to my typist Mr. H.K. Sharma who has been instrumental in the production of the research manuscript. (SHAY QA JAMAL) SPECIAL THANKS TO ICPR, NEW DELHI I take this opportunity to express my huge indebtedness to Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi for awarding me J.R.F. for the academic years 2004-2006 which really enabled me to continue with my work without financial worries. I extend my sincere thanks to Prof. Ramakrishna Rao, Chairman, ICPR, Prof. Godabarisha Mishra, Member Secretary, Dr. Mercy Hellen, Director (P&R), Dr. Arun Mishra, Director (Academic) and all other staff of ICPR, New Delhi and Lucknow. CONTENTS Page Nos. Acknowledgement WI Chapter I Introduction 1-25 1. Voluntarism vs. Determinism 2. Arguments for Determinism 3. Arguments for Voluntarism Chapter II Problem of Free Will in Judaism, Christianity and Islam 26-71 1. Concept of Original Sin in Bible 2. Maimonides on Sin and Free Will 3. Spinoza on Will and Desire 4. Free-will in Christianity 5. Martin Luther and John Calvin on Free Will 6. William of Ockham on Free Will 7. John Duns Scotus on Free Will 8. Problem of Free Will in Islam 9. Rumi and Ibn Arabi on Free Will 10, Indian Sufis' Views on Free Will 11. Mohammad Igbal on Free Will Chapter III St. Augustine on Free Will 72-120 1. The Fall of Man and Free Will 2. Arguments for Free Will 3. God's Grace and Free Will Chapter IV AI-Ghazali on Free Will 121-172 1. Nature of Man 2. God's Will and Man's Will 3. Knowledge, Will and Power 4. Argument for Free Will 5. Will and Motive (Niyah) 6. Theory of Acquisition Chapter V Conclusion 173-191 Appendix I A Brief Life of St. Augustine 192-200 Appendix!! A Brief Life of AI-Gahzali 201-206 References 207-220 Selected Bibliography 221-225 Chapter — I INTRODUCTION 1. Voluntarism vs. Determinism Free-will and predestination are the central problems of many religions. These have been important concepts in philosophy of religion as well in the history of philosophy. There have been several theories pertaining to problem of free will, such as determinism, fatalism, voluntarism, predestinarianism and so on. Several questions arise in regard to this concept. The fundamental question pertains to morality but it also has bearing on one's view of religion as well as science. Is man a free agent ? Are his actions predetermined by mechanical laws by way of cause and effect relation? Is man responsible for his good and bad actions ? If it were so, then supremacy of almighty God would be in jeopardy. If, on the other hand, man were not free then there would be no responsibility on man and no justification to reward or punish him for those actions. But before we proceed with this discussion, we should first clear the meaning of the expression `freedom of will'. Broadly, we can understand the meaning of freedom of will in two senses. First one is "Free will as freedom of choice", meaning thereby that one does freely whatever he wants. One has power to choose to do anything and he would be responsible for his action. This type of freedom of will implies responsibility for one's action that he performs whether good or bad. Another meaning of `freedom' 2 is `absence of compulsion and constrain'. This means one acts willingly or voluntarily though in accordance with what is determined by God or some supreme power outside him. The first meaning of freedom of will contrasts with determinism but not the second. The second meaning of freedom of will is not opposed to causality but opposed to constraint or compulsion. Freedom of will is not understood as freedom of choice but as voluntary necessity. "....where freedom means the absence of compulsion, necessary acts determined by God none the less can be freely done".' That means God-determined action has been done willingly or voluntarily. We observe that this voluntary necessity has been maintained by most of predestinarian theologians. They hold that these predestined actions are performed by human being and they do involve responsibility, although man has no power to choose his action. This voluntary necessity has historically been common place in Augustinian and Calvinistic theology in Christianity as well as in Islamic theology. To some extent it is found even in materialistic determinism. Thomas Hobbes, for example, thought that necessary acts were entirely voluntary and therefore man was responsible for his action. Besides these two broadly distinct meanings of freedom we can understand freedom in many other ways. Some possible explanations are given here below. 3 We may, for example, speak of freedom that can be understood as regularity in nature. That means every event in this world is occurring in an overall framework of cause and effect relation and that everything is happening spontaneously. One can be said to be free when there is no compulsion and constraint upon him.2 "Freedom" in this sense can be said to be present even in nonorganic things insofar as they act and interact under a self-regulated law. The animals are also free in this sense because there is no external compulsion upon them. Similarly, a faint person who has lost altogether his consciousness, might be called unfree because he lacks physical freedom. But a person would still be said to be free when his action is continuously performed without external prevention. Physical freedom depends upon circumstances. If there is more constraint upon someone by circumstances, and one's action does not continue then there would be less room for freedom. Furthermore, on account of physical freedom we can say that there is no meaning of morality or responsibility. In another sense, `freedom' means "freedom to do as one pleases".3 According to this kind of freedom, if some one does not want to do something then no one can compel him to do that or if someone has desire to do a particular action then no one can stop him to do that particular action. This means freedom in this sense can be understood as lack of constraint. One can willingly do anything whatever he wants: no one can compel or order him to do or not to do something. One's freedom is inherent in his pleasure. This kind of freedom implies responsibility. If one's pleasure is in 4 doing good action then he gets reward and if one's pleasure or happiness is in doing bad action then he gets punishment.